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MACROANALYSIS IS THE POLICY SYSTEM IS PREREQUISITE FOR MACROEVALUATION. EVALUATION REQUIRES THE EXISTENCE OF A STANDARD AGAINST WHICH THE THING TO BE EVALUATED IS MEASURED; THE KEY INGREDIENT IS THE CORRESPONDENCE OF PUBLIC WANTS AND POLICY OUTCOME SETS AS THIS IS THE SPECIFIC CRITERION OF MACROEVALUATION FOR THE POLICY SYSTEM "PUBLIC ACCEPTABILITY."

The theory of the unitary executive is one of the most controversial and significant constitutional doctrines of the past several decades. It holds that the U.S. president alone embodies all executive power and therefore has unlimited ability to direct the many people and institutions within the federal government's vast executive branch. It thus justifies the president's prerogative to organise the executive branch and to direct its activities, to tell executive personnel what to do and to fire them if desired, to control the flow of information, and to issue signing statements that make judgments about constitutionality and determine the extent to which laws will be implemented

Graham G. Dodds explores the constitutional and historical development of unilateral presidential directives--the ability of presidents to bypass the legislative process and set public policy via their own executive orders--and how such a practice fits Americans' conception of democracy.

AbstractAfter the dramatic disruptions of Trump years, American political development might do well to consider whether American exceptionalism still holds or has changed, and that would require scholars to be more attentive to cross-national comparisons and perhaps also to change the countries with which the United States is compared.

AbstractThis article assesses recent developments in the interbranch struggle over control of the bureaucracy, specifically independent federal agencies and the impact of the unitary executive theory during the presidency of Donald Trump. It examines controversies that involved two Supreme Court cases about independent agencies: Lucia v. SEC (2018), which addressed administrative law judges and the president's appointment power, and Seila Law v. CFPB (2020), which addressed agency leadership and the president's removal power. The two cases have received some attention from legal scholars, but they are not well known among presidency scholars, and they are important for understanding how the unitary executive theory and the interbranch struggle over control of the bureaucracy have developed in recent years.