Suchergebnisse

Using detailed case studies of Egypt and Tunisia, and drawing on over 140 interviews with civilian and military leaders and three surveys of military personnel, this scholarly volume examines why some militaries support and others thwart transitions to democracy.

The Algerian military's response to the 2019–2020 Hirak protests was relatively peaceful. In contrast to its violent repression of protests in 1988, and subsequent coup and civil war in the 1990s, the military showed considerable restraint toward the Hirak. Leveraging a survey of 2,235 self-reported military personnel, I show that the military's restraint emanated from protesters' use of nonviolence and fraternization, as well as from a recognition that the military's more repressive approach in the 1990s was a mistake. At the same time, a priming experiment suggests that the military's willingness to repress increases when protesters threaten the military's corporate interests, and when Russia, Algeria's primary arms supplier, reiterates its support for the regime. Overall, the results show how protester tactics, international reactions, and political learning can condition the military's repression or restraint during times of unrest.

What drives some Islamists to become "Muslim Democrats," downplaying religion and accepting secular democracy? This article hypothesizes that one channel of ideological change is migration to secular democracies. Drawing on an ideal point analysis of parliamentary votes from the Tunisian Islamist movement Ennahda, I find that MPs who had lived in secular democracies held more liberal voting records than their counterparts who had lived only in Tunisia. In particular, they were more likely to defend freedom of conscience and to vote against enshrining Islamic law in the constitution. Interviews with several of these MPs demonstrate that they recognize a causal effect of their experiences abroad on their ideologies, and provide support for three distinct mechanisms by which this effect may have occurred: socialization, intergroup contact, and political learning.

In May 2017, the Tunisian military allowed protesters to storm and shut down an oil valve in Tataouine, in contravention of a direct order from President Essebsi to defend the production site. While scholars have recently examined military defection during mass uprisings, these protests were small and localized. Why did the military disobey President Essebsi in Tataouine? Drawing upon a survey of military officers conducted six months prior to the defection, I show that the military's composition and corporate interests, rather than its professionalism, likely prompted its defection. The majority of the military hails from impoverished regions in Tunisia's neglected interior and identifies with the demands of protesters in these regions. The military also saw the curtailment of its material and political interests in early 2017, giving it little incentive to repress protesters on the regime's behalf. Methodologically, this study provides some of the first survey data of military officers' attitudes toward defection.

Domestic politics around the globe have become increasingly polarized along secular-religious lines. Recent literature suggests that one way to ease secular-religious tension and gridlock is for religious leaders to offer progressive reinterpretations of religious texts, that might convince religious conservatives to compromise from their seemingly-fixed policy positions. But can everyday citizens deploy religious reinterpretations themselves? We examine this question through a series of citizen debates in Tunisia, in which 602 participants attempted to reach a compromise over two 'culture wars' issues. Across both experiments, we find that having secular liberals engage religious conservatives with religious reinterpretations backfired, nearly halving the rate of compromise. Religious reinterpretations produced both defensive conservatives and emboldened liberals, obstructing compromise between them. While scholarship suggests that religious leaders may be able to deploy reinterpretations effectively, our results caution that everyday citizens may not.

AbstractMuslims in Europe and North America face high rates of discrimination and hostility. Less clear are the consequences of this prejudice on Muslims' political attitudes. Leveraging a survey of 1,330 Muslims in Germany, we show that Muslims who have personally experienced discrimination exhibit higher anti‐system tendencies: more supportive of violence, more supportive of Islamism, and less supportive of democracy and secularism. We also find that these patterns are concentrated among Muslims who believe they "suffer alone," not believing other Muslims experience similar hostility. Finally, through a priming experiment, we find causal evidence that German Chancellor Angela Merkel's inclusive rhetoric and policies toward Muslims may help mitigate these dynamics, reducing perceptions of discrimination and in turn producing pro‐system sentiments.