The Nordic countries are viewed as forerunners on gender equality and women's labour force participation. However, we note that there are far fewer women than men starting businesses in the Nordic countries. The Nordic countries are often considered to be culturally similar: they have similar social systems, economic structures, labour markets, concepts of democracy, models of the welfare state, and universal public services (Arenius & Kovalainen, 2006). Nevertheless, there are clear differences in the share of female entrepreneurs across the Nordic countries. Why is this?
In this study we model effects on Norwegian industry and trade patterns of the recently implemented trade reforms - the WTO-agreement, the EEA-treaty, the OECD ship building reform and the EFTA fishing agreement - through changes in tariffs, NTBs, government procurement and subsidy policy as well as shifts in foreign prices and demand. We employ a highly disaggregated CGE model to simulate the difference between an economy adapted to the mentioned reforms and an economy based on a multilateral maintenance of the pre-reform trade system. Exports and import shares are modelled differently depending on commodity characteristics. Labour supply and national wealth are exogenously determined in order to focus on the gains from reallocations of given resources. The results indicate strong effects on the patterns of industry and trade. Specifically, we observe an increase in the production of services and highly processed goods, and a decrease in the production of raw materials and less processed commodities.
Abstract In small and open economies, absorption of foreign knowledge through international trade often plays a more important role for domestic innovation and growth than investment in domestic R&D. This suggests that trade policies can increase knowledge spillovers from abroad. Public support to R&D can be motivated both by positive internal knowledge externalities and by its ability to expand absorptive capacity. This dynamic, empirical, general equilibrium analysis models these interplays between R&D, trade and productivity. It compares public R&D support and export promotion of R&D based products with respect to long term growth and welfare impacts. We find that export promotion is inferior to R&D support in spurring R&D. However, it is not outperformed in terms of welfare generation. The reason is that existing and politically persistent policy interventions create inefficiencies that can be counteracted by R&D-based export promotion as a second-best policy.
We employ a large scale macroeconometric model to study transitory adjustment problems and long term welfare effects of a Norwegian EU-membership. Compared to the present European Economic Area (EEA) treaty, accession would primarily require economic reforms in the fields of agriculture, public finance and trade. When we ignore the yearly net contribution of approximately 1 billion ECU (1 per cent of GDP), integrating the Norwegian economy into EU generates a small welfare gain. The results seem to be strongly affected by a long transition period with under-utilisation of resources. With the costs of the net contribution included, we identify a welfare loss. This is especially so if fiscal policy is adjusted to maintain public and current account balances. To investigate the stability of the results when the estimated wage rate response and trade elasticities are altered, we present two sensitivity tests. None of them give us reason to cast doubt on the qualitative conclusions presented.
This study analyzes TTIP, its implications for Norway and Norway's trade policy choices. TTIP will hardly be concluded under Obama's presidency, but the agreement could become a reality within a few years. TTIP aims at comprehensive cooperation in the regulatory area. In the short term there will be limited harmonization of standards but regulatory cooperation between different systems. In the long term, the goal is stronger cooperation in the regulatory area. TTIP will from what we know not lead to a lowering of European health regulations or a "race to the bottom". If TTIP is realized and Norway remains outside, the EEA Agreement will be little affected and the overall economic impact is moderate. If Norway joins TTIP, there will be a significant real income gain, with estimates ranging from 2236 to 6772 NOK per capita in the various scenarios. There is considerable variation across sectors. With Norway outside TTIP there will be a moderate negative impact for a majority of the sectors, especially some manufacturing sectors that face tougher competition in the EU and USA export markets. The oil industry will benefit from increased demand and higher prices. If Norway joins TTIP, a clear majority of industries will benefit; especially business services and a number of other service industries. The public sector gains from TTIP, mainly due to cheaper inputs. TTIP will contribute to the dismantling of import protection for Norwegian agriculture and without compensating measures, production and employment will be reduced. TTIP will still allow some import protection and this margin of maneuver, which depends on future negotiations, is important for the outcome. With a larger margin of manoeuvre and unchanged budgetarty support, most of Norway's agriculture can be maintained. With less margin of manoeuvre, it will be more challenging. Norwegian accession to TTIP may occur in the form of a standard trade agreement in which Norway or EFTA are formally equal to the EU and the United States. Alternatively, Norway may participate in a European pillar as in today's "Open Skies" agreement on air traffic. If TTIP succeeds in establishing comprehensive regulatory cooperation, the latter solution is most likely. Such a solution implies that Norway will become more closely integrated with the European Union also in trade policy towards third countries. Norwegian entry into TTIP implies that we have to accept the established rules and negotiate bilaterally with the EU and the USA on market access. The negotiations with the USA will apply to all aspects of market access, while negotiations with the EU will apply only to areas in which the EEA agreement is not already deeper. The negotiations with the EU for TTIP entry will thus include, among other issues, tariffs for seafood and agriculture. As an alternative to membership in TTIP, Norway or EFTA may initiate a trade agreement with the USA. Such an agreement would likely be less extensive in the regulatory area. Such an agreement will also provide an economic gain for Norway, but less than accession to TTIP. For Norway as a whole, accession to TTIP creates a real income gain between 12.5 and 35 billion NOK according to various scenarios, while a free trade agreement with the United States results in a gain of about 7.4 billion NOK. TTIP also includes negotiations on so-called Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), whereby foreign-owned companies can sue a state if they are unfairly or inappropriately treated. Such rights also exist in national law but international tribunals have to some extent extended the interpretation of what is considered unfair. The European Union has proposed a solution in TTIP with a permanent court as well as rules that discipline the interpretation of the principles, and thus avoids that ISDS unduly interferes into the states' "right to regulate". This and many other issues are analysed in this report and six background papers.
