Suchergebnisse

Crises, change, and productive incoherence -- Introduction: contesting continuity -- Productive incoherence : a hirschmanian perspective -- Setting the stage -- The east asian financial crisis and neoliberalism : the beginning of the end of a unified regime -- The global crisis and innovations in financial governance and developmental finance -- Planting seeds, bearing fruit? : the group of 20 and the financial stability board -- Imf stewardship of global finance -- The changing institutional landscape of financial governance and developmental finance in emerging market and developing economies -- Financial crisis, financial control -- Where from here? -- Conclusion: opportunities, challenges, and risks -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Index

I offer this article as a small way of honoring my friend, mentor, and role model Jim Crotty, whose intellectual legacy, commitment to engaged scholarship, lived experience, and warmth and generosity continue to influence me profoundly. Here, I offer several observations and speculations on the state of play in the global and US financial systems in a Crottyian vein. These include several 1980s throwbacks—bank failures in the United States; rentier-driven tight monetary policies across the world with attendant negative effects; and, debt distress and the likelihood of a (new) "lost decade" in the Global South. These familiar experiences are unfolding against the backdrop of an interregnum in which a "post-American global financial order" is emerging in an environment marked by "productive and destructive incoherence." JEL Classification: F02, F33, O23, E44, E58

The crises of 1997–98, 2008, and the pandemic accelerated contradictory changes in global financial governance. Taken together, the change and stasis propelled by these crises is coalescing around a fragmented "post-American financial order." The war in Ukraine represents another inflection point. The war has facilitated the reassertion of American financial power and cooperation among rich nations. However, like previous crises, the war is creating fissures in financial governance. The landscape offers risks and opportunities against a backdrop of heightened financial fragilities, authoritarianism and fascism, inequalities, devastation associated with the pandemic and war, and climate crisis. In such moments, Hirschman's "possibilism" is both elusive and necessary. In this context, we might aspire to "permissive multilateralism s" rather than nostalgia for a new Bretton Woods. JEL Classification: F02, F51

ABSTRACTThis article examines the effects of the Asian crisis and especially the global financial crisis on developmental finance (that is, long‐term project finance and counter‐cyclical liquidity support) and the global financial architecture. In this connection three claims are advanced. The first is positive: that the crises occasioned meaningful although ad hoc, uneven discontinuities. The conjunction of discontinuities and continuities is imparting incoherence to the developmental and global financial architecture. The second claim is normative and controversial. Contrary to the common narrative, emergent incoherence is (on balance) productive of development and stability rather than debilitating. Actors in parts of the global South and East enjoy greater opportunities for institutional experimentation today in comparison with the limited space available in the coherent neoliberal era when the Bretton Woods institutions were monolithic. All of the experiments underway are not equally likely to survive, but even failures can provide lessons and networks that contribute to future successes. Emergent redundancy and new networks of institutional cooperation increase financial resilience. The article also explores the risks of incoherence and redundancy. The third claim is that productive incoherence can be understood within a 'Hirschmanian mindset' — an understanding of change and development informed by Albert Hirschman's theoretical and epistemic commitments.

At least one good thing may have emerged from the crisis: new international lending institutions led by developing nations are challenging and complementing the old US-dominated regime.

I advance three claims in the paper. First, the Asian and especially the global financial crisis occasioned discontinuities and continuities that are imparting incoherence to the global financial governance architecture and developmental finance. Second, the emergent incoherence is productive of development rather than debilitating. Third, productive incoherence can be understood most fully within a "Hirschmanian mindset," that is, an understanding of social and regime change informed by Albert O. Hirschman's key theoretical and epistemic commitments.

The rebranding of capital controls during the global crisis has widened the policy space in the financial arena to a greater, more consistent degree than following the Asian crisis. How are we to account for this extraordinary ideational and policy evolution? The paper highlights five factors that contribute to the evolving rebranding of capital controls. These include: (1) the rise of increasingly autonomous developing states, largely as a consequence of their successful response to the Asian crisis; (2) the increasing assertiveness of their policymakers in part as a consequence of their relative success in responding to the current crisis; (3) a pragmatic adjustment by the IMF to an altered global economy in which the geography of its influence has been severely restricted, and in which it has become financially dependent on former clients; (4) the need for capital controls by countries at the extremes, i.e. those that faced implosion, and also and more importantly by those that have fared 'too well'; and (5) the evolution in the ideas of academic economists and IMF staff. The paper also explores tensions around the rebranding of capital controls as exemplified by efforts to 'domesticate' their use via a code of conduct. Adapted from the source document.