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Presidential scholars hypothesize that presidential contestedness increases among recent presidents only because of unfinished research or within historical eras because of growing governing problems. Applying unused data from studies of scholarly assessments of presidential performance, this analysis disconfirms the recency hypothesis and confirms the era hypothesis. Presidential contestedness increases after each of the least contested presidents: George Washington, Abraham Lincoln, and Franklin D. Roosevelt. Uncontestedness is a hard act to follow.

Abstract.  Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) overlaps logistic regression in explaining events, but challenges the latter's lack of accounting for causal complexity. QCA has only to a limited degree been applied to large‐N studies or individuals as cases and has not incorporated the logic of probability. QCA and logistic regression are compared with respect to logic, procedure and outcome. Political orientations from five national surveys are adapted to the requirements of the two methods. The methods are demonstrated on explanations of individuals' party preferences. QCA and logistic regression converge and overlap in identifying degrees of causal complexity, in ascertaining model significance and in identifying antecedents to party preference. Results differ in degree, not in kind. A slightly more nuanced picture emerges using the QCA approach, whereas logistic regression delivers greater parsimony. Choice of method(s) is not arbitrary. QCA can easily be used on any large‐N research problem. It should apply probability when appropriate.

The erosion of the social and economic bases underlying traditional party systems has led analysts to search for new cleavage structures undergirding the present party systems. Meanwhile, analysts have identified a range of issue dimensions that also bear on voters' party preferences. This article studies the degree to which grid‐group theory's four political biases of hierarchy, egalitarianism, individualism, and fatalism can make inroads into the left–right dimension's stronghold in accounting for voters' party preference. The analysis draws on a 1999 survey in the five Nordic countries (N= 4,832). The method combines voters' party preferences with their scores on issue dimensions, or political dimensions. Analyses show that conventional party families, with one exception, are not identified along any of the five political orientations. Only the five conservative parties are exclusively identified as a party family on the left–right dimension. Party preference is more closely associated with the left–right dimension than the political biases. Sweden has the purest and simplest party cleavage, whereas Denmark has the most composite one. Across the Nordic countries, the green party family is most dissimilar, whereas the progress siblings are most alike. The left–right dimension accounts well for differences between parties within polities, whereas political biases, and egalitarianism in particular, account well for differences between parties of similar origin across polities.

Abstract.  The left‐right dimension and grid‐group theory differ in their empirical track records and the complexity of their conceptual structures. As regards the former, the left‐right dimension is the clear winner. With respect to the latter, grid‐group theory comes out ahead. The parsimony of the unidimensional left‐right dimension may result in a conflation of, or failure to account for, important political distinctions which grid‐group theory accounts for through its four political biases or orientations: hierarchy, egalitarianism, individualism and fatalism. The degree to which grid‐group theory holds 'excess empirical content' compared to the left‐right dimension is tested by way of nine hypotheses. The analysis draws on a 1999 survey in the five Nordic countries (N=4,832) and demonstrates excess empirical content. Except in Norway, the left‐right dimension is found to be a surrogate for the conflict between egalitarianism's equality of outcome and individualism's equality of opportunity. Sweden and Denmark are prototypical cases. Conservatism conflates individualism and hierarchy, whereas radicalism conflates egalitarianism and fatalism. Confirmed excess empirical content is a necessary step. Theoretical complexity must also demonstrate enhanced causal power.

The left-right dimension and grid-group theory differ in their empirical track records and the complexity of their conceptual structures. As regards the former, the left-right dimension is the clear winner. With respect to the latter, grid-group theory comes out ahead. The parsimony of the unidimensional left-right dimension may result in a conflation of, or failure to account for, important political distinctions which grid-group theory accounts for through its four political biases or orientations: hierarchy, egalitarianism, individualism and fatalism. The degree to which grid-group theory holds 'excess empirical content' compared to the left-right dimension is tested by way of nine hypotheses. The analysis draws on a 1999 survey in the five Nordic countries (N = 4,832) and demonstrates excess empirical content. Except in Norway, the left-right dimension is found to be a surrogate for the conflict between egalitarianism's equality of outcome and individualism's equality of opportunity. Sweden and Denmark are prototypical cases. Conservatism conflates individualism and hierarchy, whereas radicalism conflates egalitarianism and fatalism. Confirmed excess empirical content is a necessary step. Theoretical complexity must also demonstrate enhanced causal power. (European Journal of Political Research / FUB)

A number of cultural theories identify, or call for the elaboration of, deeper cultural patterns that both disallow cultural invariance and constrain cultural variation. Grid‐group theory identifies four cultures: hierarchy, egalitarianism, individualism and fatalism. This article, which measures grid‐group theory's four cultures by means of cultural biases, (1) explores the neglected relationship between sociodemographic correlates and cultural biases, and (2) tests the theory's hypothesized effects of cultural biases, controlled for sociodemographics, on attitudes toward nature, technology and human nature, and on geographical belonging and trust in institutions. The test draws on three independent surveys of the general public in Norway in the 1990s. The empirical results show that cultural biases are significantly explained by sociodemographics, and whereas convergent validity of cultural biases on selected attitudes and beliefs was acceptable, discriminant validity was weaker and more inconsistent.