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AbstractThis article relates the history of economists' influence in shaping the content of the Humphrey-Hawkins Act (1978) and its immediate consequences. The act committed the federal government to reducing unemployment to 4 percent and inflation to 3 percent as soon as 1983. Initially, the Humphrey-Hawkins bill was conceived as a project to favor the economic integration of African Americans and economic planning and targeted only the unemployment rate. Republican senators successfully pushed for adding a numerical inflation target during the debates in Congress. The act eventually put on equal footing inflation and unemployment. This article argues that the economists in the Carter administration, and notably the Council of Economic Advisers, were instrumental, even if unintentionally, in favoring the integration of an inflation target and such an interpretation of the bill. In the negotiations that opposed them to the supporters of the bill, as well as in the analysis of the bill they produced, they insisted on the existence of a trade-off between inflation and unemployment and referred frequently to the famous Phillips curve. They endeavored to anchor their expertise on academic publications, which strengthened the role of the Phillips curve in shaping the debates. Business organizations and senators used references to the trade-off to undermine the bill and favor the integration of an inflation target.

Cet article propose une histoire de l'évolution des explications de la stagflation états-uniennes des années 1970, de 1975 à 2013. Mariant méthodes qualitatives et quantitatives, 1) j'observe les différents types d'explications coexistant à la même période ; 2) j'identifie quel type d'explications était dominant pour chaque période ; et 3) j'identifie les principales sources d'inspiration pour chaque type d'explication. Dans les années 1970 et 1980, les chocs d'offre et l'inertie de l'inflation sont fondamentaux pour expliquer la stagflation. Mais l'intérêt pour ce sujet disparaît peu à peu après 1985. C'est une nouvelle littérature qui émerge dans les années 1990, sans référence ou presque aux explications des années 1970 et 1980, et se focalisant sur le rôle joué par la politique monétaire durant la période pour expliquer l'augmentation de l'inflation. Les contributions des nouveaux classiques comme Lucas [1976] ou Kydland et Prescott [1977], qui étaient ignorées dans les explications des années 1970 et 1980, deviennent des références majeures pour rendre compte de la stagflation à partir des années 1990.

L'International Seminar on Macroeconomics (ISoM) est une conférence annuelle co-financée, pendant 15 ans (1978-1993), par l'EHESS et le NBER. Cet article expose les dynamiques institutionnelles et scientifiques sous-jacentes à cette coopération. Nous suggérons que les macroéconomistes rassemblés par l'ISoM contribuèrent grandement à la constitution d'un réseau européen d'économistes, partageant certains standards intellectuels et professionnels. Nous montrons que l'ISoM se situait au croisement de deux types d'« internationalisation » de l'économie : l'intégration au niveau européen des communautés de recherche nationales, ainsi qu'un processus d'« américanisation » de la discipline. Alors que la littérature existante sur l'« internationalisation » se concentre plutôt sur le niveau national, notre article étudie ce processus à l'échelle européenne. À cet égard, nous mettons en évidence le rôle clé joué par deux programmes de recherches en macroéconomie : la modélisation macroéconométrique à grande échelle et la théorie du déséquilibre.

The International Seminar on Macroeconomics (ISoM) is an annual conference, which was co-sponsored, during 15 years (1978-1993) by the French EHESS and the NBER. This article uncovers the scientific and institutional dynamics unrolling from this cooperation. The ISoM, we argue, constituted a decisive step towards the making of a European network of economists, sharing a distinctive style of economics, insofar that the Seminar gathered macroeconomists who were leading the development of this European network. We illustrate how the ISoM stands at the crossroad of two types of 'internationalisation' of economics: on the one hand, the integration of European national communities; on the other hand, the process of 'Americanisation' of economics. While existing literature on 'internationalisation' focuses on the national level, our contribution investigates its European level. Moreover, we unveils the key role played in this process by macroeconomics - and more specifically, large-scale macroeconometric modelling on the one hand, and the disequilibrium theory on the other hand. These two approaches provided a common research agenda and shared scientific standards for the emerging network.

The standard history of macroeconomics considers Lucas (1976)– "the Lucas Critique"–as a path-breaking innovation for the discipline. According to this view Lucas's article dismissed the traditional macroeconometric practice calling for new ways of conceiving the quantitative evaluation of economic policies. The Lucas Critique is considered, nowadays, as a fundamental principle of macroeconomic modeling (Woodford, 2003). The interpretation and the application of the Critique, however, represent still unsolved issues in economics (Chari et al., 2008). Even if the influence of Lucas's contribution cannot be neglected, something seems to be missing in the narrative: the reactions of the economists that were directly targeted by the Critique. Modeling practices of economic policy evaluation were not overthrown immediately after Lucas (1976), creating a divide between theoretical and applied macroeconomics (Brayton et al., 1997). In the first section we propose a careful account of Lucas's argument and of some of the previous works anticipating the substantial outline of the Critique (like Frisch's notion of autonomy). Second, we bring our own interpretation of Lucas (1976). We find two points of view in Lucas's paper: a prescriptive one that tell how to build a good macroeconometric model (it is the standard interpretation of the article); a positive one that relies on the fact that the Lucas critique could be seen as an attempt to explain a real-world phenomenon: stagflation. Third, we classify the reactions of the Keynesian macroeconometricians following this line of interpretation. On the prescriptive side, the Keynesians protested against the New Classical solution to the Lucas critique (the use of the rational expectation hypothesis among other things). Klein, for instance, proposed an alternative microfoundational program to empirically study the formation of expectations. On the positive side, the Keynesians put into question the relevance of the Lucas Critique to explain the rise of both unemployment and inflation in the 1970s. They tried to test the impact of policy regime changes and of shifts in agents' behavior. We argue that the explanation of the stagflation was elsewhere. The purpose of this paper is to study the reactions of the macroeconometricians criticized by Lucas. We focus especially on those macroeconometricians who worked on policy evaluation and who held an expertise position in governmental institutions. We categorize the different reactions to the Critique, in order to enrich the understanding of the evolution of modeling and expertise practices through the analysis of the debates–which have not yet been completely solved.

The standard history of macroeconomics considers Lucas (1976)– "the Lucas Critique"–as a path-breaking innovation for the discipline. According to this view Lucas's article dismissed the traditional macroeconometric practice calling for new ways of conceiving the quantitative evaluation of economic policies. The Lucas Critique is considered, nowadays, as a fundamental principle of macroeconomic modeling (Woodford, 2003). The interpretation and the application of the Critique, however, represent still unsolved issues in economics (Chari et al., 2008). Even if the influence of Lucas's contribution cannot be neglected, something seems to be missing in the narrative: the reactions of the economists that were directly targeted by the Critique. Modeling practices of economic policy evaluation were not overthrown immediately after Lucas (1976), creating a divide between theoretical and applied macroeconomics (Brayton et al., 1997). In the first section we propose a careful account of Lucas's argument and of some of the previous works anticipating the substantial outline of the Critique (like Frisch's notion of autonomy). Second, we bring our own interpretation of Lucas (1976). We find two points of view in Lucas's paper: a prescriptive one that tell how to build a good macroeconometric model (it is the standard interpretation of the article); a positive one that relies on the fact that the Lucas critique could be seen as an attempt to explain a real-world phenomenon: stagflation. Third, we classify the reactions of the Keynesian macroeconometricians following this line of interpretation. On the prescriptive side, the Keynesians protested against the New Classical solution to the Lucas critique (the use of the rational expectation hypothesis among other things). Klein, for instance, proposed an alternative microfoundational program to empirically study the formation of expectations. On the positive side, the Keynesians put into question the relevance of the Lucas Critique to explain the rise of both unemployment and inflation in the 1970s. They tried to test the impact of policy regime changes and of shifts in agents' behavior. We argue that the explanation of the stagflation was elsewhere. The purpose of this paper is to study the reactions of the macroeconometricians criticized by Lucas. We focus especially on those macroeconometricians who worked on policy evaluation and who held an expertise position in governmental institutions. We categorize the different reactions to the Critique, in order to enrich the understanding of the evolution of modeling and expertise practices through the analysis of the debates–which have not yet been completely solved.

Abstract
This paper discusses the transformation of the content, role, and status of economic research at the Bank of England in the past sixty years. We show how three factors (the policy functions and missions of the Bank, the attitude of its executives toward economics, and its organizational structure) shaped the evolution of in-house economic research at the Bank during three distinctive periods (1960–91; 1992–2007; 2007–14). Our account relies on a broad set of sources and methods (the Bank's publications, archives, interviews with current and former Bank economists, citation analysis, prosopography, and topic modeling).