Suchergebnisse

Under President Lukashenko, three Belarusian national security strategies have been announced: the first in 1995, the second in 2001 and the third in 2011. The first proposal, formulated after Lukashenko' victory in the presidential elections in 1994, outlined Belarus as a neutral state, unbound to any military block in the absence of external enemies. The direction of the foreign policy pursued by the president of Belarus was reflected in the second strategy, where security against NATO and EU member states was sought in a federal state with the Russian Federation. Under the third national security scheme Belarus was to remain in Russia's military security system. Nevertheless, an important security factor was considered to be the modernisation of the economy with foreign capital participation and the need to diversify the supplies of fuels, thus reducing the country's dependence on its earlier partner. The subsequently issued documents: the military doctrine of the State, whose assumptions were published on 20 July 2016, and the Concept of security of the Belarusian state borders for the period 2018–2022, prioritised further development of relations with the Russian Federation and the member states of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation. A new element of the 2019 defence plan is the prevention of external aggression and internal disturbance that contribute to the destabilisation of the state.

Azerbaijan has a population of more than 10 million, of which women accounted for 50% in 2020. At the same time, 93% of Azerbaijan's citizens describe themselves as Muslims. Since the beginning of independence, Azerbaijan has been a secular state by virtue of Article 48 of the Constitution, which guarantees the freedom of worship, choice, or nonpractice of religion and the freedom of expression of one's own views on religion. This article aims to assess the changes in the self-employment of women in Azerbaijan through a deductive analysis of data and observation of changes in the structure of resources based on generally available macroeconomic data. This study focuses on the situation of women on the Azerbaijani labour market over the two decades of the 21st century. The numbers of economically active women, including those in employment and the unemployed, and economically inactive women are specified. Further, the government's legal and financial policy in respect of women's self-employment is analysed. The author determines what percentage of companies were set up by women and in which sectors and locations.

Целью статьи являлсяподсчёт количества иммигрантов, которые прибыли в Польшуиз Украины на временное проживаниев 2004–2017 г.г., а также предоставление характеристикиих занятости. Исследовательская гипотеза статьи (чем больше было возможностей найту работув Польше, тем больше украинцев приезжало в эту страну) была проверена посредством нахождения ответов на следующие вопросы: на каких юридических основах граждане Украины могли приезжать в Польшу на временное проживание; сколько украинцев приехало в Польшу легально за период 2004–2017 г.г. на временное проживание; чем они занимались в Польшe; на каких условиях и какого типа работу выполняли чаще всегограждане Украиныв Польше; кем работали чаще всего украинские студенты в Польше? В ходе анализа материалов было определено, что количество приезжающих в Польшу на временное проживание граждан Украиныв 2004–2016 г.г. постоянно увеличивалось. Более чем 1/3 этой группы составляли студенты, начинающие обучение в польских вузах. Чаще всего граждане Украины приезжали в Польшу в поисках работы. Значительная их часть предварительно получила разрешение на работу. Количество предприятий, заинтересованных трудоустройством украинцев, с каждым годом росло. Граждане Украины чаще всего работали квалифицированными работникaмиили разнорабочими. Менее многочисленной была группаработниковна руководящих должностях и лиц, являющихся членами правления фирм. Небольшое количество украинцев работало в юридической и медицинской сфере. По статистикe Воеводского Управления Занятости в Варшаве подтверждается, что легально украинцы работали в областях: сельского хозяйства, в переробатывающей промышленности, в строительстве, в транспорте и прискладировании, а также в услугах. Почти половина украинцев работала на основании договора на конкретную работу, на многоменьше ихработало на основании договора-поручения, а только одна десятая часть – на основании трудового договора. Вторую группу работников из Украины составляли лица, работающие нелегально. Польские работодатели сравнительно часто трудоустраивали украинцев нелегально, поскольку в этом случае не платили высокой ставки обязательного социального страхования, а размер штрафа за нелегальное трудоустройство был сравнительно низкий. Специфической группой работающих лиц являлись студенты из Украины. Больше половины студентов выполняло разовую работуили подрабатывала.

During the independence period, the Ukrainian government has published two energy security strategies. The first strategy was adopted in 2006 and the second one in 2016. Both documents provided a similar definition of energy security. The aims of the first strategy, covering the period 2006–2030, were the restructuring of the fuel and energy complex using new technologies, increase of energy efficiency and ensuring market prices of energy generation and sale. The second strategy was much more extensive and envisaged the implementation of changes in three stages until 2035. The changes proposed in the document are reasonable from the point of view of Ukraine's energy security. The strategy does not take an explicit position on decarbonisation, although it provides for the modernisation of power plants and closure of unprofitable mines. Some of the goals of the Ukrainian energy sector were only roughly outlined and therefore need elaboration and clear indication of how they would be achieved. The aim of this article is to analyse the reforms and measures provided for in Ukraine's strategies designed to ensure the country's energy security. The research hypothesis is as follows: The reforms envisaged in the strategies can effectively contribute to ensuring the state's energy security. To test this hypothesis, the author formulated the following research questions: 1. How did the two energy strategies define security?; 2. Which elements of energy policy were considered to be the most important in the first strategy document?; 3. What energy security components are listed in the second strategy document?; 4. Were the measures specified in the first and second strategies capable of ensuring the energy security of Ukraine? The applied research methods were the following: literature research, comparison method and content analysis.

Until the 2015 elections, youth policy in Poland was treated as a separate domain. There is no uniform legal basis concerned with the matters of young people. Youth rights are dealt with in several articles of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland as well as a number of Acts: on Public Administration Branches, on the Education System, on Higher Education, on Employment Promotion and Labour Market Institutions, on NFZ General Health Insurance, on Combating Domestic Violence, on Social Employment, on Public Benefit Organisations and Voluntary Service, along with the Labour Code and certain government regulations. The first consistent document concerned with youth issues was the National strategy for young people for 2003–2014, adopted in 2003. Thereafter, the matters of youth policy were discussed in the report entitled Youth 2011, the document Poland 2030 – Third Wave of Modernity, the Long-Term National Development Strategy, and the Government Program for Social Activity of Youth for the years 2015–2016. Following the 2015 parliamentary elections, youth issues were given a lower priority. In the election manifesto of PIS (Law and Justice party), much attention was devoted to family policy, with youth policy being regarded as part thereof. Consequently, on 13 February 2018, the Family, Senior and Social Policy Committee of the Senate of the Republic of Poland adopted a Resolution on "Integrated youth policy", presenting it as one of the areas of family policy.KEYWORDS: youth, youth policy, Polish legations, polish document programme Law and Justice Party.JEL CODES: I1, H1.DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.15181/rfds.v27i1.1865

Przeciwdziałaniu nielegalnej emigracji do państw Unii Europejskiej służą akty prawa unijnego i krajowego. Do najważniejszych unijnych aktów prawa należy zaliczyć: traktat o funkcjonowaniu Unii Europejskiej, program "Otwarta i bezpieczna Europa: realizacja założeń" oraz dyrektywy w sprawie przeciwdziałania nielegalnej migracji. Do polskich aktów prawnych należą ustawy: o cudzoziemcach, o udzielaniu cudzoziemcom ochrony na terytorium Rzeczypospolitej, o wjeździe, pobycie i wyjeździe z terytorium Polski, o promocji zatrudnienia i rynku pracy, o skutkach powierzania pracy cudzoziemcom nielegalnie przebywającym na terytorium Polski, ustawa o straży granicznej. Nielegalni migranci mogli wjechać do Polski przez sześć granicznych przejść osobowych na odcinku granicy polsko-rosyjskiej. W latach 2004–2016 liczba zatrzymanych na zewnętrznej granicy UE wzrosła, a spadła na odcinku granicy polsko-rosyjskiej. Liczba zatrzymanych na zewnętrznej granicy UE za przekroczenie granicy państwowej wbrew przepisom lub usiłowanie przekroczenia utrzymywała się na stałym poziomie. Wzrosła w 2008 r. po wejściu w życie traktatu z S chengen, a następnie w 2014 r. w związku z migracjami z Ukrainy na początku konfliktu rosyjsko-ukraińskiego. Analiza narodowości osób zatrzymanych na granicy polsko-rosyjskiej wykazała, iż zatrzymani to głównie obywatele rosyjskiej i czeczeńskiej narodowości. Liczba osób wydalonych z Polski przez zewnętrzną granicę UE w latach 2004–2014 spadła. Od kryzysu ukraińsko-rosyjskiego do końca badanego okresu wzrosła w związku z kryzysem migracyjnym. Liczba osób przekazanych przez granicę polsko-rosyjską była niewielka i w 2004 r. wyniosła 60, tj. 1,07% ogółu. Na granicy polsko-rosyjskiej w latach 2004–2016 w Polsce przyjęto nieliczne osoby, oznacza to iż, procedura przyjęć była realizowana na pozostałych częściach granicy zewnętrznej Unii Europejskiej.

Abstract: Counteracting the development of illegal immigration to the European Union countries serves European and national legal acts. The most important EU acts include the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the program "Open and Safe Europe: the realization of the assumptions" and the Directive on combating illegal migration. The Polish legal acts include the Act on aliens, granting protection to foreigners within the territory of the Republic of Poland, the entry, stay and departure from Poland, the promotion of employment and the labor market, the consequences of entrusting work to aliens illegally staying in Poland, Border Guard Act. Illegal migrants could enter Poland through six border crossing points on the Polish-Russian border. Between 2004 and 2016, the number of detainees on the Union's external border increased and fell on the Polish-Russian border. The number of detainees at the external border of the European Union for crossing state borders contrary to regulations or attempted crossing remained at a stable level. It increased in 2008 after the entry into force of the Schengen Treaty and then in 2014, in connection with the migration from Ukraine at the beginning of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. Analysis of the nationality of detainees on the Polish-Russian border showed that the detainees were mainly Russian and Chechen nationals. The number of people who were expelled from Poland by the Union's external borders in the years 2004–2014 has fallen. From the Ukrainian-Russian crisis until the end of the period underreview, it grew due to the migration crisis. The number of persons transferred across the Polish-Russian border was small and in 2004, it amounted to 60 (it meant 1.1% of the total). At the Polish-Russian border in 2004–2016, few people were admitted to Poland, which means that the admission procedure had being carried out on the rest of the European Union's external border. ; Przeciwdziałaniu nielegalnej emigracji do państw Unii Europejskiej służą akty prawa unijnego i krajowego. Do najważniejszych unijnych aktów prawa należy zaliczyć: traktat o funkcjonowaniu Unii Europejskiej, program "Otwarta i bezpieczna Europa: realizacja założeń" oraz dyrektywy w sprawie przeciwdziałania nielegalnej migracji. Do polskich aktów prawnych należą ustawy: o cudzoziemcach, o udzielaniu cudzoziemcom ochrony na terytorium Rzeczypospolitej, o wjeździe, pobycie i wyjeździe z terytorium Polski, o promocji zatrudnienia i rynku pracy, o skutkach powierzania pracy cudzoziemcom nielegalnie przebywającym na terytorium Polski, ustawa o straży granicznej. Nielegalni migranci mogli wjechać do Polski przez sześć granicznych przejść osobowych na odcinku granicy polsko-rosyjskiej. W latach 2004–2016 liczba zatrzymanych na zewnętrznej granicy UE wzrosła, a spadła na odcinku granicy polsko-rosyjskiej. Liczba zatrzymanych na zewnętrznej granicy UE za przekroczenie granicy państwowej wbrew przepisom lub usiłowanie przekroczenia utrzymywała się na stałym poziomie. Wzrosła w 2008 r. po wejściu w życie traktatu z S chengen, a następnie w 2014 r. w związku z migracjami z Ukrainy na początku konfliktu rosyjsko-ukraińskiego. Analiza narodowości osób zatrzymanych na granicy polsko-rosyjskiej wykazała, iż zatrzymani to głównie obywatele rosyjskiej i czeczeńskiej narodowości. Liczba osób wydalonych z Polski przez zewnętrzną granicę UE w latach 2004–2014 spadła. Od kryzysu ukraińsko-rosyjskiego do końca badanego okresu wzrosła w związku z kryzysem migracyjnym. Liczba osób przekazanych przez granicę polsko-rosyjską była niewielka i w 2004 r. wyniosła 60, tj. 1,07% ogółu. Na granicy polsko-rosyjskiej w latach 2004–2016 w Polsce przyjęto nieliczne osoby, oznacza to iż, procedura przyjęć była realizowana na pozostałych częściach granicy zewnętrznej Unii Europejskiej.

Since the early 1990s, the European Union has been supporting socio-economic transformations in the former Soviet Union states, including the Russian Federation. Initially, this assistance was provided in the framework of the TACIS Programme, offering long-term, non-repayable aid. In 1991–2006 Russia received EUR 2.7bn for the restructuring of the state enterprise sector, establishment of private companies, state administration reform, telecommunications, nuclear safety and security and environmental protection. Despite severe criticism directed at the implemented programme, emphasising its unclear objectives, lack of awareness of the conditions in which the projects were executed, prolonged completion periods for some projects and lack of evaluation, the European Union continued its financial assistance to Russia since 2007 as part of the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument. The funds available for the programme were earmarked to support political, economic and social reforms, and regional and local development through programmes implemented in two time perspectives: 2007–2013 and 2014–2020. Evaluation of the programmes implemented in 2007–2013 revealed numerous shortcomings in project execution. For example, projects implemented as part of the Arctic Circle-Russia Programme were criticised for weak objectives and only partial completion of some undertakings. Another programme – Karelia–Russia failed to create a joint vision of the region and develop joint investment plans. The issues indicated as barriers to cooperation between the Russian Federation and Finland included: complicated administrative procedures in Russia and poor command of the English language on the Russian side. No evaluation report was prepared on completion of the South-East Finland–Russia Programme and Lithuania–Poland–Russia Programme. Furthermore, the objectives of the Estonia–Latvia–Russia Programme were not accomplished. Nevertheless, the European Union decided to continue the assistance to the Russian Federation in 2014–2020 as part of the following programmes: Arctic Circle–Russia, Karelia–Russia and South-East Finland–Russia and to launch four new programmes: Estonia–Russia, Latvia–Russia, Poland–Russia and Lithuania–Russia.

Since the dissolution of the USSR, students from Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova have been able to study at Polish universities on the basis of bilateral agreements between the Polish government and the governments of the respective countries. The purpose of this article is to analyse the legal basis enabling the citizens of these three countries to obtain education in Poland, analyse the numbers of such students and the principles and procedures they followed to begin studies at Polish universities in 1993–2014. The research hypothesis is as follows: the range of scholarships offered has contributed to an increase in the number of students from Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova at Polish universities. The following research methods were used in this study: analysis of source materials, comparative analysis and statistical data analysis. Analysis of data for the relevant period demonstrated a systematic year-to-year increase in the number of citizens of these three countries arriving to study in Poland. The largest group of students arrived from Ukraine and the smallest – from Moldova. In 1997, the largest share of students of Polish descent was among the students from Belarus, and in 2013 – among the students from Ukraine. The number of government scholarships for Belarusian, Ukrainian and Moldavian students increased, particularly after the launch of the Eastern Partnership. Initially, the greatest number of scholarships were awarded to students from Ukraine, and as of the academic year 2006/2007 – to students from Belarus. Moldavian students received the fewest scholarships. Initially, students from Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova did not undertake paid-for studies. This situation changed after Poland's inclusion in the EU structures. Starting from the academic year 2006/2007, the number of students undertaking paid-for studies increased systematically, particularly in the case of Ukrainian students. In the case of Belarus and Moldova, the number of scholarship holders and those studying free of charge was higher than the number of students paying for their education. However, the situation was different in the case of Ukrainian students. In 2000/2001, relatively few students undertook paid-for education. In the academic year 2013/2014, the situation reversed. Scholarship holders from Ukraine accounted for a small percentage of students, as did those studying free of charge. Students paying their tuition fees were a predominant group – 76.35% of the total number of university students from Ukraine. Availability of scholarships had a significant impact on the arrivals of Belarusian and Moldovian citizens, but did not contribute to an increase in the number of Ukrainian students.