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Introduction: The debate -- Deliberation -- Internalism versus externalism -- Advantages of internalism: a modified humeanism -- Reasons and rationality -- Reasons defined -- Rationality: the information requirement -- Rationality: the coherence requirement -- Emotions, desires, and reasons -- Emotions and desires -- Desires, depression, and rationality -- Desires and reasons -- The externalist's examples -- Learning reasons for desires -- Prudence -- Moral motivation -- A different approach and a last ditch reply -- The case against objective value -- Objective value and motivation -- The impartial and impersonal perspectives -- Pleasures and pains -- Good and meaningful lives -- Conclusion

As a preliminary to the justification of equal opportunity, we require a few words on the concept. An opportunity is a chance to attain some goal or obtain some benefit. More precisely, it is the lack of some obstacle or obstacles to the attainment of some goal(s) or benefit(s). Opportunities are equal in some specified or understood sense when persons face roughly the same obstacles or obstacles of roughly the same difficulty of some specified or understood sort. In different contexts we might have different sorts of benefits or obstacles in mind. But in the current social context, and in the context of this discussion, we refer to educational and occupational opportunities, chances to attain the benefits of higher education and of socially and economically desirable positions, benefits assumed to be desired by many or most individuals, other things being equal. And we generally divide obstacles into two broad classes: those imposed by the social system or by other persons in the society, for example, the hardships of life in the lower economic classes or barriers from prejudices based on race, sex, or ethnic background; and those imposed by natural disabilities, for example, low intelligence or lack of talents.The initial question is whether a moral society is obligated to create equality in opportunities in the senses just defined. I shall assume here initially that there is some such obligation on the part of society or the state, although I shall specify its nature and limits more precisely below. With the exception of certain libertarians, almost everyone, liberal and conservative alike, agrees in this assumption.

Punitive institutions appear to be at the same time required & unjustified morally. This arises from a conflict between utilitarian & retributive approaches to the issue. A position is advanced combining theses from both viewpoints. The retributivist thesis is advanced that a person who has violated others' rights cannot reasonably complain of comparable violations of his own rights. However, this does not actively justify punishment, but only removes a barrier to it. A utilitarian thesis is that the justification for punitive institutions is deterrence; however, the problem is that, to be a strong enough deterrent, punishment must be worse than the acts punished. Arguments for the legitimacy of disproportionate punishment are examined & found flawed. Nor does it appear practical to lower the severity of punishments to a level of proportionality with acts punished. W. H. Stoddard.

Analysis of the concept of sex is necessary to understand the relation of sex to such other societal functions as morality & social regulation. Analytic philosophy is the means to this end. A conceptual or reflective equilibrium is sought to extricate the concept of sex from cultural, moral, & superstitious superstructures which surround & confound it. The inadequacies of recent philosophical writings are examined; their basic fault is misrepresentation of sex. "Means-end analysis" is especially criticized on these grounds, in this view external goals & purposes are imputed to sexual activity giving rise of a false view of sex in its relation to deviance & perversion. This type of analysis stems from Platonic-Christian moral tradition. Two articles are particularly discussed: (1) R. Solomon's "Sex and Perversion" (in Philosophy and Sex, Baker, R., & Elliston, F. [Eds], Buffalo: Prometheus, 1975) & T. Nagel's "Sexual Perversion" (The Journal of Philosophy, 1969, 66, 1, 16 Jan), Plain sex is merely the desire for physical bodily contact directed at a specific person & the pleasure derived thereof, & is obtained through sexual activity. Such generality in definition serves to classify sexual & nonsexual activity accurately & does not result in over-stressing orgasm as a goal of sexual activity. This type of analysis contains no moral or value implications, although a concept of sexual perversion is suggested. This perversion consists of deviation from the norm, (desire for physical contact). If the form of desire perverts this basic function, it is a sexual abnormality. C. Grindle.

Attempts to achieve the stated aims of affirmative action programs through establishment of goals &/or quotas for an entire minority group have: (1) discriminated in reverse against those least responsible for past situations, (2) benefited those least affected by past discrimination, & (3) benefited single individuals in the name of a group. Justified goals & mechanisms of valid compensation include: (A) elimination of discrimination in areas relevant to determining/achieving competence, (B) reverse discrimination for those who previously experienced job discrimination, (C) remedial programs or 'handicapping' for those discriminated against at lower levels, & (D) reverse discrimination for the chronically- deprived if such does not cause severe deprivation for others. Affirmative action should seek to redress through: (a) establishing & advertising objective merit criteria, (b) an administrative complaint & enforcement agency, (c) remedial & child-care programs, (d) active recruitment of minority members, & (e) a neutral government official overseeing recruitment & hiring procedures. Modified Author's Summary.