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US policymakers have come to rely on precision conventional strike systems -- most notably, unmanned air vehicles (UAVs), including single-use cruise missiles and, more recently and controversially, reusable armed drones -- for what one policy expert has artfully termed "discrete military operations," or single or several attacks conducted over a brief span of time. Surely the cost and casualty implications of more substantial commitments of military forces for major combat operations or lengthy counterinsurgency campaigns explain why policymakers have become accustomed to such UAV employment. The most controversial use of armed drones includes targeted assassination strikes against al Qaeda or al Qaeda-affiliated leadership figures, as well as groups of foot soldiers, in Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, and possibly the Philippines. Although important questions remain about the legal implications of lethal operations in sovereign nations, and the extent to which such strikes create more terrorists than they kill, this article examines two equaling consequential and interrelated challenges resulting from our growing fascination with and dependence on UAVs: dampening widespread UAV proliferation and creating stronger global norms governing their spread and use. Adapted from the source document.

Since 2005 an astonishing number of new missile-development programmes have appeared in the Middle East, South Asia and Northeast Asia. The surprising fact is that land-attack cruise missiles, not ballistic missiles, constitute the primary problem, yet ballistic missiles, and defences against them, command virtually the exclusive attention of decision-makers. Perversely, the United States' quest to sell ballistic-missile defences may be hastening cruise-missile proliferation. Knowing that defences are not nearly as effective against cruise missiles as they are against ballistic missiles, several states have turned to the former to complement the latter. Others, frustrated with the high cost of ballistic-missile defence, have turned to cheaper cruise missiles linked to pre-emptive strike doctrines. In either case, absent policy adjustments, the unintended by-product is likely to be regional arms races and crisis instability. (Survival / SWP)

Except as a weapon of last resort, nuclear weapons have no legitimate or compelling military role to play in any conceivable US national security challenge. Yet some policymakers still cling to modernised nuclear weapons for specific tasks in ensuring American security. Since at least 1991, US security has depended almost exclusively on increasingly capable conventional weapons, as effective as nuclear weapons for attacking the most difficult targets. Deterrence through conventional weapons is decisively more credible than through existing or prospective nuclear alternatives. The mere possession of unprecedented conventional military superiority is not enough; a truly effective strategy hinges on perceived effectiveness. Along with addressing conventional needs, America must reformulate its position on nuclear weapons to severely diminish their relevance and solidify the longstanding international taboo against their use. (Survival / SWP)