Suchergebnisse

The traditional state administrative paradigm and it's connection with educational institutions is the focus of this article. So, bureaucracy as the political institution is formed within the framework of universal educational paradigm. The bureaucracy is connected with dysfunctions. The sociological research conducted in Republic of Komi has demonstrated, that, as a rule, managing posts takes the people with humanitarian university education. It is quite possible, that the modernisation of a system of a state and municipal service can begin from the development of regional educational training institutions that would help "discovering" local elites that in turn would help in building public sector institutions.

ABSTRACT: The IASB discussion paper, Preliminary Views on Financial Statement Presentation (IASB 2008), asks whether income should be aggregated and reported as a single comprehensive income figure, and how comprehensive income components should be reallocated. We extend prior empirical evidence by researching 16 European countries and by an extensive examination of impact metrics that include information, measurement, prediction, and conditional conservatism issues. A European setting that comprises substantial variation in markets, accounting rules, and business culture would, ceteris paribus, support differential reporting of comprehensive income. Results, however, consistently support the retention of operating net income as a general decision-relevant metric, with other comprehensive income reported individually and delineated by its unrealized nature. We found no compelling evidence that it should be reallocated into net income by function. Further, reported aggregated comprehensive income reverses the conservative attributes of income and has policy implications for providers of debt capital in a European setting. Results are robust to several firm-specific controls, nonlinearities, the impact of reporting incentives, and for early IFRS adopters.

AbstractThe article analyzes the use of accounting information in Russia. We assess reporting behaviour in the lending process for a sample of Russian companies in the years 1999–2004 and postulate that Russian companies manage their earnings in order to avoid showing losses when applying for bank financing. Once a credit has been granted, companies are predicted to manage earnings because of the bank's monitoring activities. By means of univariate and multivariate analysis we are able to attribute the discontinuity around a zero target in the earnings distribution with firms' response to the banks' assessment of accounting performance. This implies that financing considerations affect the reporting incentives of Russian companies.

We test the earnings management behavior of Russian companies in the years 2001 and 2002. We analyze the effects of ownership structure on the extent of tax management. We first hypothesize that Russian firms manage earnings downward to reduce income taxes. We test for irregularities in the distribution of earnings in the subsamples of the companies with relatively high and low marginal tax rates in 2001 and 2002, distinguishing between low incentives versus high incentives for tax management. Conducting univariate and multivariate tests, we find evidence consistent with our hypothesis. We secondly hypothesize that incentives to provide high quality financial information constrain tax management. Consistently we find that public companies manage taxes to a lesser extent than private companies. We thirdly test whether the interaction among market forces, political forces, and the changing tax law from 2001 to 2002 caused a change in the reporting practices. We find evidence consistent with public firms reporting earnings of a higher quality in 2002.

We document that central banks are significantly more likely to report slightly positive profits than slightly negative profits, especially amid greater political pressure, the public's receptiveness to more extreme political views, and when governors are reappointable. The propensity to report small profits over small losses is correlated with more lenient monetary policy and higher inflation. We conclude that profitability concerns, although absent from standard theory, are present and effective in practice. These findings inform a debate about the political economy of central banking, monetary stability, and the effectiveness of non-traditional central banking.

We document that central banks are significantly more likely to report slightly positive profits than slightly negative profits. The discontinuity in the profit distribution is (i) more pronounced amid greater political or public pressure, the public's receptiveness to more extreme political views, and agency frictions arising from governor career concerns, but absent when no such factors are present, and (ii) correlated with more lenient monetary policy inputs and greater inflation. These findings indicate that profitability concerns, while absent from standard theoretical models of central banking, are both present and effective in practice, and inform a theoretical debate about monetary stability and the effectiveness and riskiness of non-traditional central banking.

Since 2002 company law requires listed German corporations to declare their degree of conformity to the German Corporate Governance Code (GCGC). We examine whether there is a pricing effect connected to the declared degree of compliance for a sample of (big) publicly traded German companies listed in the DAX 30 and MDAX. We find that the degree of compliance with the Code is value‐relevant after controlling for an endogeneity bias. This shows that the capital markets find the rules in the code meaningful and that there is capital market pressure to adopt the Code regulation. Our findings also suggest that the capital market fills a possible "control vacuum" resulting from the withdrawal of commercial banks from their (former) influential role in the German "insider control" corporate governance model.