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This article draws on official sources to investigate how New Zealand interpreted its Women, Peace and Security obligations through the development and implementation of its first National Action Plan (NAP) in 2015. Existing beliefs that New Zealand was already a 'world leader' in this field yielded an unambitious document. Government agencies such as the New Zealand Police (NZ Police) and New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) have gone on to make some gains under the narrow remit of the NAP, but resourcing and accountability are lacking. Moreover, this focus on perceived existing strengths, and the drawing of objectives from these, meant that New Zealand missed an opportunity to initiate the kind of deeper structural changes initially envisaged by WPS advocates. This article therefore closes with a discussion of how two broader processes – 're-gendering' and 'de-othering' – could help New Zealand to better serve the original intent of the WPS agenda.

This article investigates the relationship between the statebuilding efforts currently emphasised as necessary for development and security in post-conflict settings, and the possibilities for broader peacebuilding efforts to be prioritised. It does this through an analysis of the push to form a centralised formal police force in the Solomon Islands where more informal sites of policing authority already exist. The paper suggests that the narrower emphasis on statebuilding as represented by a focus on the institutional rebuilding of police needs to be reoriented towards a focus on peacebuilding as represented by a more flexible approach to supporting sustainable broader forms of policing.

Since the mid-1980s, a number of authors have asserted that there is a special kind of relationship between democratic states; or that liberalism promotes peaceful relations between liberal states; or that there exists a hierarchy of states in international society with liberal states at the apex of that hierarchy. Many of these theories touch on issues of liberalism, liberal states, and the use of military force. Yet they still do not directly address the key question of: when, and for what ends, liberals believe that military force may be used. An implicit intimation is often made that there is a monolithic liberal approach to the use of force. In contrast, this article identifies a variety of contemporary liberal views on this topic and argues that these depend upon the priority given to values such as those of tolerance and consent versus progress and civility, or those of cosmopolitanism versus communitarianism. On this basis, the article examines the liberal options for the use of force that can be justified in different ways by these different values, from self-defense to the creation of liberal entities, depending upon which liberal values predominate.

This article examines how New Zealand has framed recent security dynamics in the region and asks how this framing aligns with the priorities of Pacific partners. There are some indications of increasing alignment with 'like-minded' partners such as the US and Australia, prompted in part by increased concerns about Chinese engagement in the region. However, New Zealand has also been circumspect in seeking out opportunities to continue to engage with China and, perhaps most importantly for its Pacific partners, has increasingly responded to regional concerns about understanding climate change as an existential security threat. Recent uptake of Pacific imagery and narrative in the Ministry of Defence's Advancing Pacific Partnerships policy document is particularly evocative in suggesting a more genuine recentring of Pacific priorities, although enduring engagement is needed to support rhetorical commitments (New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2018). Here relationships with diasporic populations, youth and women, in particular, should be more strongly pursued as New Zealand navigates its way in and through the Pacific and its politics into the future.

This book examines international efforts to provide security in post-conflict sites and explains why internal security should be given precedence in statebuilding endeavours.The work begins by exploring the evolution of security sectors in mature liberal democratic states, before examining the attempts of such states to accelerate that evolutionary process in post-conflict sites through statebuilding and security sector reform. These discussions suggest interestingly different answers to the question of who should provide for internal security in international operations. When considering matu