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Argues that the practice of worst-case analysis & the unchecked arms race of the cold war were reined in by virtue of an revolution in US & Soviet national intelligence that began with "national technical means" (NTM) & allowed for more accurate assessments of each country's forces. In turn, this allowed for the development of & reliance on arms control arrangements. NTM capabilities include reconnaissance satellites; radar, camera, & infrared sensors; electronic surveillance; & other sensors. Provisions to optimize NTM systems in US-Soviet arms treaties are outlined: Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, START I, START II, Seabed Arms Control Treaty of 1972, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, Chemical Weapons Convention of 1993, Biological Weapons Convention, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty of 1996, & Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty. Despite the contribution of NTM verification, it is contended that the need for weapons of mass destruction (WMD) monitoring remains. In this light, discussed are monitoring issues with regard to China, India, Pakistan, Iraq, North Korea, & Iran, as well as to NTM monitoring in connection with the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Attention is also given to terrorism & WMD monitoring & the weaponization of outer space. D. Edelman

Sixty years into the atomic era, much has changed in the global security environment, but the peril of nuclear holocaust remains.

A consideration of the current state of global nuclear threats & capabilities. Introduced with a short history of the use of nuclear weapons, the decline of the power of deterrence in an era of proliferation, & the importance of the NPT (Nuclear Proliferation Treaty) & its CTBT (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty) to the slowing of nuclear proliferation since its 1968 signing. But with the United States' 1999 rejection of the CTBT & withdrawal from the ABM treaty, the failure to negotiate a FMCT (Fissle Material Cutoff Treaty), no new international commitments to reduce nuclear weapons since the mid-1990s, & nuclear testing by NPT non-nuclear states (Pakistan & India), the NPT is weak & its future unsure. Five United States' responses are suggested -- presidential seeking of senate advice & consent to ratify the CTBT, willingness to sign legally binding protocol to the NPT of negative assurance, commitment to vigorous pursuit of verifiable FMCT, restarting START (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks), & removing the option of military action against Iran -- followed by concluding suggestions of limiting access to the nuclear fuel cycle. These would strengthen the NPT from within & reduce the potential of nuclear nightmare. R. Rodriguez

Comments on the question of whether to develop a national ballistic missile defense system & whether the 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM), ratified by the US & USSR, remains in force despite the latter's breakup. Graham presents arguments in support the president's right to decide, stating that the Constitution gives him the supreme national authority in foreign policy. The Senate's role ceases after it approves a treaty. The many important multilateral & bilateral international arms control agreements with the USSR have not been questioned, but would be in jeopardy if the treaty were declared invalid. The US supports adherence to international law, & must, therefore, not set a precedent of breaking its agreements. Intent to withdraw could be achieved through the use of the treaty's supreme interests withdrawal clause & adherence to its conditions. L. A. Hoffman