Suchergebnisse

Russia's political system can be best understood as an electoral patronal regime in which key actors are organized into a single pyramid of authority that dominates the political arena, particularly in the ethnic republics. It is argued that the asymmetric federalization of post-Soviet Russia and centralization of governance were stabilizing for the state because, during the tumultuous transition from Communism, they have acted as counterweights to such centrifugal forces as nationalism and religious radicalism. The article addresses this question: Does the political regime under Putin limit the behaviour of regional elites by structuring and prioritizing their agendas or, on the contrary, does this regime gradually devolve to match the underlying political configuration of the state? The article concludes that in multi-ethnic hybrid regimes that preserve contested elections, as does Russia, regional politics matters more than in typical authoritarian regimes. Since Putin's popularity and power are closely tied to Russia's economic stability and anti-Western sentiment, protracted economic stagnation coupled with growing social discontent at the regional level will trigger a long-awaited centrifugal change in political authority and may eventually lead to political fragmentation after Putin.

Although Russian authorities point to the supposed success of Britain's late colonial counter-insurgency campaigns as a model even in the 21st century, their grasp of the historical lessons is partial at best. This article considers the applicability and relevance of the counter-insurgency experience of the late British colonial state to present-day ethno-religious conflicts in the North Caucasus. The article suggests that the flexibility of British arrangements for counter-insurgency was a major factor in achieving long-term stability for the gradual transition to indigenous self-rule. The key practice was to devolve responsibility and power to indigenous elites operating with a high degree of autonomy. The article then proposes guidelines relevant to the conditions of the present and the near future that will affect prospects both for full-fledged democratization of Russia and for effective state-building, also vitally important for the development of the North Caucasus. The article concludes that the most relevant factor in the British counter-insurgency experience is to win the hearts and minds of the population. However, this cannot be achieved without a legitimate indigenous administration capable of taking full responsibility and ownership of the campaign. Otherwise, diminished political access and accountability create propitious conditions for adherents of radical movements, who are increasingly capable of and prepared to use violence and who are the only de facto rival political forces within the Russian Federation.

The idea of redrawing the borders between the republics of the region remains a topic of discussion beyond its borders. While the Kremlin de facto makes the subject of territorial changes in the North Caucasus taboo, the processes related to the rise of ethnic selfconsciousness in ethnic republics hardly stopped. The Syrian crisis, which gave Russia a much-celebrated diplomatic victory, threatens its territorial integrity because Moscow's mishandling of the Circassian issue is radicalizing the Circassian communities of the North Caucasus. Drawing on the dynamics of ethnic mobilization among Circassians, the paper argues that this process may result in the most dangerous consequences of the Kremlin's policies based on the ancient imperial principle of "divide and rule" — redrawing the administrative map of the entire region. The paper concludes that even though Moscow pretends that the situation is under control, a shift which consequences are hard to predict is already happening. One of them is that the demand for an increased congruency between Russia's ethnic and administrative borders becomes politically salient; and a protrusion in the battle line becomes more prominent with each passing day.

The emergence of an autocratic regime in Chechnya, traditionally structured on polycentric elites from clans and regions, has been just one outcome of President Putin's ethnic policies based on personal loyalty. The paper addresses this puzzle: why, against rigorous rhetoric and demonstration of tight control over Chechnya, this region is already de facto separated from Russia? Concentrating on the question of ethnicity and its relation to democracy in contemporary Chechnya, the main argument of the article is while ethnic politics has been partly the outcome of the authoritarian rule of President Putin, the way ethnicity has been instrumentalized by the Chechen elites and the federal authorities, have created serious obstacles for the rise and the consolidation of democracy in Russia. The paper concludes that under the circumstances of ideological vacuum, pervasive corruption, and further crack-down on civil liberties that became defining characteristic features for the present political regime under President Putin, Chechen ethnic nationalism is gradually transforming the republic from a de facto independent territory associated with Russia into a de jure independent state that could request recognition of its independence from other countries.

One of the most lingering questions about Russian politics that dominates public discourse and media coverage is the future of political regime after the 2012 presidential elections. The answer to this question is inextricably linked to the extent of differences between President Vladimir Putin and Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev, how long their "tandemocracy" will last and what can bring about regime change as scarce critics of the Kremlin, from ultra-liberals to communists, have been haphazardly co-opted into the power system, leaving no political ambitions that they would not, in principle, be ready to abandon in return for proper compensation.
In sharp contrast to the views of many regional experts and commentators, the presentday Russian Federation is the world's most anti-Soviet state. It is based upon a very different set of values: private ownership, dire individualism, the cult of money, a clan-based political system, and pervasive corruption at all levels of government. The North Caucasus ethnocratic elites, however, do not have access to abundant resources for sale, and are forced to look around for alternative sustenance, as rigid centralism and unification limit their rent-seeking capabilities. Alexander Khloponin, the incumbent presidential envoy in charge of the North Caucasus Federal District, seems to continue the policy of buying the loyalty of regional archaic clan-based elites that aggravates rather than improves the situation.
The paper addresses this puzzle: why, against rigorous rhetoric and demonstration of tight grip over the region, neither Putin nor Medvedev has real power to bring change to the North Caucasus? In an attempt to solve this puzzle, the paper examines the triadic relationship among central political elite, who benefited from the massive privatisation of lucrative segments of Soviet industry in the early 1990s, regional clan-based ethnocracy, and non-systemic religious opposition. Drawing on the works of Russian scholars and experts in Russian politics, the paper explores the hypothesis that on-going instability in the North Caucasus can no longer be explained by a well-known set of theories of ethnic violence, because it is carefully negotiated by regional and central political elite, who do not see the North Caucasus as an indispensable part of the Russian Federation and whose clan-based rent-seeking agendas have gradually driven Russian statehood into a complete dead-end. Instead of facing the real challenges that are addressed in this paper, it is only able to make a public show of action on the eve of crucial political campaigns: the 2012 presidential elections and the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi. The paper concludes that the deep freeze in the Russian political system has exhausted its debatable potential for change through the existing tandem model of government with its obscure division of roles between two leaders. What we actually see is an imitation of political reform and the resulting degradation of the entire system of governance. Over the past century, Russian polity has never been as weak as today, because the only legitimate source of power in Russia is corruption.