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The introduction of multiparty competition around the world following the Cold War raises the specter of rising civil violence during election periods in emerging democracies and hybrid regimes. Yet there are also plausible theoretical reasons to expect dropping civil violence around elections in these states or, alternatively, no significant change in the level of such conflict. This article tests these hypotheses in Africa with the aid of event data on the daily rate of civil violence incidents (1997–2013). It asks if civil violence in that region is more frequent, less frequent or constant during election cycles compared to other times. To guard against definitional and data selection problems encountered in some prior cross-national studies of elections and use of force, the research design emphasizes the relative risk of social conflict at the national level. The analysis suggests three distinct patterns in Africa. Given countrywide norms, election periods in most countries run the same relative risk of a day with violent events as do non-election periods. A subset of African countries exists, however, with more civil violence during elections when judged against the national reference line for conflict. There is a smaller group of countries where the risk of electoral civil violence is comparatively low. While caution should be exercised in interpreting the findings, the policy implication is that no general reason exists to preclude or defer elections in Africa as a way to minimize social conflict associated with political campaigns, although there may be specific reasons to do so in particular countries.

Competitive, but imperfectly democratic elections have become the predominant mode for selecting political leaders around the globe, even in very poor countries. Such elections are often projected to spark struggles for power by unsanctioned means, yet there has not been a corresponding rise in coups, assassinations, or the onset of civil wars for central control. Using updated datasets on various aspects of political competition over the past 50 years, this article looks carefully at the historical record. Contested elections in low-income nations are associated with the timing of irregular, violent efforts to seize or influence political leadership, but do not correlate with a greater number of such events.

AbstractA growing movement commends a targeted business‐oriented approach as the best chance to reduce global poverty. It offers the promise of dual returns—empowerment for the world's neediest citizens and earned income for investors in pro‐poor ventures at the same time. This appealing vision may underplay the importance of multi‐stakeholder collaboration to make it work. There is no unambiguous free‐standing business paradigm for helping the poor better themselves. A review of previously documented cases shows the market‐oriented approach can reach low‐income and socially excluded households, but the payoff usually depends on cross‐sector subsidies from non‐profit or government organizations. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

ABSTRACTPolitical violence in sub-Saharan Africa is down. The number of military dictatorships and one-party states is also down. Are the two trends related? Conventional democratic peace theory says the answer is yes, because the relationship between democracy and peace is linear and positive. A revisionist view, however, raises questions. The majority of Africa's new regimes are not full democracies but mixed regimes that some studies find to have the greatest propensity to violent behaviour. Using statistical analysis of a trichotomous classification of African regimes from 1960 to 2008, this article suggests that neither argument fits the facts. Autocracies and partial democracies in this region appear to have similar exposure to conflict, with both types of systems suffering more conflict than full democracies. Variables other than regime type appear to be the driving forces behind these trends.