Suchergebnisse

The Jahrbuch für historische Kommunismusforschung usually has a two-year embargo period. Thereafter the whole volume becomes OA under https://kommunismusgeschichte.de/jhk/. The present article serves as a test case for the publisher and will become Open Access after only six months after publication of the volume in March 2020. ; Even though the GDR's special relationship to the EEC was subject to permanent discussions in East and West throughout the Cold War, historical research on the East German attitude towards West European integration has limited itself largely to perceptions of the Community and hardly addressed its role as an economic factor. Against the backdrop of the peculiar situation resulting from division of Germany and global economic developments, this article analyses how the deepening and enlargement of the Western integration project affected the GDR during the "long 1970s" and how perceptions of the emerging economic giant changed over time. Despite the favorable conditions of intra-German trade, East Berlin had to face the economic repercussions of progressing West European integration. The implementation of the EEC's Common Commercial Policy and consecutive steps towards an ever-closer foreign trade policy impaired East German economic interests in many ways. As a result, the supposedly strict and formally upheld policy of non-recognition towards the EEC failed. Nevertheless, in a somewhat surprising way, the SED leadership started to see the EEC as a role model for the CMEA. ; The research leading to this article is part of the project PanEur1970s, which has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (Grant Agreement No. 669194).

First published online: 5 August 2019 ; Due to costly 'consumer socialism' and continuous trade deficits with the West, the East German balance of payments crisis was aggravated towards the end of the 1970s. Declining Soviet support, the tense international situation, rising interest rates and the financial turbulences of other Socialist states (Poland, Romania) made the situation even worse. Facing a Western 'credit boycott', in spring 1982 bankruptcy seemed unavoidable to many of the GDR's economic experts. However, after the adoption of several emergency measures, solvency was secured in the short-run and finally the loans negotiated by Bavarian Prime Minister Franz Josef Strauß in 1983/84 released the GDR from the acute debt crisis. This article revisits the East German struggle to avoid bankruptcy prior to the 'Strauß loans'. It sheds new light on the regime's reactions to the 'credit boycott' and examines the strategies pursued to secure solvency. Oil and other trade operations with the USSR and certain Western countries created the necessary financial leeway. Since the resulting short-term liquidity came at high costs, the search for new loans continued. Finally, the so-called 'Zurich model' and its failure is a good case in point to illustrate the GDR's aim of surviving the debt crisis without making any major concessions in return. ; The research leading to this article is part of the project PanEur1970s, which has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (Grant Agreement No. 669194).

mis en ligne le 02 juillet 2020 ; L'article traite des relations entre la RDA et la CEE de 1957 à 1990. Après une introduction consacrée aux contextes germano-allemand et européen dans lesquels s'inscrivent ces relations, leur dimension politique et économique est examinée. Il apparaît clairement que, malgré son statut spécial résultant du commerce intra-allemand, la RDA, comme tous les autres pays du CAEM, a été affectée par la construction de l'Europe occidentale. Suivant la ligne de Moscou, Berlin-Est refusait néanmoins de reconnaître la CEE. Ce n'est qu'au milieu des années 1980 que les contacts se sont intensifiés et qu'en 1988, des relations ont été établies. Bien que la Communauté européenne ait toujours formellement préconisé la réunification de l'Allemagne, les dirigeants de la RDA espéraient que Bruxelles soutiendrait leur lutte pour préserver leur État. ; The article deals with the relations between the GDR and the EEC from 1957 to 1990. After a problem-oriented introduction to the German-German and European framework of this relationship, it focusses on its political and economic dimension. In doing so, the analysis shows that – despite the special status resulting from the provisions of intra-German trade – the GDR was no less affected by the progress of deepening West European integration than the other COMECON member states. Nevertheless, following Moscow's line, East Berlin refused to officially recognize the EEC. Only in the mid-1980s contacts intensified and relations were established in 1988. Despite the fact, that the developing European Community had – at least formally – always supported the West German goal of reunification, ironically, the GDR leadership hoped for support by Brussels in its struggle for the survival of its state. ; The research leading to this article is part of the project PanEur1970s, which has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (Grant Agreement No. 669194).

The essay provides a detailed analysis of the Communist Party of Austria's (KPÖ) policy in relation to the events in the Alps-Adriatic region after WWII. The territorial dispute between Austria and Yugoslavia over Carinthia shows the gap between national politics and internationalism at the heart of the strategy pursued by this communist party. In fact, while the KPÖ openly praised the achievements of Yugoslavian socialism and supported its claims on Trieste, it rejected Belgrade's territorial demands on Austria. The relationship between the two parties, however, developed quite positively until Stalin's break with Tito. Although part of the party was incredulous with respect to the denunciation that Tito was a traitor to communism, the KPÖ still chose the path of total alignment with Stalin's dictation. In the case of South Tyrol, however, the Austrian party first demanded the right of self-determination and thereafter, in 1946, sought to install itself as a leading force in the region, referring to the possibility of creating a section of the KPÖ south of the Brenner. However, the PCI proved determined not to leave the rather limited reins of South Tyrolean communism in Austrian hands