Suchergebnisse

Abstract
This article analyzes the degree of convergence between the United States and the European Union regarding the structural role of administrative agencies. As will be argued, the United States and European Union have arrived at the same broad conclusion about a "nondelegation doctrine": delegations to administrative agencies should be permitted so long as some limiting principle governs the exercise of that power and allows for sufficient judicial review. However, the Supreme Court has taken a more permissive approach than the Court of Justice in defining the limiting principle. The United States has loosened the reins for the sake of modern administration while the European Union has maintained a firmer grip to keep better control over the Europeanization project. Stated another way, the nondelegation doctrine is simply a reflection of the systems' relative levels of integration. Thus, the nondelegation doctrine will be stretched in Europe as functional regulatory demands arise from wider and deeper integration. At the same time, the focus will be redirected from substantive limits to procedural controls; accordingly, this Note advocates for a European Administrative Procedure Act.