ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS DURING TRANSITION
In: The Pacific review, Band 46, Heft 1, S. 89-106
ISSN: 0951-2748
IN POST-COMMUNIST COUNTRIES, THE GENERAL STRATEGY OF TRANSITION AND INITIAL REFORM POLICIES APPEAR TO BE INFLUENCED MOST BY THE INHERITED ECONOMIC AND INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS AND THE LONG-TERM POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC GOALS OF REFORM, RATHER THAN BY THE SHORT-TERM CONCERN OF GAINING AND PRESERVING POLITICAL POWER. MANY OF THE CONSTRAINTS ARE SYSTEMIC AND, THEREFORE, COMMON TO ALL COUNTRIES UNDERGOING THE TRANSITION. THESE CONSTRAINTS, BOTH COMMON AND COUNTRY-SPECIFIC, INFLUENCE THE CHOICE OF REFORM STRATEGY AS WELL AS THE CHOICE OF SPECIFIC ECONOMIC POLICIES. ECONOMIC, INSTITUTIONAL, AND POLITICAL REFORMS DURING TRANSITION HAVE A FEEDBACK EFFECT ON THE INHERITED CONSTRAINTS. THEY ALSO ACTIVATE OR MODIFY CURRENT POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS. POSITIVE RESULTS OF REFORMS TEND TO RELAX SOME OF THE CONSTRAINTS WHILE NEGATIVE OUTCOMES, SUCH AS SEVERE RECESSIONS AND GRAVE FISCAL PROBLEMS, TEND TO PRODUCE NEW ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS. THESE CHANGES OF CONSTRAINTS MAY LEAD TO MODIFICATIONS OF INITIAL REFORM POLICIES DURING THE COURSE OF TRANSITION.