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Drawing on social psychological threat theories and extending them to a national level, this study investigated individual- and country-level predictors of Europeans' support for immigration criteria. Endorsement of ascribed and acquired immigration standards was analysed with survey data across 20 nations. Multi-level regression analyses revealed that among the individual-level predictors, perceived threat had the strongest relationship with support for both entry criteria. Low gross domestic product (GDP) and low refugee rate predicted approval of ascribed criteria. Cross-level interactions revealed that relationships between perceived threat and approval of acquired entry criteria were intensified in high GDP and high refugee rate contexts. The results corroborate predictions of social psychological threat theories and underscore the importance of including macro-social factors in the cross-national study of immigration attitudes.

In the context where immigration divides the political space of Western societies, perceived social polarization as an explanation of collective action is surprisingly understudied in contemporary social psychology. We hypothesize that the more people perceive polarization, the more they will engage in collective action in line with their attitudes. Moreover, this effect should be explained by two interrelated factors: identification and perceived efficacy. Perceived polarization should shape how important immigration attitudes are for individuals' self-definition and thereby believing oneself capable of making a change, which in turn triggers collective action. To test our predictions, we conducted three studies (Studies 1 and 2 were correlational and Study 3 experimental) among mobilized and non-mobilized samples in two countries (i.e. Belgium and Switzerland). Results partially support our predictions that perceived social polarization on immigration issues relates to engaging in collective action. Indirect effect analyses revealed the predominant role of identity dynamics in the social psychological processes linked to perceiving polarization. These results provide potential explanations to the strong mobilization that emerged since 2015 following the so-called migrant crisis. Implications of our findings for collective action literature are discussed. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/inPress

Abstract
The closing of national borders was one of the most far-reaching policy measures adopted to limit the spread of the virus during the coronavirus disease 2019 pandemic. Despite its unprecedented nature and far-reaching impact on individual lives, blocking almost all human movements not only into but also out of states, popular support for this measure was surprisingly high. How can this support be explained? Using an original 4-wave panel dataset across 11 countries together with cross-national policy data, we explore individual and contextual drivers of border closure support throughout 2020. We find that higher support can partly be explained by political attitudes related to cross-border mobility, such as distrust in foreigners or right-wing ideology. Primarily, however, support for closing borders is shaped by respondents' evaluation of governments' handling of the pandemic, as well as the intensity and timing of the constraining measures. We also find that support wanes over time, which may indicate a policy fatigue effect. Interestingly, health concerns (exposure to the virus) have almost no influence on support. Even in this exceptional situation, and when confronted with a new policy issue, citizens' preferences are thus primarily a politically driven response to government measures.

This study identifies life dissatisfaction and related political attitudes as predictors of right-wing populist voting in Europe. Using survey data from 14 countries (2012–2018, N = 54,263), we find that life dissatisfaction links to negative attitudes on immigration and, in many countries, also to political distrust, and relates through these attitudes to a right-wing populist vote. By proposing a well-being framework to explain right-wing populist demand, we broaden the focus of discontent taken in previous research on psychological antecedents of populism. We suggest that low subjective well-being among the electorate has political relevance and could become a threat to the future of liberal democracy.

Negative attitudes toward immigrants are widespread in Western societies, and research has repeatedly attempted to explain such attitudes with the presence of cultural diversity arising from a high number of immigrants. Highlighting how political psychology integrates individual and contextual levels of explanation, the present paper aims to overview research that reaches beyond this narrow focus of diversity (i.e., immigrant proportion) to understand anti-immigrant attitudes in culturally diverse societies. First, we present research that reconciles two opposing intergroup mechanisms – contact and threat – both triggered by a high proportion of immigrants. Second, emphasis is placed on ideological climates, a novel contextual antecedent of anti-immigrant attitudes understood as collectively shared norms and values permeating all spheres of social life. Ideological climates influence anti-immigrant attitudes beyond individual characteristics and further shape individuals' responses to cultural diversity. Third, the paper extends existing research on a Person × Context interaction approach to anti-immigrant attitudes and suggests how cultural diversity and ideological climates differentially impact the link between individual-level ideologies and anti-immigrant attitudes. The growing field of multilevel research on anti-immigrant attitudes is overviewed and empirical illustrations of our recent research in Switzerland are provided. We conclude by discussing the benefits and further challenges of integrating individual and contextual antecedents in political psychology and beyond.

We investigate how different types of cultural diversity influence anti-immigration attitudes across Swiss municipalities. While from a threat theory perspective, a high number of immigrants within a region increases (perceived) threat which fosters negative immigration attitudes, intergroup contact theory contends that culturally diverse societal contexts increase opportunities for contacts with immigrants, which give rise to more positive immigration attitudes. Prior research on ethnic hierarchies and host society acculturation attitudes led us to hypothesize that the presence of valued, "culturally similar" immigrants from wealthier countries increases contact and decreases threat, thereby reducing anti-immigrant prejudice. The presence of devalued, "culturally distant" immigrants from poorer countries should increase threat perceptions and dissuade contact thus heightening prejudice. A multilevel study was conducted using the 2002 European Social Survey (N = 1472 Swiss citizens, N = 185 municipalities). Replicating previous research, contact reduced exclusionary immigration attitudes through reduced threat. On the municipality level, higher proportion of North and West European immigrants increased contact, thus reducing threat. A larger proportion of Muslims was related to an increase in threat, leading to more pronounced exclusionary attitudes, but also to increased contact. Finally, we discuss how the impact of diversity depends on the social construction of immigrant categories, respondents' social position and ideological stances, and the prevailing local ideological climate. Adapted from the source document.

AbstractThe marked increase of asylum seekers arriving in Western Europe after 2014 has renewed debates on policy measures that countries should put into place to support their integration. Although implemented by many countries in recent years, research has neglected the effect of integration policy reform packages combining economic and social policy measures on asylum‐related immigrants' adjustment processes. Exploiting a comprehensive integration policy reform in Switzerland, using survey data from the Health Monitoring of the Swiss Migrant Population, and registering data on the whole asylum‐related population, our difference‐in‐differences analyses reveal that provisionally admitted individuals benefiting from the reform have higher employment probability, increased income levels, better language skills, and feel less lonely or without a homeland relative to comparable asylum seekers who did not benefit from the reform. Robustness checks assessing common pre‐reform trends support our findings, which highlight the importance of evaluating entire reform packages when assessing integration policies' effectiveness.

Since the launching of the Oslo peace process in 1993, the term 'normalization' has been used to characterize policies that aim to recognize the state of Israel and to establish 'normal' relations between Israelis and Palestinians. Whereas the Palestinian Authority has been supportive of normalization policies, numerous domestic and international critics have argued that these policies serve to perpetuate occupation and its consequences. We examine how Palestinians understand normalization, to what degree they support various forms of 'normalizing' relations with Israelis, and how contact with Israelis relates to support for normalization and motivation for revolutionary resistance against the occupation. Based on a cross-sectional survey conducted among an adult sample (N = 159) in the West Bank in 2016, we show that the understanding of normalization was multi-faceted, and that support for contact and collaboration across group lines (i.e., with Israelis) depended on the type of intergroup relations. On average, respondents were more supportive of relations within the political sphere, e.g. civilian policies and diplomatic coordination, than of interpersonal contact, cultural cooperation or security coordination. Support for most types of intergroup relations was related to decreased motivation for revolutionary resistance. In line with research on 'sedative' effects of positive intergroup contact in historically unequal societies, we found that past positive contact with Israelis was linked to decrease in Palestinians' motivation for revolutionary resistance through increased support for interpersonal contact and security coordination as forms of normalization. ; peerReviewed ; publishedVersion

Since the launching of the Oslo peace process in 1993, the term 'normalization' has been used to characterize policies that aim to recognize the state of Israel and to establish 'normal' relations between Israelis and Palestinians. Whereas the Palestinian Authority has been supportive of normalization policies, numerous domestic and international critics have argued that these policies serve to perpetuate occupation and its consequences. We examine how Palestinians understand normalization, to what degree they support various forms of 'normalizing' relations with Israelis, and how contact with Israelis relates to support for normalization and motivation for revolutionary resistance against the occupation. Based on a cross-sectional survey conducted among an adult sample (N = 159) in the West Bank in 2016, we show that the understanding of normalization was multi-faceted, and that support for contact and collaboration across group lines (i.e., with Israelis) depended on the type of intergroup relations. On average, respondents were more supportive of relations within the political sphere, e.g. civilian policies and diplomatic coordination, than of interpersonal contact, cultural cooperation or security coordination. Support for most types of intergroup relations was related to decreased motivation for revolutionary resistance. In line with research on 'sedative' effects of positive intergroup contact in historically unequal societies, we found that past positive contact with Israelis was linked to decrease in Palestinians' motivation for revolutionary resistance through increased support for interpersonal contact and security coordination as forms of normalization.

Since the launching of the Oslo peace process in 1993, the term 'normalization' has been used to characterize policies that aim to recognize the state of Israel and to establish 'normal' relations between Israelis and Palestinians. Whereas the Palestinian Authority has been supportive of normalization policies, numerous domestic and international critics have argued that these policies serve to perpetuate occupation and its consequences. We examine how Palestinians understand normalization, to what degree they support various forms of 'normalizing' relations with Israelis, and how contact with Israelis relates to support for normalization and motivation for revolutionary resistance against the occupation. Based on a cross-sectional survey conducted among an adult sample (N = 159) in the West Bank in 2016, we show that the understanding of normalization was multi-faceted, and that support for contact and collaboration across group lines (i.e., with Israelis) depended on the type of intergroup relations. On average, respondents were more supportive of relations within the political sphere, e.g. civilian policies and diplomatic coordination, than of interpersonal contact, cultural cooperation or security coordination. Support for most types of intergroup relations was related to decreased motivation for revolutionary resistance. In line with research on 'sedative' effects of positive intergroup contact in historically unequal societies, we found that past positive contact with Israelis was linked to decrease in Palestinians' motivation for revolutionary resistance through increased support for interpersonal contact and security coordination as forms of normalization.

In 2011, the killing of a Black man by a police officer triggered violent riots across England. In a context where ethnic minorities are rarely openly blamed, we examined the lens through which the events were interpreted in the official discourses of the British Prime Minister. A thematic content analysis (Study 1) revealed that, without explicitly blaming ethnic minorities, the discourses built on antagonistic normative references opposing a virtuous majority to threatening minorities. Then, based on online survey data of self‐declared Londoners (N = 223) during the riots, we analyzed (Study 2) how agreement with the discourses related to individuals' ethnocentrism and their understanding of the causes underlying the events. Results of regression analyses showed how agreement with the discourses related to blaming ethnic diversity for the riots and to higher ethnocentrism, especially among individuals least likely to discriminate against minorities (i.e., low in social dominance orientation). Agreement with the discourses was also linked to reduced blame of authorities. To conclude, we discuss the mobilization potential of political discourses on ingroup virtue and outgroup threat.