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The author explores a conceptual crisis in studies, dedicated to international relations, which are under pressure of growing number of threats and challenges. In search of new perspective models of global economic and political development and in the pursuit of attempts to explain the nature and causes of growing confrontation among different global actors specialists in IR, including European studies, propose various approaches and strategies, which often run counter to each other. The article focuses on a role of empirics in this scientific work, on a problem of measurability of different hypotheses and generalisations. On the basis of application of concrete indicators and data the author analyses the role of the EU, major European countries, Russia and other centres of power in world political-economic tables of ranks. The internal balance of power in the EU is explored, as well as main risks and vulnerabilities in its development. In the context of global reassembly the assessments are made on threats and challenges facing Russia. The conclusion is drawn that in the near future the phenomenon of polycentricity with elements of composite quasi-bipolarity will intensify. At the same tine, quasi-bipolarity represents more relevant configuration than the hypothesis about US-China "new bipolarity". The United States and China more and more obviously shape new confrontational pivot of world politics in near future. This model is characterized with quasi-bipolarity because the number of rising powers, comparable with US and China in terms of capabilities and geopolitical ambitions, is much bigger than in the second half of XX century.

In the centre of the study ‒ the contemporary discourse on the subjectivity of the European Union, conducted by euro-atlantists and euro-autonomists in the field of both conceptual and applied issues. We witness a collision of two views about a desirable type of the EU's identity as a part of the revived Western-centric world or as a moderate Eurocentrism. A significant attention is paid to the principle of strategic autonomy and the role of Germany and France in its implementation. The subjectivity of the EU is treated as a multi-speed process, intrinsic to the history of the European integration. The author explores the Eurocentric tendencies in the military-political sphere including deliberations on the primary deterrence. The EU's aspirations towards digital and trade sovereignty are highlighted drawing examples of the JCAP and Nord Stream 2. The article demonstrates that J. Biden's victory in the presidential election in November 2020 has not reduced the EU ‒ US contradictions on a range of important issues. The recent events in Afghanistan and the signing of AUKUS have become a stark reminder that the principle of strategic autonomy of the EU should be treated by Brussels as the basis for the common security and defense policy.

The article continues the research of the "big three" strategic thinking, especially the USSR and the USA, during the Second World War, their contribution to the post-war settlement with the United Nations as a key element. Their approaches to new mechanisms of global governance were developing on parallel and overlapping courses. On the chronology of the Cold War, the author proposes to define its start as an extended period from 1945 until the end of the decade. This methodology avoids absolutization of intentions, separate events and statements. Instead it imbeds them in the process of political-military structures' construction, designed for regional and global confrontation. The attention is paid to the role of the subjective factor in transition of the "big three" from cooperation to the Cold War. The meaning of the Iranian crisis is demonstrated as an additional source of the Cold War's premises. The author reveals the milieu of conflicting views in the US political establishment on the legacy of the "Roosevelt course" including the nuclear factor. The conclusion is drawn that in the years of the Second World War great powers pursued long-term policy towards the post-war settlement putting aside political conjuncture.

The article is dedicated to the 75-th anniversaries since the end of the Second World War and the creation of the United Nations. The author explores the evolution of key ideas, including the contribution of the Soviet diplomatic strategy, on the post-war world and interaction among the great powers. Special attention is drawn to the phenomenon of the ―Roosevelt course‖ and the atmosphere in the Soviet-American relations during the war. The main approaches of the allies' diplomacy towards principles of post-war cooperation are analysed. It is shown that the emergence of the Cold War was not inevitable and did not correspond to the national interests of great powers. In the course of the war their vision was based mainly on pragmatism and security interests rather than on antagonistic ideologies. In terms of chronology the start of the Cold War is proposed to attribute not to a concrete year but to a period from 1945 to the end of the decade. The author underlines the outstanding and unique nature of the UN as the most enduring legacy of the Second World War, which has not lost its acute role in 2020. This research will be continued in the next paper by the author.