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ABSTRACTIn this study, we examine how the different incentive structures inherent in two primary contract types—time and materials (T&M) and fixed price (FP)—influence the quality provided by the vendor in the software development outsourcing industry. We argue that the incentive structure of FP contracts motivates a vendor to be more efficient in the software development process, which results in higher quality as compared to projects executed under a T&M contract. We thus argue that vendors consistently staff FP projects with better trained personnel because they face the most risk on these contracts, resulting in better outcomes on these projects. We extend our analysis to propose that providing higher quality is associated with higher profit margins for the vendor only for FP contracts. We develop and test these hypotheses on data collected from 100 software projects completed by a leading Indian offshore vendor. The results provide strong support for our fundamental thesis that the drivers of and returns to quality vary by contract type. We discuss the implications of our research for both researchers and practitioners.

New information pertinent to organizational decision making, even when publicly available, may not diffuse rapidly in the form of adoption and transformation of organizational practices. In this study, we examine how different markers of expertise, each representative of human capital at both individual and organizational levels, moderates the speed of response to new information. We do so in the context of medical device utilization, viz. stents, for the treatment of stable coronary arterial disease by physicians practicing in hospitals. Results show that physicians possessing specialized expertise developed through deliberate practice adopt new guidelines significantly faster, as compared with physicians endowed with general expertise reflected in elite schooling or tenure. Furthermore, we observe significant spillovers within organizations from expertise gained through deliberate practice, indicating that physicians with expertise markers associated with deliberate practice are able to act as influential agents and help diffuse new practices within the organization. Our study thus extends the literature on both information diffusion and expertise by providing quantitative and qualitative evidence of the mechanisms at play in the adoption of new best practices. The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2018.1246 .