Suchergebnisse

Covert action can be an important weapon in a state's arsenal. It is, however, inherently controversial and risky. Rory Cormac, Michael S Goodman and Tom Holman argue that when considering covert action, Whitehall should look to lessons from the recent past. The UK has long used covert action, and how best to manage and co-ordinate such sensitive activity was for many decades a key preoccupation of its policy-makers and politicians. Given the secrecy involved, these lessons, and the machinery created, have been lost to history. Yet with covert action seemingly now back on the agenda, previous experience and hard-learnt lessons have assumed renewed importance.

Frontmatter -- Contents -- 1. Introduction: The Rise of the Joint Intelligence Committee -- 2. Origins of the Joint Intelligence Committee -- 3. World War II and the Role of Intelligence in Strategic Planning -- 4. A Post-War Intelligence Machinery -- 5. Origins of the Soviet Threat -- 6. Sigint Targeting -- 7. The Berlin Blockade -- 8. Chinese Intervention in the Korean War -- 9. Estimating Soviet Capabilities -- 10. Counterinsurgency -- 11. The Suez Crisis -- 12. The Cuban Missile Crisis -- 13. Vietnam -- 14. The Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia, 1968 -- 15. The Rise of International Terrorism in the Middle East -- 16. Northern Ireland: Direct Rule -- 17. The Falklands War -- 18. Changing Requirements at the End of the Cold War -- 19. War in Iraq: Weapons of Mass Destruction -- 20. War in Iraq: Aftermath -- 21. The Joint Intelligence Committee and the National Security Council -- 22. The Syrian Civil War -- 23. Through the Looking Glass: Illusions of Openness and the Study of British Intelligence -- Appendix: Chairmen of the Joint Intelligence Committee -- Document Sources -- Bibliography -- Index

These 20 case studies reveal the declassified papers of the JIC, shining a light on the workings of Whitehall's secret world and the vital, previously unknown, role played by intelligence in pivotal events across the 20th and 21st centuries. For more than half a century, the Joint Intelligence Committee or 'JIC' has been a central component of the British Government's secret machinery. It represents the highest authority in the world of intelligence and acts as a broker between the spy and the policy-maker. From WWII to the War in Iraq, and from the Falklands to the IRA, it has been involved in almost every key foreign policy decision. Key Features. 20 case studies explore the role of intelligence in foreign and defence policy, showing how the JIC influences the government's policy responses to particular situations Each study reproduces an original intelligence assessment or report together with a contextualising introduction and explanatory footnotes Essential reading for students and academics researching contemporary international history and government policymaking processes

The poisoning of former Russian intelligence officer and MI6 agent Sergei Skripal highlights the enduring Russian ardor for poisoning enemies of the state as a warning to others who contemplate disloyalty. Beyond treating the event itself, we explore Russian conceptions of theatrical murder as a peculiar element of state power. We historicize this development and inquire whether assassination as political theater and strategic messaging is a tool embraced in particular by Vladimir Putin or rather emblematic of the Russian state. We explore why and how Putin opted to strike at the moment he did to seek vengeance against Skripal, concluding that a confluence of structural and human factors at the intersection of British government policies with Russian domestic politics led Putin to his decision. We conclude with the implications of these findings for western governments.

This book provides the first assessment of the performance of three leading European polities in providing estimative intelligence during an era of surprise. It develops a new framework for conducting postmortems guided by a normative model of anticipatory foreign policy. The comparative analysis focuses on how the UK, the EU and Germany handled three cases of major surprises: the Arab uprisings, the rise to power of the Islamic State (ISIS), and the Russian annexation of Crimea. It considers not just government intelligence assessments, but also diplomatic reporting and expert open sources and how these assessments were received by organisational leaders. The book tests and develops new theories about the causes of strategic surprises, going beyond a common focus on intelligence versus policy failures to identify challenges and factors that cut across both communities. With the help of former senior officials, the book identifies lessons yet to be learnt by European polities to better anticipate and prepare for future surprises.