Suchergebnisse

Introduction: Against critical thinking? -- Critical atmospheres: where are we now with facts, critique and care? -- The rhetoric of urgency: tensions between critique and practice -- Autonomy, critique, and consensus -- Placing the review under review: reconciling critique with assemblage in safeguarding reviews -- The power of critique: looking back and forwards with Foucault -- The vulnerability of critique.

1. Interpretation : social work and hermeneutics -- 2. Community : the case of the missing community -- 3. Identity : a short word from Nietzsche: marginalisation, recognition and ressentiment -- 4. Ethics : three concerns about human rights -- 5. Documents : the politics of writing -- 6. Self : who am I, and what do I actually do? -- 7. Culture : the culture industry -- 8. Knowledge : professionalised practice and the locus of expertise.

Cover -- Title -- Copyright -- Dedication -- CONTENTS -- Preface -- Introduction: Why should social workers think about philosophy, and why should philosophers care? -- 1 Interpretation: Social work and hermeneutics -- 2 Community: The case of the missing community -- 3 Identity: A short word from Nietzsche: marginalisation, recognition and ressentiment -- 4 Ethics: Three concerns about human rights -- 5 Documents: The politics of writing -- 6 Self: Who am I, and what do I actually do? -- 7 Culture: The culture industry -- 8 Knowledge: Professionalised practice and the locus of expertise -- Index.

What is it to claim that "misogyny" might be "ironic"? Why is it that, in the works of Nietzsche, Kierkegaard and Schopenhauer, the possibility of irony constantly interferes with a conclusive ethical judgement over the meaning of their "misogyny"? How do we hold our interpretations of such ambiguous texts ethically accountable? This book brings together the driving concerns of hermeneutics, feminist philosophy and the history of philosophy in dealing with the "problem of irony". It develops

Franco 'Bifo' Berardi concludes his analysis of tragedy in late capitalism with a bold call to arms: post-liberal dystopia must be faced and dissolved by irony. He argues for a renewed ironic autonomy, which emphasises the independence of mind from knowledge and the excessive nature of the imagination. Developing Berardi's argument, I suggest there are three obstacles to theorising irony as a form of politics. The first is that a politics of irony is often accused of being either a fraudulent or amoral form of politics, which has itself allowed a post-liberal malaise to fester and grow. The second problem is that irony may no longer be simply an ambivalent tool of critique from the edges of political discourse, but instead a tool which perpetuates its very centre. The third problem is that theorising the performance and place of irony in relation to political critique often results in a slippage from the complexity of the second problem to the impasse of the first. I argue that Berardi's 'ironic autonomy' is entirely possible, so long as the politics of irony is understood as depending on the different forms and media of interpretative space through which contemporary politics takes place.

The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the significance of the politics of health as an ongoing interpretative event. The effectiveness of delivering prevention strategies is in negotiation with day-to-day arguments in the public sphere, not just by "experts" in peer-reviewed papers, but also in the everyday interpretations and discussions of available expertise on print and digital media platforms. In this paper I explore ae particular facet of these public debate over the politics of health: the deployment of the commonplace of stupidity. I argue that the growth of this commonplace within discussion is rooted in particular models of interpretation which limit self-understanding, by over-emphasising certain points of significance within the interpretative horizon over more banal (and "stupid") aspects that are, nevertheless, influential on health interventions.

The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the significance of the politics of health as an ongoing interpretative event. The effectiveness of delivering prevention strategies is in negotiation with day-to-day arguments in the public sphere, not just by "experts" in peer-reviewed papers, but also in the everyday interpretations and discussions of available expertise on print and digital media platforms. In this paper I explore ae particular facet of these public debate over the politics of health: the deployment of the commonplace of stupidity. I argue that the growth of this commonplace within discussion is rooted in particular models of interpretation which limit self-understanding, by over-emphasising certain points of significance within the interpretative horizon over more banal (and "stupid") aspects that are, nevertheless, influential on health interventions.

A number of writers have recently challenged the notion of the demonic as mere superstition, and arguing for a need to understand the demonic in terms of the often-obscured ways in which it operates in relation to contemporary thought and critique. Building on this, this paper offers an analysis of the demonic as a rhetorical concept. Moving beyond the notion of the demonic as simply a trope at the disposal of a speaker or writer, the paper explores how the expression of the demonic performs a more foundational, repetitive, and indeed, deceptively banal role in shaping the discourses it inhabits. This precedes and frames the ethico-political discourses on evil commonly associated with demonology today.

In order to practice effectively in today's complex and changing environment, social workers need to have an understanding of how contemporary cultural and philosophical concepts relate to the people they work with and the fields they practice in. Exploring the ideas of philosophers, including Nietzsche, Gadamer, Taylor, Adorno, MacIntyre, Zizek and Derrida, this text demonstrates their relevance to social work practice and presents new approaches and frameworks to understanding social change. Key Debates in Social Work and Philosophy introduces a range of concerns central to social work and social care, with chapters looking at questions such as: What is the 'self'?; How are communities formed?; Why is 'choice' important?; Are certain rights really applicable to all humans?; What are the political and ethical implications of documenting your practice?; What does it mean to be a professional social worker? Each chapter focuses on a particular area of dispute, presenting the relevant philosophical theories, and considering how relevant social work examples and research can be used to further inform theoretical debate, and includes questions to prompt discussion and reflection. The only book to examine the philosophical ideas that underlie and inform contemporary issues for social work and social care practitioners, this is a useful resource for those studying social work theory, policy and practice.