Cover; A Moment's Notice; Title; Copyright; Dedication; Contents; Preface; Introduction; Part I; 1 Time, Life, and Society; 2 Relative Time and the Limits of Law; 3 Agency and Authority; Part II; 4 Time and Territory in Ancient China; 5 Time and Sovereignty in Aztec Mexico; 6 Time, Life, and Law in the United States; Conclusion: Postmodernity This Time; Notes; References; Index.
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Relevance in question -- Templates of relevance -- Texts and contexts -- Textual strategy and the politics of form -- The discourse of solutions -- Democracy in the first person -- Gendering difference and the impulse to fiction -- Markets for citizenship
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La sociedad neoliberal engloba tanto poderes estatales como no estatales, de modo tal que plantea nuevos retos interpretativos a los antropólogos y sociólogos del derecho interesados en la significación social y cultural del derecho. Desarrollo aquí un "estudio de caso" en torno a un dictamen reciente del Tribunal Supremo de los Estados Unidos en el cual esos aspectos figuran entre los temas que contempla. Examino el asunto Comisión de Elecciones Federales contra Ciudadanos Unidos [Citizens United] —un caso que implicaba el derecho de las empresas a invertir dinero en campañas electorales federales. El resultado fue altamente polémico en Estados Unidos, ya que eliminaba antiguas restricciones relativas a la inversión empresarial en la esfera política. Desde un punto de vista etnográfico, sin embargo, la relevancia del dictamen puede estar menos en lo que permite a las corporaciones decir y hacer en el contexto electoral que en el modo en que cualidades peculiares de carácter social, pretendidamente (por el Tribunal) inherentes a las empresas, son valoradas y priorizadas. Sugiero que la multiforme naturaleza de las cualidades de las empresas, tal como las define el Tribunal, apunta al significado potencial del caso para la vida cotidiana que alcanza al sentido de la propia diferenciación entre derecho y sociedad. ; Neoliberalism compresses state and non-state powers together in ways that pose fresh interpretive challenges for anthropologists and sociolegal scholars interested in the social and cultural significance of law. In this article, I develop a "case study" around a recent opinion of the United States Supreme Court in which these are among the issues. I examine Federal Elections Commission versus Citizens United —a case that involved the rights of corporations to spend money on federal electoral campaigns. The outcome was highly controversial in the United States, since it removed longstanding restrictions on corporate spending in the political sphere. From an ethnographic standpoint, though, the significance of the case may be less in what it allows corporations to say and do in the electoral context, than in the ways particular qualities of sociality claimed (by the Court) to be inherent in corporations are valorized and prioritized. I suggest that the protean nature of corporate qualities as defined by the Court points to a potential significance of the case to everyday life that extends to the meaning of the very distinction between law and society.
This article takes up Marilyn Strathern's formulation of a law/culture 'duplex' – her term for the complementarity of anthropology and law as means to each other's ends. She draws attention to the limitations of the duplex, and urges us to consider ethnography as (in part) a project of unwinding its entwinement. As a step toward that end, the article returns to classic texts by Emile Durkheim and Bronislaw Malinowski – texts that were foundational to the emergence of anthropology, and to the establishment of law as an object of study for the social sciences. Re-read in light of Strathern's insight, what has been widely taken as their relativism emerges instead as their defense of political community as a subject for ethnography, and (accordingly) the basis for a theoretical check on law conceived globally – within states or as colonial overrule. The article concludes with a discussion of the contemporary relevance of that position.
The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia.By James C. Scott. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009. 464p. $35.00.The book under discussion is James C. Scott's latest contribution to the study of agrarian politics, culture, and society, and to the ways that marginalized communities evade or resist projects of state authority. The book offers a synoptic history of Upland Southeast Asia, a 2.5 million–kilometer region of hill country spanning Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, Burma, and China. It offers a kind of "area study." It also builds on Scott's earlier work on "hidden transcripts" of subaltern groups and on "seeing like a state." The book raises many important theoretical questions about research methods and social inquiry, the relationship between political science and anthropology, the nature of states, and of modernity more generally. The book is also deeply relevant to problems of "state-building" and "failed states" in places like Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia. As Scott writes, "The huge literature on state-making, contemporary and historic, pays virtually no attention to its obverse: the history of deliberate and reactive statelessness. This is the history of those who got away, and state-making cannot be understood apart from it. This is also what makes it an anarchist history" (p. x).In this symposium, I have invited a number of prominent political and social scientists to comment on the book, its historical narrative, and its broader theoretical implications for thinking about power, state failure, state-building, and foreign policy. How does the book shed light on the limits of states and the modes of resistance to state authority? Are there limits, theoretical and normative, to this "anarchist" understanding of governance and the "art of being governed"?—Jeffrey C. Isaac, Editor
Justice Sonia Sotomayor was President Obama's first nominee to the United States Supreme Court. She was confirmed by the Senate after three days of hearings in July, 2009 – and three months of partisan contention focused in part over her so-called "wise Latina" speech years earlier. My interest in the hearings is two-fold: first, in the question of how Sotomayor's opponents tied the question of her particular judicial qualifications to her self-identity; and second, in the related question of how they worked minority identity more generally into a question of legitimacy. I focus on Republican opposition in the hearings, since Democrats – assured by their numerical majority in Congress at that time – engaged the nominee primarily in reaction to Republican challenges. My thesis is that the Republican performance was keyed to an oppositional discourse in which both the form and content of language were politicized in ideological terms – terms that ascribe a particular significance to race as a form of alienated solidarity.