While political theorists tend to regard rule as a necessary evil, this work aims to explain how rule need not be understood as anathema to political life. By looking at some of the earliest traditions of political thought, Stuart Gray establishes a new analytic approach to understanding fundamental political ideas of other cultures and time periods, and he uses this comparative analysis to re-envision the meaning of rule in contemporary political life.
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AbstractWhile numerous methodological and interpretive challenges confront the study of cross-cultural political theory, this essay examines a particular premodern Indian tradition as an example of such difficulties and one way in which they can be overcome. Exploring the problematic ways in which people have interpreted and made use of India's ancient past, it critically examines arguments for the existence of secularism, free elections, and democratic assemblies in the Vedas. Defending what I call a "critical revivalist" position, it is argued that predominant approaches to premodern traditions in contemporary Indian political theory place significant constraints on cross-cultural intelligibility and theory building within the Indian context. To elaborate this point, I shift from a "political" to rājan-oriented categorical register in an effort to reposition current understandings of self-rule (swaraj) in India within a broader rajanical tradition. Finally, this essay explains how contemporary Indian political theory can draw insights from this native tradition without necessarily reverting to familiar Western idioms.
Since the rediscovery of the ancient Indian political thinker Kautilya and his Arthaastra in the early twentieth century, scholars have argued for similarities between his political thinking and Machiavelli's, especially on the topic of realism. Employing a new analytic approach to reexamine their political thought, I locate unidentified tensions and overlaps between Machiavelli's secular ethic, which pulls towards autonomous standards, and Kautilya's political-theological ethic, which follows traditional brahmanical beliefs. In the first part of the essay, I challenge existing interpretations of Kautilya's thought and clarify a coherent political theology in the Arthaastra. The second part critically assesses their realist positions using the concepts of flexibility and legitimacy. While I explain how the Machiavellian position poses justifiable objections to the apparent repression and self-defeating nature of brahmanical realism, I also argue that the Kautilyan position raises important questions concerning both the flexibility and inflexibility of a secular realist position. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Inc., copyright holder.]
Since the rediscovery of the ancient Indian political thinker Kautilya and his Arthaśāstra in the early twentieth century, scholars have argued for similarities between his political thinking and Machiavelli's, especially on the topic of realism. Employing a new analytic approach to reexamine their political thought, I locate unidentified tensions and overlaps between Machiavelli's secular ethic, which pulls towards autonomous standards, and Kautilya's political-theological ethic, which follows traditional brahmanical beliefs. In the first part of the essay, I challenge existing interpretations of Kautilya's thought and clarify a coherent political theology in the Arthaśāstra. The second part critically assesses their realist positions using the concepts of flexibility and legitimacy. While I explain how the Machiavellian position poses justifiable objections to the apparent repression and self-defeating nature of brahmanical realism, I also argue that the Kautilyan position raises important questions concerning both the flexibility and inflexibility of a secular realist position.