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AbstractThe majority of economic actors in the developing world participate in the informal sector, and yet little is known about the political implications of this constituency. I argue that, particularly in weak‐state democracies, economic informality constrains the rise of programmatic politics. An uncertain, undocumented, and irregular economic relationship with the state conveys signals about the state that affect citizens' demand for and ability to coordinate on programmatic policy. Novel survey evidence from urban Senegal illustrates that greater irregularity is associated with weaker perceptions of tax compliance, lower expectations of government, and weaker coordination capacity and that informality is associated with weaker programmatic demands. Experimentally providing information about a salutary fiscal policy causes some informal sector members to positively update expectations about government performance and electoral coordination capacity. Field experiments in two other African democracies increase confidence in the proposition that informality inhibits the formation of a constituency for programmatic politics.

I argue that if citizens systematically underestimate what their government can and should do for them, then they will hold politicians to a lower standard and sanction poor performers less often. A field experiment across 95 localities in Mali in which randomly assigned localities receive a civics course identifies the effect of raising voter expectations of government on their willingness to hold leaders accountable. The course provides information about local government capacity and responsibility as well as how local politicians perform relative to others, effectively raising voter expectations of what local governments can and should do. Survey experiments among individuals in treated and control communities (N = 5,560) suggest that people in treated villages are indeed more likely to sanction poor performers and vote based on performance more often. A behavioral outcome—the likelihood that villagers challenge local leaders at a town hall meeting—adds external validity to survey findings.

A credible opposition is necessary for democratic accountability. However, in a multiparty democracy, a credible opposition may fail to emerge when it is in the strategic interest of political parties to collude rather than compete, effectively extinguishing all credible opposition. The author argues that illicit collusion among parties on a representative council is more likely when all viable parties win seats and are thus able to enter into a self-binding commitment to jointly engage in misconduct without risk of exposure. Conversely, when at least one party fails to win representation on the council, there is a credible opposition with the incentive and ability to threaten exposure of rent seeking among council members. The theory is tested using a regression discontinuity design where the electoral threshold to win a single seat is, within a narrow band, an exogenous determinant of whether or not there is an out-party or credible opposition. Exploiting the fact that Mali's decentralization produces within-country variation in both electoral and governance outcomes, the author uses data from commune council elections alongside local-level public goods provision as a measure of rent seeking. Poorer public goods provision is indeed more likely when all political parties in a district win seats on the council. To show that collusion is the mechanism driving this relationship, the author tests several observable implications in the data and uses qualitative evidence as illustration. This examination of when it is in the strategic interest of parties to engage in uncompetitive behavior contributes to the literature on when elections fail to produce democratic accountability. (World Politics / SWP)

A credible opposition is necessary for democratic accountability. However, in a multiparty democracy, a credible opposition may fail to emerge when it is in the strategic interest of political parties to collude rather than compete, effectively extinguishing all credible opposition. The author argues that illicit collusion among parties on a representative council is more likely when all viable parties win seats and are thus able to enter into a self-binding commitment to jointly engage in misconduct without risk of exposure. Conversely, when at least one party fails to win representation on the council, there is a credible opposition with the incentive and ability to threaten exposure of rent seeking among council members. The theory is tested using a regression discontinuity design where the electoral threshold to win a single seat is, within a narrow band, an exogenous determinant of whether or not there is an out-party or credible opposition. Exploiting the fact that Mali's decentralization produces within-country variation in both electoral and governance outcomes, the author uses data from commune council elections alongside local-level public goods provision as a measure of rent seeking. Poorer public goods provision is indeed more likely when all political parties in a district win seats on the council. To show that collusion is the mechanism driving this relationship, the author tests several observable implications in the data and uses qualitative evidence as illustration. This examination of when it is in the strategic interest of parties to engage in uncompetitive behavior contributes to the literature on when elections fail to produce democratic accountability.

In spite of Mali's international recognition as a beacon of good governance in the region, decades of free and fair elections and extensive civil liberties failed to engender public support for democracy following the March 2012 coup d'état. Demonstrations against the military junta were half as large as demonstrations in support of it. What looked to be strong democratic institutions from the outside were often hollow shells that privileged the elite class and marginalized everyone else – not a system ultimately worth fighting for. This essay discusses some of the constraints to democratic accountability in Mali and what can be done to mitigate them.

Political competition is widely recognized as a mediator of public goods provision through its salutary effect on incumbents' electoral incentives. We argue that political competition additionally mediates public goods provision by reducing the efficiency of legislative bargaining. These countervailing forces may produce a net negative effect in places with weak parties and low transparency—typical of many young democracies. We provide evidence of a robust negative relationship between political competition and local public goods using panel data from Mali. Tests of mechanisms corroborate our interpretation of this relationship as evidence of legislative bargaining inefficiencies. To explore the generalizability of these findings, we analyze cross-country panel data and show that political competition leads to better (worse) public goods provision under high (low) levels of party system institutionalization. The paper sheds light on why political competition is only selectively beneficial, and underscores the importance of considering both the electoral and legislative arenas. ; IFPRI3; ISI; CRP2; 5 Strengthening Institutions and Governance; IFPRIOA ; DSGD; PIM ; PR ; CGIAR Research Program on Policies, Institutions, and Markets (PIM)

Political competition is widely recognized as a mediator of public
goods provision through its salutary effect on incumbents' electoral
incentives. We argue that political competition
additionally mediates public goods provision by
reducing the efficiency of legislative bargaining. These
countervailing forces may produce a net negative effect in places
with weak parties and low transparency—typical of many young
democracies. We provide evidence of a robust negative relationship
between political competition and local public goods using panel
data from Mali. Tests of mechanisms corroborate our interpretation
of this relationship as evidence of legislative bargaining
inefficiencies. To explore the generalizability of these findings,
we analyze cross-country panel data and show that political
competition leads to better (worse) public goods provision under
high (low) levels of party system institutionalization. The paper
sheds light on why political competition is only selectively
beneficial, and underscores the importance of considering both the
electoral and legislative arenas.

Political competition is widely recognized as a mediator of public goods provision through its salutary effect on incumbents' electoral incentives. We argue that political competition additionally mediates public goods provision by increasing the inefficiency of legislative bargaining. These countervailing forces will produce a net negative effect in places with weak parties and low transparency – typical of many young democracies. We provide rigorous evidence from one such context, Mali, and then show results generalize to other weak party settings. Using panel data from Mali and a first differences model, we find a robust negative relationship between competition and local public goods. Tests of mechanisms corroborate our interpretation of this relationship as evidence that legislative bargaining inefficiencies are driving poor outcomes. This sheds light on why evidence of positive effects generally comes from more established democracies, and underscores the importance of both the electoral and legislative arenas in analyzing public goods provision. ; Non-PR ; IFPRI1; 5 Strengthening Institutions and Governance; CRP2 ; DSGD; PIM ; CGIAR Research Program on Policies, Institutions, and Markets (PIM)