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The rise of global finance in the latter half of the twentieth century has long been understood as one chapter in a larger story about the postwar growth of the United States. This book challenges this popular narrative. Revealing the Anglo-American origins of financial globalization, Jeremy Green sheds new light on Britain's hugely significant, but often overlooked, role in remaking international capitalism alongside America. Drawing from new archival research, Green questions the conventional view of international economic history as a series of cyclical transitions among hegemonic powers. Instead, he explores the longstanding interactive role of private and public financial institutions in Britain and the United States – most notably the close links between their financial markets, central banks, and monetary and fiscal policies. He shows that America's unparalleled post-WWII financial power was facilitated, and in important ways constrained, by British capitalism, as the United States often had to work with and through British politicians, officials, and bankers to achieve its vision of a liberal economic order. Transatlantic integration and competition spurred the rise of the financial sector, an increased reliance on debt, a global easing of regulation, the ascendance of monetarism, and the transition to neoliberalism. From the gold standard to the recent global financial crisis and beyond, this book recasts the history of global finance hrough the prism of Anglo-American development.

Cover -- Contents -- List of Illustrations -- Preface -- Acknowledgments -- List of Abbreviations -- Introduction -- 1.Conceptualizing Anglo-American Development -- 2. The Great Reversal -- 3. Bretton Woods and the Keynesian State -- 4. The Euromarkets and the Crisis of Bretton Woods -- 5. In the Eye of the Storm -- 6. Internalizing Discipline -- 7. A Crisis of Anglo-America -- 8. From Crisis to Stagnation -- Conclusion -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Index -- A Note on the Type.

Frontmatter -- contents -- illustrations -- preface -- acknowledgments -- abbreviations -- Introduction -- 1. Conceptualizing Anglo-American Development -- 2. The Great Reversal -- 3. Bretton Woods and the Keynesian State -- 4. The Euromarkets and the Crisis of Bretton Woods -- 5. In the Eye of the Storm -- 6. Internalizing Discipline -- 7. A Crisis of Anglo-America -- 8. From Crisis to Stagnation -- Conclusion -- notes -- bibliography -- Index

To explain why trading European markets for Chinese is not a simple switch, Jeremy Green examines the City of London Corporation's role within economic policy-making, as well as the embrace of Chinese finance under the Coalition government.

This article examines the embrace of Chinese finance under the United Kingdom's 2010–2015 Coalition government. The article argues that the City of London's centrality within British capitalism has been reinforced, not displaced, since the Global Financial Crisis. Geo-economic rebalancing towards China, not the Coalition's professed spatial and sectoral 'rebalancing' ambitions, prevailed. To explain the City's renewed pre-eminence in the wake of the crisis, the article draws upon a modified version of the 'City–Bank–Treasury nexus' theory of British capitalism. Breaking from structuralist approaches that underplay the City of London Corporation's role within economic policy-making, the article illuminates the Corporation's agency as a key parastate institution that reoriented the City–Bank–Treasury nexus towards Chinese finance under the Coalition.

This article challenges existing accounts of the development of the Euromarkets by arguing that their emergence constituted the foundational moment in the advent of a postwar Anglo-American developmental field. The account contends the notion of a postwar order shaped predominantly by the outward expansion of American financial power, by deprivileging the exclusivity of American power and arguing that co-constitutive Anglo-American developmental processes were the generative force that produced the Euromarkets. Drawing upon new archival material, the article suggests that an Anglo-American developmental sphere, in which Britain continued to play a crucial but subordinate role, was key to the unfolding of postwar financial globalisation. The Anglo-American developmental processes occasioned by the Euromarkets gave rise to a 'transatlantic regulatory feedback loop' that stimulated deregulation on both sides of the Atlantic and placed Anglo-American capitalist interdependence at the centre of the politics of globalisation. The deeper origins of financial deregulation lie in the transformation of Anglo-American finance during the 1960s.

AbstractThis article challenges existing accounts of the development of the Euromarkets by arguing that their emergence constituted the foundational moment in the advent of a postwar Anglo-American developmental field. The account contends the notion of a postwar order shaped predominantly by the outward expansion of American financial power, by deprivileging the exclusivity of American power and arguing that co-constitutive Anglo-American developmental processes were the generative force that produced the Euromarkets. Drawing upon new archival material, the article suggests that an Anglo-American developmental sphere, in which Britain continued to play a crucial but subordinate role, was key to the unfolding of postwar financial globalisation. The Anglo-American developmental processes occasioned by the Euromarkets gave rise to a 'transatlantic regulatory feedback loop' that stimulated deregulation on both sides of the Atlantic and placed Anglo-American capitalist interdependence at the centre of the politics of globalisation. The deeper origins of financial deregulation lie in the transformation of Anglo-American finance during the 1960s.

This article scrutinises Robert Cox's theorisation of 19th century world order, proposing 'uneven and combined development' as an alternative conceptual approach. I contend that Cox's understanding of 19th century world order is insufficient as it neglects the significance of German ascendance. Privileging hegemonic construction of world order, Cox's account of the decomposition of Pax Britannica reifies the neo-realist anarchy problematique. Overall, Cox exaggerates the degree of rupture between phases of world order, obscuring developmental continuities that produce different 'geopolitical' contexts. Uneven and combined development, I propose, enables a fruitful reappraisal of the period. Process-based international historical sociology is suggested as an alternative way to think about 19th century world order and critical IR.

This article attempts to situate the approach to World War I within the context of the uneven and combined development of 19th-century European capitalism. Through a comparative analysis of German and British development within the context of the epochal transition from feudalism to capitalism, the article proposes that existing historical materialist and Realist understandings of the roots of World War 1 are inadequate. Realist analyses, stressing the primacy of 'geopolitics', fail to provide a convincing explanation of the precise origins of German bellicosity. Instead they assume that expansionist German behaviour was an inevitable consequence of systemic anarchy. Historical materialist accounts, preferring a sociological explanation, overstate the importance of systemic capitalist crisis and the European-wide escalation of class struggle for understanding the genesis of the war. Utilizing Trotsky's concept of uneven and combined development, I contend, enables a more comprehensive understanding of the origins of the conflict. [Reprinted by permission; copyright Sage Publications Ltd. & ECPR-European Consortium for Political Research.]