Suchergebnisse

Chinese engagement in African states has increased tremendously over the last decade, much in line with Chinese globalisation strategies and supported by state encouragement and financial support. The size and potential of China as a world power leads to the level of expectations the country faces from the developing world. However, some elements of these expectations are also created through political discourses which emphasise differences with Western countries. The types of promises that the Chinese leadership makes to create such enthusiastic welcome amongst African political leaders are linked closely to the discourse on South-South cooperation. Albeit different from Western development assistance promises and parallel attempts to produce moderate expectations, the current discourse is thus partly sowing the seeds for future disappointment. This article takes a closer look at the discussions around South-South cooperation in China-Africa relations and at key rhetorical features ('mutual benefit'; 'non-interference') and at the practice of this cooperation. It concludes that the Chinese discourse is creating large public expectations in African countries and while China delivers on many projects, its impact on development is less certain. The overall development success of this strategy builds on longer-term success and is implicitly linked to the occurrence of more reforms in Africa. Chinese policy thus 'bets on the future' in their foreign relations with Africa; the success of this strategy is dependent on political circumstances among the partners that are largely beyond Chinese control. In a number of cases, it can thus be expected that currently up-beat political rhetoric is going to meet obstacles that will require adjustments in a discourse that, in its current form, might undermine Chinese credibility if not the core elements of South-South cooperation altogether. (J Contemp China/GIGA)

Zum Jahresende 2009 werden in den europäischen Außenbeziehungen wichtige Weichen gestellt. Mit den bisherigen Reformen der europäischen Entwicklungspolitik wurden die grundlegenden Entscheidungsprozeduren nicht verändert , die Zuständigkeiten für Entwicklungspolitik blieben und bleiben weiterhin zwischen der Union und den Mitgliedstaaten geteilt. Nun stehen jedoch Strukturfragen an, die die EU-Außenbeziehungen betreffen und damit vor allem das Umfeld der Entwicklungspolitik verändern werden. Mit dem Lissabonner Vertrag wird die Gemeinsame Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik (GASP) deutlich aufgewertet. Ein vom Rat zu ernennender Vize-Präsident der Kommission wird künftig das Scharnier zwischen GASP und anderen Außenbeziehungen, einschließlich der Entwicklungspolitik, bilden. Die Entwicklungspolitik wird ihr Verhältnis zum "Hohen Vertreter der Union für Außenbeziehungen und Sicherheitspolitik" klären müssen. Außenpolitik und Entwicklungspolitik haben zwar im Idealfall komplementäre Zielsysteme (z. B. die langfristige globale Sicherheit), arbeiten aber mit einem differenzierten Zeithorizont und aus unterschiedlichen Interessensperspektiven. Die Beibehaltung einer Stimme für die Entwicklungspolitik am Kommissionstisch bleibt angesichts der bevorstehenden globalen Herausforderungen entscheidend. Andernfalls besteht die Gefahr, dass mittelfristig entwicklungspolitisches Wissen und Kompetenz verloren gehen, wenn entwicklungspolitische Ziele strukturell vernachlässigt bzw. außenpolitischen Interessen untergeordnet werden. Eine zentrale Entscheidung wird mit der Ausgestaltung des Europäischen Außendienstes getroffen. Eine gestärkte Struktur für Entwicklungspolitik, die mit dem de facto Außenminister eng verzahnt, aber eigenständig ist, entspräche am ehesten einer konsequenten Fortführung der bisherigen EU-Ziele und wäre den künftigen Herausforderungen angemessen. Die Neuorganisation der EU-Außenbeziehungen: Welche Rolle für die Entwicklungspolitik im Institutionengefüge?

At the end of 2009 important changes will be implemented in European foreign relations. Previous reforms in European development policies have not changed the basic decision-making procedures, and the lines of responsibility for development policies have remained and will continue to remain shared by the Union and its member states. Now, however, structural issues have become imminent which affect the EU's foreign relations and for this reason will alter above all the context of its development policies. The Lisbon Agreement resulted in a major expansion of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). A Vice-President of the Commission, to be named by the Council, will in future serve as a hinge between the CFSP and other external relations, including the area of development policy. Development policies will be required to establish their relationship to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy . Although foreign policy and development policies in the ideal case have complementary target systems in view (e.g. long-term global security), they nevertheless work with a differentiated time horizon and from different perspectives of interest. In view of forthcoming global challenges, the retention of a strong voice in development policies at the Commission table remains decisive in importance. Otherwise the danger remains that knowledge of and competence in development policy will be lost sooner or later when development policy targets are structurally neglected or subordinated to foreign policy interests. A central decision will be made in the design of European External Action Service. A stronger structure for development policies, one which both closely meshes with the work of the de facto Foreign Minister but remains nevertheless independent, would correspond most with a consistent continuation of the EU's targets to date and would be appropriate for future challenges.

In this article in the section on Multidimensional Security, the author investigates the intentions & understandings of security in the European Security Strategy (ESS) to argue that the document neither prioritizes goals, nor does it attribute instruments or define conditions of their use to achieve goals. The reactionary origin of the ESS is reflected in the focus on threats & defensive security in the strategy that does not represent the "human security" understanding of the EU in the internal predisposition to multilateralism & the use of civilian power. The ideal case for the improvement of human security is asserted to be tackling conflicts within the region that is supported by recent EU funding to increase regional capacity for conflict resolution as in the case of the African Union (AU). The consequences of development endeavours are delineated as better coordination of administration, sequencing, & engagement of new groups in insecure environments. The ESS is concluded to not to replace European self-interest with altruistic global policy, but does offer conceptual bridges between security & development. The questions that remain are how to coordinate different agendas with different timeframes on the ground. References. J. Harwell