Suchergebnisse

Feminist scholars have demonstrated the gendered nature of intimate violence and the tendency to put the responsibility on women to avoid both sexual and physical violence ("responsibilization"). This article applies these insights to the context of intimate partner criminal harassment, which is committed overwhelmingly by men against former female intimate partners. Using criminal harassment decisions over the past decade, this article argues that the elements of the offence—specifically the requirements that the accused cause the complainant to fear for her safety, that this fear be reasonable, and that he intend to harass her—feed into the tendency towards responsibilization. Women are disbelieved if they fail to report the harassment promptly to police, fail to obtain a no contact order, or fail to communicate to their harassers that the harassment is unwanted. The accused's behaviour is never subjected to a standard of reasonableness. The article concludes that legislative reform is a necessary step towards providing an adequate criminal justice response to this serious problem.

This article reviews the current sentencing regime for the crime of murder in Canada with a view to identifying its shortcomings and suggesting possibilities for improvement. The article argues that the existing classification of murder into first- and second-degree, and the harsh periods of parole ineligibility attached to a murder conviction should both be abolished. The author argues for a compromise position, which would maintain the important distinction between manslaughter and murder and yet allow sufficient flexibility for trial judges to ensure that sentences for murder, as with other crimes, can be tailored to fit the crime.

This paper examines the legislative response to the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R. v. Daviault. The author argues that Bill C-72, which limits the defence of extreme intoxication, is constitutional because of its strong underpinnings in equality. The author reviews the statistics on violence against women and the role of intoxication in that violence to illustrate why the defence of intoxication raises issues of sex equality. The author argues that a court assessing the constitutionality of Bill C-72 should consider this strong foundation in equality and the fact that the Bill is the result of a careful balancing of the interests at stake by a democratically elected legislature.

This paper presents an analysis of the early Charter cases dealing with civil commitment and compulsory treatment of individuals under provincial mental health legislation. The author describes two models for dealing with these issues: the paternalistic model and the social control model. She argues that Canadian courts have adopted a paternalistic approach and, as such, have failed to recognize the adversary relationship between the state and the individual which forms the basis of involuntary psychiatry. Courts have thus failed to develop the kinds of procedural protections that are available in the criminal law context. The author proposes that courts making decisions dealing with civil mental health issues should rely less on paternalism and recognize the serious deprivations of liberty at stake for individuals in the mental health system.

The specific focus of this paper is on the Dangerous Offender provisions in Part XXI of our Criminal Code.' However, the issues that arise in any form of preventive detention2 go to the heart of our criminal justice system. Hence, these provisions will be used as a vehicle for dealing with the broader issues. Ethical considerations will be discussed as they arise. The paper begins with an analysis of the history of Part XXI, with emphasis on the moral and legal problems that had to be faced as the legislation developed. The legislative history and the case law are important tools in the analysis but they are only a means to an end. In this case, the end is to present the problems inherent in preventive detention.

This paper examines the phenomenon of non-consensual condom removal (NCCR) and its relationship to sexual assault in Canada. Using empirical studies and the insights of feminist theory, we explore the nature of the harms caused by NCCR and contend that this pervasive practice constitutes sexual assault. We then critique the decision of R v Hutchinson, which held that condom sabotage does not negate subjective consent, ignoring the dignitary harms of NCCR. While lower court decisions before Hutchinson recognized that consent to sex with a condom does not include consent to sex without, courts after Hutchinson have struggled to distinguish the decision in ways that lack coherence or have simply ignored the decision altogether. After briefly examining legislative amendments in other jurisdictions, we argue for a return to the fundamental finding in R v Ewanchuk that how sexual activity is carried out, including whether a condom is used, must be part of the subjective consent inquiry. Dans cet article, nous examinons le phénomène du retrait non consensuel du condom (RNC) et son lien avec les agressions sexuelles au Canada. À l'aide d'études empiriques et de la théorie féministe, nous explorons la nature des préjudices causés par le retrait non consensuel du condom et soutenons que cette pratique omniprésente constitue une agression sexuelle. Nous critiquons ensuite la décision rendue dans l'affaire R. c. Hutchinson, selon laquelle le sabotage du préservatif n'annule pas le consentement subjectif, ignorant ainsi les atteintes à la dignité causées par le RNC. Alors que les décisions des tribunaux inférieurs rendues avant l'arrêt Hutchinson reconnaissaient que le consentement à des relations sexuelles avec un préservatif n'inclut pas le consentement à des relations sexuelles sans préservatif, les tribunaux après l'arrêt Hutchinson se sont efforcés de distinguer la décision de manière peu cohérente ou ont tout simplement ignoré la décision. Après avoir examiné brièvement les modifications législatives apportées dans d'autres juridictions, nous plaidons en faveur d'un retour à la conclusion fondamentale de l'arrêt R c. Ewanchuk selon laquelle la façon dont l'activité sexuelle est menée, y compris l'utilisation d'un préservatif, doit faire partie de l'enquête sur le consentement subjectif.