Price and welfare effects of a pharmaceutical substitution reform
In: Umeå economic studies 777
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In: Umeå economic studies 777
In: Umeå economic studies 710
In: The B.E. journal of economic analysis & policy, Band 15, Heft 3, S. 1197-1235
ISSN: 1935-1682
Abstract
This paper analyzes how allowing pharmacies to negotiate discounts with parallel traders and producers affects the market share for parallel imports. Economic theory predicts that discount negotiations will promote products bought directly from the producers because producers have cost advantages, due to which they always underbid the marginal prices of parallel traders. A reform that allowed discount negotiations is found to reduce the market share for parallel imports by about 11 percentage points to reach 31%. The results clearly indicate that pharmacies have an important role in the choice between medically equivalent pharmaceuticals.
In: Public choice, Band 148, Heft 3-4, S. 531-546
ISSN: 1573-7101
In democracies, elections are the primary mechanism for making politicians act in voters' interests, but voters are unable to prevent that some resources are diverted to political rents. With two levels of government, the rents are reduced if voters require higher beneficial public expenditures for reelecting incumbents. Voters can also strengthen their power by holding politicians liable also for decisions made by the other level of government. When the incumbent at one level acts as a Stackelberg leader with respect to the other, there is no risk of this leading to Leviathan policies on the part of the incumbents. Adapted from the source document.
In: Public choice, Band 148, Heft 3, S. 531-547
ISSN: 0048-5829
In democracies, elections are the primary mechanism for making politicians act in voters' interests, but voters are unable to prevent that some resources are diverted to political rents. With two levels of government, the rents are reduced if voters require higher beneficial public expenditures for reelecting incumbents. Voters can also strengthen their power by holding politicians liable also for decisions made by the other level of government. When the incumbent at one level acts as a Stackelberg leader with respect to the other, there is no risk of this leading to Leviathan policies on the part of the incumbents.
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In: Public choice, Band 148, Heft 3-4, S. 531-546
ISSN: 1573-7101
This thesis consists of a summary and four papers. The first two concerns health care and sickness absence, and the last two pharmaceutical costs and prices. Paper [I] presents an economic federation model which resembles the situation in, for example, Sweden. In the model the state governments provide health care, the fed-eral government provides a sickness benefit and both levels tax labor income. The re-sults show that the states can have either an incentive to under- or over-provide health care. The federal government can, by introducing an intergovernmental transfer, in-duce the state governments to provide the socially optimal amount of health care. In Paper [II] the effect of aggregated public health care expenditure on absence from work due to sickness or disability was estimated. The analysis was based on data from a panel of the Swedish municipalities for the period 1993-2004. Public health care expenditure was found to have no statistically significant effect on absence and the standard errors were small enough to rule out all but a minimal effect. The result held when separate estimations were conducted for women and men, and for absence due to sickness and disability. The purpose of Paper [III] was to study the effects of the introduction of fixed pharmaceutical budgets for two health centers in Västerbotten, Sweden. Estimation results using propensity score matching methods show that there are no systematic differences for either price or quantity per prescription between health centers using fixed and open-ended budgets. The analysis was based on individual prescription data from the two health centers and a control group both before and after the introduction of fixed budgets. In Paper [IV] the introduction of the Swedish substitution reform in October 2002 was used as a natural experiment to examine the effects of increased consumer infor-mation on pharmaceutical prices. Using monthly data on individual pharmaceutical prices, the average reduction of prices due to the reform was estimated to four percent for both brand name and generic pharmaceuticals during the first four years after the reform. The results also show that the price adjustment was not instant.
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This paper addresses vertical fiscal externalities in a model where the state governments provide health care and the federal government provides a sickness benefit. Both levels of government tax labor income and policy decisions affect labor income as well as participation in the labor market. The results show that the vertical externality affecting the state governments' policy decisions can be either positive or negative depending on, among other things, the wage elasticity of labor supply and the marginal product of expenditure on health care. Moreover, it is proved that the vertical fiscal externality will not vanish by assigning all powers of taxation to the states.
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We study how the optimal public provision of health care depends on whether or not individuals have an option to seek publicly financed treatment in other regions. We find that, relative to the first-best solution, the government has an incentive to over-provide health care to low-income individuals. When cross-border health care takes place, this incentive is solely explained by that over-provision facilitates redistribution. The reason why more health care facilitates redistribution is that high-ability individuals mimicking low-ability individuals benefit the least from health care when health and labor supply are complements. Without cross-border health care, higher demand for health care among high-income individuals also contributes to the over-provision given that high-income individuals do not work considerably less than low-income individuals and that the government cannot discriminate between the income groups by giving them different access to health care.
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This short paper analyzes whether a federal transfer system can be designed to increase welfare, when state governments create political budget cycles to increase the likelihood of reelection. The results show how the federal government may announce a transfer scheme in advance for the post-election year that counteracts the welfare costs of political budget cycles.
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This paper analyzes the welfare effects of a publicly provided private good with long-term consequences for individual well-being, in an economy where consumers have present-biased preferences due to quasihyperbolic discounting. The analysis is based on a two-type model with asymmetric information between the government and the private sector, and each consumer fives for three periods. We present formal conditions under which public provision to the young and the middle-aged generation, respectively, leads to higher welfare. Our results show that quasihyperbolic discounting provides a strong incentive for public provision to the young generation - especially if the consumers are naive (as opposed to sophisticated).
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