Suchergebnisse

At the end of its first year, the revolutionary process in Nicaragua must be considered a success from several different perspectives. The war-torn economy has been stabilized, a progressive agrarian reform program initiated, a large state sector formed on the basis of expropriatedSomocistaproperty, an independent foreign policy adopted, and a massive literacy campaign launched throughout the country. Most important, however, has been the imposition of a high degree of political stability coupled with, and partially growing out of, the consolidation of power in the hands of a cohesive revolutionary vanguard. The ability of the Sandinista Front of National Liberation (FSLN) to establish its hegemony in post-Somoza Nicaragua has permitted the government to move decisively on a number of critical fronts and to escape power-sharing formulas that could have turned the policymaking process into a protracted struggle against entrenched interests. The foundation of Sandinista control over the government is simple: as Comandante Humberto Ortega explained, 'We took power by arms, and it should be clear who has power in Nicaragua today.'

In a recent reinterpretation of political change in Peru between independence and World War I, Berg and Weaver (1978) suggest that the rise of guano export beginning in the 1840s led to important changes in socioeconomic relations within the country. In consequence, a centralized and powerful state emerged which asserted its authority over the formerly dominant provincial elites. On this point, Berg and Weaver's analysis is not inconsistent with existing literature on the period (Basadre, 1963; Pike, 1967; Bonilla, 1974). But their argument that by retaining control over guano export the state acquired the financial resources with which to establish its independence from newly emerging urban elites does not seem completely valid.

ELECTIONS FOR A CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY ARE SCHEDULED TO TAKE place in Peru in 1978. In view of this event and of the changes which it might bring about, it would be useful to examine the tenyear record of the military revolutionary government in that country.If the road to hell truly is paved with good intentions, it is of little solace to those who must walk it. So it is that after nearly a decade of revolution in Peru we can no longer concern ourselves with ferreting out the motives of the military officers who have led it, but must turn instead to an assessment of the damage that has been done. Peru's Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces has attracted considerable attention and even admiration within and without Latin America since its inception through a bloodless coup on 3 October 1968. In subsequent years the military junta, in which the Army dominates over the Air Force and Navy, has passed through three perceptible stages. The first corresponded to the presidency of General Juan Velasco Alvarado, architect of the coup and leader of the revolution until he was ousted in August 1975. His tenure, now referred to officially as the 'First Phase' of the revolution, was responsible for dramatic and far-reaching reforms which eventually over-taxed the financial and political resources of his government and forced him from office. The so-called 'Second Phase' of the revolution began with Velasco's replacement by his more conservative Prime Minister, General Francisco Morales Bermddez. Attention turned to consolidating the gains of the revolution during this period but the inability of the government to shore up the economy and rationalize the programmes of the Velasco era resulted in the imposition ofa severe austerity programme in July 1976. Violent political upheavals within the popular classes in July, and the backlash of the conservative factions within the military, caused a purge of most of the remaining liberal officers in the government. It is fair to speak of a 'Third Phase' of the revolution since the latter part of 1976 in which President Morales has been pressured into systematically dismantling many of the popular reforms of the Velasco era. Official announcements in 1977 clarified the military's intention to withdraw from direct management of the state over the next two to three years. Thus, it is appropriate now to begin assessment of the Institutional Revolution of the Armed Forces and its legacy for Peru.