Suchergebnisse

Redistribution differs widely across countries, but our understanding of why this is the case is limited. In democracies, the extent of redistribution should ultimately reflect citizens' preferences. We measure preferences for redistribution in six developed countries through internationally standardized questions in which respondents are faced with realistic budgetary constraints on their choice. We also measure a broad array of demographic, attitudinal, and ideological characteristics and examine their correlations with the preferred pattern of redistribution. As expected, individual income is associated with lower demand for redistribution, but this relationship loses significance once other factors are controlled for. Beliefs on social mobility have, in the aggregate, the largest effect in reducing demand for redistribution, the effect being largest in the US but insignificant in Italy and Slovenia. Trust in government has a negative effect on demand for redistribution across all countries. In line with other studies, we interpret this result as evidence that people believing that the political élite is corrupt demand more redistribution. Financial security, a proxy for the Prospect of Upward Mobility hypothesis, is also a significant correlate of preferences for redistribution, the effect being largest in Japan but small in the UK and Slovenia. Finally, discrimination of racial minorities is associated with lower demand for redistribution, but the effect is only significant in the US and Germany. Overall, the main theories that have been proposed to account for preferences for redistribution are confirmed to be valid, but with significant variation across countries.

Globalization is defined as an individual's connectivity in global networks. Social identity is conceptualized as attachment and identification with a group. We use questionnaire items to measure individual involvement with global networks along with local, national, and global social identity. Propensity to cooperate is measured in experiments involving local and global others. Firstly, we analyse possible determinants of global social identity, showing a significant and positive correlation with an index of individual global connectivity. Secondly, we find a significant mediating effect of global social identity between individual global connectivity and propensity to cooperate at the global level. This is consistent with a cosmopolitan hypothesis of how participation in global networks reshapes social identity: increased participation in global networks increases global social identity and this in turn increases propensity to cooperate with others.

We report experimental results from three Colombian villages concerning the impact of a voting mechanism on interpersonal trust and trustworthiness. The vote is purely consultative in that participants are asked to declare in a secret ballot the most "appropriate" plan of action for individuals involved in a "Trust Game". The plan of action that is most voted is then publicly announced. The mechanism is unbinding, as only the aggregate result of the voting is disclosed and it has no bearing on individual decisions. In spite of the strategic irrelevance of the announcement, we observe an increase in both trust and trustworthiness after the announcement is carried out, in comparison to the baseline condition where no voting takes place.

Two traditional theorems of welfare economics posit a trade-off between a government redistribution targets and efficiency. We propose a third 'claim' of welfare economics, stating that in closed economies the actual efficiency costs associated with redistribution are small. We then examine the claim in the current phase of 'hyper-globalization'. On the one hand, a race-to-the-bottom in taxation restricts the capacity to tax high-earners and the associated brain drain may affect a country's long-run growth. On the other hand, demand for social insurance should be particularly high in an open economy, especially with advancing digitalization. Xenophobic sentiments may, however, offset this demand. We also discuss the impact of globalization on wage equalization and productive efficiency. We conclude against the idea that the welfare state is intrinsically unable to carry out its redistributive function in an era of globalization. However, its strategies and tools of intervention must be rethought.

This report, by the co-chairs of the T20 process during Germany's G20 Presidency, presents 20 key policy recommendations for G20 policy-makers and stakeholders. The policy recommendations are formulated concisely to be easily accessible to those seeking a short summary of the main conclusions. Readers who are interested in the detailed recommendations are referred to the Policy Briefs in the G20 Insights Platform (www.g20-insights.org). This report includes only a selection of policy recommendations that have been chosen for their novelty, ease of implementation and relevance to the G20 during the German Presidency. The G20 Insights Platform contains the full range of T20 policy recommendations. ; Dieser Bericht, der von den Co-Chairs des T20-Prozesses (Think 20) während der deutschen G20-Präsidentschaft 2017 vorgelegt wurde, enthält 20 wichtige politische Empfehlungen für politische Entscheidungsträger und Interessengruppen rund um die G20. Die Politikvorschläge sind in Kurzform formuliert, um für diejenigen leicht zugänglich zu sein, die eine Zusammenfassung der wichtigsten Schlussfolgerungen suchen. Leser, die an den detaillierten Empfehlungen interessiert sind, werden auf die Policy Briefs auf der G20 Insights Plattform (www.g20-insights.org) verwiesen. Dieser Bericht enthält nur eine Auswahl von Politikempfehlungen, die aufgrund ihrer Neuartigkeit, ihrer einfachen Umsetzbarkeit und ihrer Relevanz für die G20 während der deutschen Präsidentschaft ausgewählt wurden. Die G20 Insights Plattform enthält die gesamte Bandbreite der T20-Politikempfehlungen.

We investigate the relationship between political attitudes and prosociality in a survey of a representative sample of the U.S. population during the first summer of the COVID-19 pandemic. We find that an experimental measure of prosociality correlates positively with adherence to protective behaviors. Liberal political ideology predicts higher levels of protective behavior than conservative ideology, independently of the differences in prosociality across the two groups. Differences between liberals and conservatives are up to 4.4 times smaller in their behavior than in judging the government's crisis management. This result suggests that U.S. Americans are more polarized on ideological than behavioral grounds.

Two traditional theorems of welfare economics posit a trade-off between a government redistribution targets and efficiency. We propose a third 'claim' of welfare economics, stating that in closed economies the actual efficiency costs associated with redistribution are small. We then examine the claim in the current phase of 'hyper-globalization'. On the one hand, a race-to-the-bottom in taxation restricts the capacity to tax high-earners and the associated brain drain may affect a country's long-run growth. On the other hand, demand for social insurance should be particularly high in an open economy, especially with advancing digitalization. Xenophobic sentiments may, however, offset this demand. We also discuss the impact of globalization on wage equalization and productive efficiency. We conclude against the idea that the welfare state is intrinsically unable to carry out its redistributive function in an era of globalization. However, its strategies and tools of intervention must be rethought.