Suchergebnisse

In contrast to the early campaign style anti-corruption strategy based on nationwide uniformity, disparate local integrity initiatives and programs have proliferated in China in recent years. Local innovation in managing government integrity has been encouraged by the Center. Drawing on the author's fieldwork in Guangdong, this article investigates the rationale behind such development and addresses the question of why the central leadership has become receptive to local initiatives in cadre management, an area where political conformity was deemed necessary by an authoritarian regime. It suggests that the strategic adjustment testifies to the institutional failure of the earlier anti-corruption regime that manifested in, inter alia, an acute agency loss problem. The emerging approach to integrity management nevertheless has paradoxical institutional roots. It indicates some new thinking by the central authorities on holding local governments responsible for integrity management. Just as clearly, the adjustment is also driven by the Center's concern about losing control and its desire to 'manage' government integrity under hierarchy. (J Contemp China/GIGA)

Résumé Les tentatives infructueuses passées de contrôler la corruption ont amené le gouvernement chinois à revoir sa stratégie, en abandonnant ses mesures anticorruption axées sur des campagnes au profit d'une gestion de l'intégrité institutionnalisée, que nous appellerons « évolution institutionnelle » dans le présent article. Cette « évolution » est caractérisée par un renforcement de l'intégrité axée sur des règles et se manifeste dans la multiplication des différentes initiatives locales en faveur de l'intégrité. C'est en nous basant sur un cas particulier (la déclaration de patrimoine des agents des gouvernements locaux) que nous allons détailler les caractéristiques et les mécanismes du changement institutionnel axé sur la gestion de l'intégrité en Chine. À côté de l'analyse conceptuelle de cette évolution institutionnelle, nous allons en examiner les implications sociales et politiques plus larges. Comme nous le verrons dans nos observations, l'évolution institutionnelle en matière de gestion de l'intégrité que connaît actuellement la Chine suppose un changement de paradigme pour comprendre la corruption et ses nouvelles caractéristiques. Remarques à l'intention des praticiens L'évolution institutionnelle axée sur la gestion de l'intégrité en Chine a des implications pratiques. Premièrement, la gestion de l'intégrité est davantage un processus institutionnalisé et axé sur des règles qu'un processus de simple inspiration idéologique . Deuxièmement, qu'ils abordent certains aspects bien précis de l'action concrète ou qu'ils proposent un schéma général à appliquer dans des circonstances particulières, les programmes de gestion de l'intégrité doivent préciser comment les obligations doivent être mises en œuvre et évaluées, et définir les sanctions encourues en cas de non respect. Troisièmement, la gestion de l'intégrité se base non seulement sur des règles, mais aussi sur des valeurs importantes, comme l'imputabilité, la responsabilité, la transparence et l'intéressement du public, des éléments qui assurent une bonne gestion des risques de probité.

Previous unsuccessful attempts at controlling corruption have led the Chinese government to change its strategy from campaign-style anti-corruption enforcement to institutionalized integrity management, referred to as an 'institutional turn' in this article. The 'turn' is characterized by rule-guided integrity building and manifests itself in the growth of various local integrity initiatives. Drawing on a particular case – the declaration of assets by local government officials – this article details the characteristics and mechanisms of the institutional change towards integrity management in China. In addition to a conceptual discussion of the institutional turn, the broad social and political implications beyond the turn itself are examined. As the findings of the article show, China's ongoing institutional turn towards integrity management implies a paradigm shift in understanding corruption and its changing patterns.Points for practitionersThe institutional turn towards integrity management in China has practical implications. First, integrity management is an institutionalized and rule-guided process, rather than a process of mere ideological inspiration. Second, whether covering certain specific aspects of concrete action or providing a general schema to be applied to particular circumstances, integrity management programmes should detail how a requirement is to be implemented and assessed, and what sanctions are to be imposed in cases of non-compliance. Third, integrity management relies not only on rules but also on important values, such as accountability, responsibility, transparency, and public engagement, which ensure good management of probity risks.

This article argues against the conventional wisdom that accountability is the raison d'être of auditing activities. Audit, admittedly, is a part of the accountability architecture as it contributes to the financial health of a government and the effective management of public money. This does not mean, however, that audit necessarily generates accountability. China's experience with establishing a power audit regime shows that without enabling goals, impartial structural arrangements, and effective procedures, auditing for accountability only remains an incomplete mission.

AbstractIn recent decades, the Chinese state has been confronted by a dual challenge: to monitor and regulate the country's rapid socioeconomic development and, at the same time, to reform itself, as centrally planned state, in order to adapt to market‐driven changes. This has made it an imperative for the state to remake as well as strengthen its capacity. How has the Chinese state taken up the challenge? To what extent has state capacity been shaped or reshaped in the process? Is the state's endeavour to strengthen and institutionalise its capacity successful? This article examines China's experience with building a powerful audit regime to answer these questions. It explores the driving forces behind institutional change and capacity development. As the findings show, the evolution of the state audit capacity in China is not a simple, linear process, but rather it is associated with multiple changes in the legal and regulatory framework, inter‐institutional relations and the norms guiding the behaviour of institutional actors. The development of the state audit in China reveals both the dynamics and dilemmas of state capacity development. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.