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"Social Science Experiments: A Hands-on Introduction is an accessible textbook for undergraduates. Its four objectives are to help readers to (1) become perceptive critics of social science claims and the evidence used to support them, (2) learn basic terminology used to describe experimental designs and the statistical analysis of experimental data, (3) design and conduct a small-scale randomized experiment in a manner that sheds light on a causal question while at the same time respecting ethical boundaries, and (4) appreciate the importance of research transparency in all phases of experimental design and analysis. Chapters draw on a wide array of social science experiments from fields such as political science, psychology, criminology, and health. The textbook assumes no prior background in statistics or programming, making it a perfect complement for a course in introductory statistics. Worked examples are written in the open-source software R. The exercises invite readers to work with publicly-available datasets from published studies. Solutions to the exercises appear at the back of the book. Further instruction in R is provided by an R Companion to this volume."--

The vast literature on party identification has gradually become bogged down by disputes about how to interpret observational data. This paper proposes the use of experimental designs to shed light on the responsiveness of party identification to short term forces such as retrospective performance evaluations. Examples of recent field experiments are used to illustrate two types of experimental designs and the assumptions on which they rest.

Cover -- CONTENTS -- PREFACE -- ONE: RATIONALITY IN POLITICS AND ECONOMICS -- TWO: THE NATURE OF RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY -- THREE: METHODOLOGICAL PATHOLOGIES -- FOUR: THE PARADOX OF VOTER TURNOUT -- FIVE: SOCIAL DILEMMAS AND FREE-RIDING -- SIX: LEGISLATIVE BEHAVIOR AND THE PARADOX OF VOTING -- SEVEN: SPATIAL THEORIES OF ELECTORAL COMPETITION -- EIGHT: RESPONSES TO LIKELY COUNTERARGUMENTS -- REFERENCES -- INDEX -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- J -- K -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- R -- S -- T -- U -- V -- W.

This is the first comprehensive critical evaluation of the use of rational choice explanations in political science. Writing in an accessible and nontechnical style, Donald P. Green and Ian Shapiro assess rational choice theory where it is reputed to be most successful: the study of collective action, the behavior of political parties and politicians, and such phenomena as voting cycles and Prisoner's Dilemmas. In their hard-hitting critique, Green and Shapiro demonstrate that the much-heralded achievements of rational choice theory are in fact deeply suspect and that fundamental rethinking is needed if rational choice theorists are to contribute to the understanding of politics. Green and Shapiro show that empirical tests of rational choice theories are marred by a series of methodological defects. These defects flow from the characteristic rational choice impulse to defend universal theories of politics. As a result, many tests are so poorly conducted as to be irrelevant to evaluating rational choice models. Tests that are properly conducted either tend to undermine rational choice theories or to lend support for propositions that are banal. Green and Shapiro offer numerous suggestions as to how rational choice propositions might be reformulated as parts of testable hypotheses for the study of politics. In a final chapter they anticipate and respond to a variety of rational choice counterarguments, thereby initiating a dialogue that is bound to continue for some time.

AbstractA pioneering study by Loewen et al. made use of the Canadian legislature's newly instituted lottery, which enabled non-cabinet Members of Parliament (MPs) to propose a bill or motion. Their study used this lottery in order to identify the causal effect of proposal power on incumbents' vote share in the next election. Analyzing the first two parliaments to use the lottery, Loewen et al. found that proposal power benefits incumbents, but only incumbents who belong to the governing party. Our study builds on these initial results by adding data from four subsequent parliaments. The pooled results no longer support the hypothesis that MPs—even those who belong to the governing party—benefit appreciably from proposal power. These updated findings resolve a theoretical puzzle noted by Loewen et al., as proposal power would not ordinarily be expected to confer electoral benefits in strong party systems, such as Canada's.

AbstractThe past decade has witnessed profound changes in the tenor of American party politics. These changes, in tandem with growing affective polarization and residential segregation by party, raise the question of whether party identification is itself changing. Using three multi-wave panel surveys that stretch from the first Obama Administration through the Trump Administration, this paper takes a fresh look at the stability of party identification, using several different statistical approaches to differentiate true partisan change from response error. Perhaps surprisingly, the pace of partisan change observed between 2011 and 2020 is quite similar to the apparent rates of change in panel surveys dating back to the 1950s. Few respondents experience appreciable change in party identification in the short run, but the pace at which partisanship changes implies that substantial changes are relatively common over a voter's lifespan.