Suchergebnisse

Abstract
In the Winter semester of 1925/26 Heidegger gave what appears to have been his first seminar on Hegel. Still unpublished in any form, this neglected seminar is of extraordinary importance, and not only for the in-depth and critical reading it pursues of Hegel's Logic I, a critique that charges Hegel with not knowing how or where to begin. The seminar is also important for its attempt to demonstrate that Hegel's philosophy was thoroughly Greek. In the class of 25 November 1925, Heidegger is reported to have said: "Therefore am I in the habit of saying that Hegel is the most radical Greek there ever was. With the means that were pre-formed in Greek ontology as if in a seed, the means that lay at the roots of Greek ontology, Hegel mastered something (roughly speaking: spirit, history) that in this form was never experienced by the Greeks. This is only asserted here. Proof of this thesis is naturally very difficult." Heidegger therefore turns towards the end of the seminar to Aristotle's account of time in the Physics to show that both this understanding of time and the conception of being it presupposes are also Hegel's. Yet Heidegger entrusts the initial presentation of Aristotle's conception of time to a student whose reading is at odds with his own, so much so that Heidegger accuses the student of turning everything on its head. The student's name is H.-G. Gadamer.

Socrates can be said to have left the subsequent philosophical tradition with the problem of the relation between philosophy and politics. Already in the Republic the proposal of philosopher-kings represents more a tension than an identity. While Aristotle responds by insisting on a sharp distinction between politics and philosophical wisdom, this distinction proves on closer examination much less sharp than might appear. Heidegger characterizes philosophy as the only authentic politics and the philosopher as ruling just by virtue of being a philosopher. In contrast, Foucault insists that, if philosophy can play a role in relation to politics by transforming the subject who lives politically, it plays no role within politics. In this contrast can be seen the 'fallout' of the tension bequeathed by Socrates through both Plato and Aristotle.

Frontmatter -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Abbreviations -- Introduction: what is to be gained from a confrontation between Plato and Heidegger? -- Part 1 Heidegger's critical reading of Plato in the 1920s -- 1 Dialectic, ethics, and dialogue -- 2 Logos and being -- Part 2 Heidegger on Plato's truth and untruth in the 1930s and 1940s -- Introduction -- 3 From the 1931– 32 and 1933 – 34 courses on the essence of truth to "Plato's doctrine of truth": Heidegger's transformation of Plato into Platonism through the interpretation of the sun and cave analogies of the republic -- 4 The dialogue that could have been: Heidegger on the Theaetetus -- 5 the 1942 interpretation of ɅHΘH in the myth of er (republic book 10) -- 6 Calculative thinking, meditative thinking, and the practice of dialogue -- 7 Dialectic and phenomenology in "Zeit und Sein": a pivotal chapter in Heidegger's confrontation with Plato -- Works cited -- Index

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