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AbstractSince the heyday of cleavage voting in the 1960s and 1970s, the majority of studies presents evidence of a decline in cleavage voting – caused by either structural or behavioural dealignment. Structural dealignment denotes changes in group size responsible for a decrease in cleavage voting, whereas behavioural dealignment concerns weakening party–voter links over time. A third phenomenon posited in this article is the collective voting abstention of certain (social) groups, here referred to as 'political dealignment', which results in a new type of division of voting versus abstention. The purpose of this article is to examine the three underlying mechanisms for the decline in social class and religious cleavage voting across four Western countries (Great Britain, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the United States) over the last 40–60 years using longitudinal post‐election data. The results prove a strong presence of political dealignment and increasing turnout gaps regarding both the class and religious cleavage. Furthermore, whenever a decline in cleavage voting is present, it is mainly caused by changes in the social groups' behaviour and less by changing social structures in a country.

Since the heyday of cleavage voting in the 1960s and 1970s, the majority of studies presents evidence of a decline in cleavage voting – caused by either structural or behavioural dealignment. Structural dealignment denotes changes in group size responsible for a decrease in cleavage voting, whereas behavioural dealignment concerns weakening party–voter links over time. A third phenomenon posited in this article is the collective voting abstention of certain (social) groups, here referred to as 'political dealignment', which results in a new type of division of voting versus abstention. The purpose of this article is to examine the three underlying mechanisms for the decline in social class and religious cleavage voting across four Western countries (Great Britain, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the United States) over the last 40–60 years using longitudinal post‐election data. The results prove a strong presence of political dealignment and increasing turnout gaps regarding both the class and religious cleavage. Furthermore, whenever a decline in cleavage voting is present, it is mainly caused by changes in the social groups' behaviour and less by changing social structures in a country.

AbstractThe traditional cleavages like social class or religion are often reported to have lost explanatory power for the voting decision. Regarding the religious cleavage, the evidence is ambiguous depending on the choice of cases and indicators used. The present study tests the impact of religion for the preference to vote the Christian Democratic Party of Switzerland (CVP) using data from the 2007 and 2011 Swiss national elections. Additional to the inclusion of individual variables, a special focus lies on contextual effects. The estimated hierarchical linear models confirm a prevailing influence of the simple individual factors and the presence of a significant contextual effect. Statistical evidence is also presented for some of the supposed interaction effects between individual and contextual religious variables.

Abstract
If elections are to perform their legitimizing role, they should not only be objectively free, fair and non-fraudulent, but should also be perceived by the public as such. This paper investigates who perceives elections to be fair and why by contrasting two main logics: one based on the idea that perceptions of election integrity arise from external cues voters get from their environment and a second logic claiming that perceptions are internally created based on attitudes and beliefs. We use original survey data collected in ten countries around the European Elections 2019. We find that perceptions of election fairness are unrelated to country levels of integrity but mainly relate to voters' status as winners/losers of the elections, attachment to the institutions they elect and populist attitudes. We also find beliefs on fake news influence to weakly mediate the relation between populist attitudes and perceptions of election fairness.

Abstract
In the current media landscape, it is becoming increasingly difficult for citizens to rely on trustworthy information, not least because reliable facts are mixed with dubious claims, unsubstantiated opinions, or outright lies. The ability to distinguish factual from other types of mediated information is becoming increasingly crucial, but we know little about how well-equipped citizens are to make these distinctions. In an original survey study conducted in ten European countries, we asked respondents whether they considered six different statements relating to the European Union to be factual or opinion statements. Our results show that citizens have considerable difficulties in correctly identifying both factual information and opinions. Next to pre-existing judgements, we identify media-related, political, and sociodemographic factors that influence categorisation accuracy. We discuss our findings in relation to citizens' perceptions of journalistic credibility and their information literacy as well as ongoing debates about the effectiveness of fact-checkers on social media.

AbstractElectoral participation research points to political interest as a strong and consistent predictor of voting, but overlooks the propensity of interested people to overreport in surveys. Vote validation studies demonstrate that vote overreporting exaggerates the association between political interest and turnout, but fails to highlight the pathways through which this bias occurs. To fill this gap and link these two strands of literature, we take a closer look at the relationships between political interest, likelihood of voting (as defined by one's actual voting record), and participation in given vote, while taking care of overreporting. Applying causal mediation models to a unique set of validated vote data, we show that themodus operandiof overreporting is both direct and indirect: A portion of politically interested people overreport their vote regardless of whether they usually vote or not. Yet, the indirect path also matters: Another portion of interested people do vote frequently, which prompts them to overreport if they for once abstain. This is consequential for the commonly found association between political interest and turnout.

Electoral participation research points to political interest as a strong and consistent predictor of voting, but overlooks the propensity of interested people to overreport in surveys. Vote validation studies demonstrate that vote overreporting exaggerates the association between political interest and turnout, but fails to highlight the pathways through which this bias occurs. To fill this gap and link these two strands of literature, we take a closer look at the relationships between political interest, likelihood of voting (as defined by one's actual voting record), and participation in given vote, while taking care of overreporting. Applying causal mediation models to a unique set of validated vote data, we show that the modus operandi of overreporting is both direct and indirect: A portion of politically interested people overreport their vote regardless of whether they usually vote or not. Yet, the indirect path also matters: Another portion of interested people do vote frequently, which prompts them to overreport if they for once abstain. This is consequential for the commonly found association between political interest and turnout.

AbstractIn the context of an ever growing importance and usage of referendums around the globe, this article provides a comprehensive approach to analyse the determinants of participation in direct democratic votes. In the absence of conclusive empirical evidence about which factors drive direct democratic participation, studies tend to adopt election‐specific findings and assume the determinants of electoral turnout to equally apply for referendums. Yet, a strict empirical test of these numerous determinants in a referendum context is still missing. By examining aspects stemming from both election‐specific and referendum‐specific contexts, this article aims to first test the applicability of common electoral theories of turnout for direct democratic participation and second to analyse the relevance of each factor when simultaneously examined with other contextual and individual factors. This holistic approach represents reality as adequate as possible, that is, to consider various factors that may simultaneously influence the individual decision to vote. Next to individual variables, the analysis particularly focuses on two contextual levels, the community a person lives in and factors linked to a given referendum. The discussion and joint analysis of competing factors addresses the problem of underspecified turnout models, which commonly prevents a detailed assessment of the relative importance of the determinants of turnout. The study uses registered data from the canton of Geneva, Switzerland, which provides official information about individual participation across 43 referendums in 45 communities. We match this individual data with referendum‐related factors, such as campaign intensity and importance of the issues at stake, and community‐level variables, such as wealth and urbanization. The results of our multilevel, cross‐classified models show significant context‐related effects, stemming mainly from the referendum and less from the community level. Still, the main driver of direct democratic participation is individual determinants, in particular citizens' past participation record.

Abstract
The share of voters participating in national elections from abroad is evergrowing. Despite this, expatriates constitute one of the most understudied groups of electors. Some existing analyses have shown that expatriates support different parties than voters residing at home. However, the reasons for this effect remain in the dark. In this article, we test common electoral theories—socio-structural, socio-psychological, and issue voting—and their relevance for voters at home and abroad. Additionally, we test if differences in voting behaviour are due to compositional or behavioural reasons. In line with previous studies, we show that expatriates support other parties, in the Swiss case left parties, than voters at home. We further show that this gap cannot be explained by the different composition of the expatriate community but rather by their different behavioural motivations. Expatriates more often base their vote choice on their social class and religious beliefs. Partisanship voting and, to some extent, issue voting are less important in the expatriate community. The findings are based on the Swiss National Election Study 2011 and additional interviews conducted among Swiss residing abroad.

Abstract
This article assesses whether—and to what extent—turnout bias in postelection surveys is reduced by adding a short nonresponse follow-up (NRFU) survey to a mixed-mode survey. Specifically, we examine how the NRFU survey influences response propensities across demographic groups and political factors and whether this affects data quality. We use a rich dataset on validated voter turnout data, collected across two different ballots. In addition to the main survey that comprises computer-assisted telephone interviews (CATI) and web respondents, both studies include a short follow-up mail survey for nonrespondents. The results demonstrate that collecting extra information from additional respondents on so-called "central" questions is worth the effort. In both studies, the NRFU survey substantially increases representativeness with respect to sociodemographic and participation variables. In particular, voters and politically active citizens are more accurately represented in the NRFU survey. This tends to result in better estimates of turnout determinants in the final (combined) sample than is seen from CATI/web respondents only. Moreover, the increase in response rate and the decrease in nonresponse bias comes at almost no price in terms of measurement errors. Vote overreporting is only slightly higher in the mail follow-up survey than in the main CATI/web survey.