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In this first full-length study of legal monism, Paul Gragl advocates for the revival of legal monism as a solution to normative conflicts between different bodies of law. Using comprehensive and inter-disciplinary arguments, this book defends the theory against dualism and pluralism.

PART I: INTRODUCTION-A TALE OF TWO COURTS -- 1. Setting the Scene for Accession -- I. The EU and the European Convention on Human Rights -- II. Accession and Autonomy: The Research Question of this Book -- III. A Caveat on Legal Definitions -- 2. Scope of this Book -- I. A Survey of the Status Quo -- II. The Shape of Things to Come -- III. Conclusions and Outlook -- PART II: THE AUTONOMY OF EUROPEAN UNION LAW VERSUS INTERNATIONAL LAW AND COURTS -- 3. The Notion of Legal Autonomy -- I. The Legal Framework: The CJEU's Exclusive Jurisdiction -- II. Accession and Autonomy: Justifi ed Concerns or Much Ado about Nothing? -- III. The Union's Legal Autonomy and International Law -- 4. The EU and International Courts and Tribunals -- I. European Union Law at Risk: The CJEU and the EEA Court -- II. Competing Jurisdictions: The MOX Plant Case -- III. Legal Analysis -- 5. A Special Case: The Court of Justice of the European Union and the European Court of Human Rights -- I. The Convention and the EU: A View from Luxembourg -- II. Violations of the Convention by EU Law: The Strasbourg Perspective -- III. Opinion 2 -- 94: Obsolete Concerns or Autonomy at Risk? -- 6. The EU, International Law and International Courts: An Anticipating Assessment for Accession -- I. Lessons of the Past -- II. Questions for the Future -- PART III: THE ROAD FROM LUXEMBOURG TO STRASBOURG: RECONCILING ACCESSION AND AUTONOMY -- 7. The Status of the Accession Agreement and the Convention after Accession -- I. The Legal Basis: Article 218 TFEU and the Court of Justice -- II. The Need for an Accession Agreement -- III. The Status of the Convention and the Agreement in EU Law -- IV. Interim Conclusions -- 8. External Review by Strasbourg: A Hierarchy of Courts? -- I. External Review vs Autonomy: The Legal Issue Situated -- II. A Binding Interpretation of Union Law by Strasbourg? -- III. European Union Law in Violation of the Convention -- IV. Interim Conclusions -- 9. Individual Applications after Accession: Introducing the Co-Respondent Mechanism -- I. Individual Applications: Core of the Convention -- II. Identifying the Right Respondent after Accession -- III. Interim Conclusions -- 10. Inter-Party Cases after Accession -- I. Inter-State Cases: A Reminiscence of Westphalia -- II. The Internal Dimension: Luxembourg versus Strasbourg -- III. The External Dimension: The European Union as a Human Rights Litigator in Europe? -- IV. Interim Conclusions -- 11. The Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies and the Prior Involvement of the Luxembourg Court -- I. The 'Exhaustion Rule' after Accession -- II. Direct and Indirect Actions -- III. The Solution of the Draft Accession Agreement -- IV. Interim Conclusions -- PART IV: CONCLUSIONS AND OUTLOOK -- 12. The Analytical Point of Departure: Revisiting and Answering the Research Question -- 13. The Prerequisites and Consequences of Accession: A Summary of Findings -- I. The Importance of the Autonomy Principle -- II. Legal Interfaces between Accession and Autonomy -- 14. Outlook and Future Perspectives

The CJEU is perceived to be a rather faceless court due to the principle of collegiality that is supposed to suppress individuality in its inner workings. This paper argues that this is not necessarily true in all cases and discusses instances wherein individual faces of the CJEU's members become discernible, in particular in their roles as President and Vice-President, respectively, the judge-rapporteur, Advocates General, single judges at the General Court, during public oral hearings, as litigants themselves, and of course in their academic publications. It also shows that judicial visibility can, in itself, certainly be construed to support the legitimacy of a court, but that it can, at the same time, also undermine its functioning, especially when judges are, as appointees, dependent on the will of their home Member State and others in the Council. Overall, it will be demonstrated that there are various situations in which individual CJEU members may emerge from an otherwise anonymous bench and play important judicial roles as individuals, thus rebutting the long-standing presumption that the CJEU is a faceless court.

Abstract
Sophocles' Antigone has been studied intensely for more than two thousand years, but it was especially Hegel's allegorical use of this tragedy in several of his works (first and foremost the Phenomenology of Spirit) that added yet another fascinating facet to its possible reading: the birth of the legal order and therewith a constitutional system from the conflict between two normative orders. In this contribution, I interpret the dialectic structure of Antigone in a manner in which each normative position – both Antigone's and Creon's – are equally justified and thereby antithetic in the ethical world of the Greek polis. It is therefore only by transcending this tragic conflict between the human and the divine orders that we can transform necessary externalities ('fate') into a process of a legal status which eventually allows individuals to become the authors of the law itself and thus to guarantee their freedom. I denote this reading of Hegel's Antigone as 'symmetrical', since it accepts both positions – Antigone's divine law and Creon's human law – as equal and makes freedom and justice only possible through the law. This means that an 'asymmetrical' reading, giving prevalence to either position (for instance, found in Goethe or Habermas) and localizing freedom and justice beyond the law, can never effectively result in a legal status that would allow individual persons to become legal persons.My principal argument consequently is that only a symmetrical view of this normative conflict can justifiably be regarded as making a constitutional order possible in the first place. It is feasible only in a dynamic-genealogical fashion (ie, by constantly generating this order through conflict and the transcending of this conflict through mutual recognition) that concurrently also respects individuals as particular individuals, not just as formal equals among equals, by allowing them to realize their personalities and to find themselves through the arts, science, and philosophy. This is more than a merely formal or negative constitution which recognizes every person as equal and free, but disregards their particularities; this is a material and positive constitution that can guarantee both equality and self-actualization. Such a constitutional order guarantees an identity of universal laws and individuality, and accordingly offers individuals a solution to the conflicting ethical orders of the ancient polis in which they would otherwise remain trapped.

In response to a climate in which respect for international law and the law of the European Union is rapidly losing ground, Paul Gragl advocates for the revival of legal monism as a solution to potentially irresolvable normative conflicts between different bodies of law. In this first comprehensive monograph on the theory as envisaged by the Pure Theory of Law of the Vienna School of Jurisprudence, the author defends legal monism against the competing theories of dualism and pluralism. Drawing on philosophical, epistemological, legal, moral, and political arguments, this book argues that only monism under the primacy of international law takes the law and the concept of legal validity seriously. On a practical level, it offers policy-makers and decision-makers methods of dealing with current problems and a means to restore respect for international law and peaceful international relations. While having the potential to revive and elicit further interest and research in monism and the Pure Theory of Law, the comprehensiveness and scope of the book also make it a choice text for inter-disciplinary scholars

Am 24.1.2017 verkündete der Supreme Court des Vereinigten Königreiches, dass der Austritt des Landes aus der Europäischen Union nach Art. 50 EUV nur nach Zustimmung des britischen Parlaments – und nicht nur durch eine Entscheidung der Regierung aufgrund ihrer "Royal Prerogative" im Bereich der Außenpolitik – erfolgen dürfe. Damit hat das Gericht nicht nur der Rechtstaatlichkeit, sondern auch der Demokratie einen unschätzbar wertvollen Dienst erwiesen. Doch was folgt aus diesem Urteil und wie wird dies den "Brexit" schlussendlich gestalten? Mein Beitrag wird versuchen, diese Aspekte kurz zu beleuchten und diese Fragen zu beantworten.