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Working paper
Essays in behavioral labor economics: experimental evidence from Germany and Ghana
The dissertation presents a collection of essays that deal with behavioral aspects on labor markets and focus especially on social interactions. Each Chapter from 2 to 5 represents one separate project/essay. In this general introduction, I will embed the four essays in the broader frame of behavioral labor economics and elucidate the relevance for agricultural markets....
Contract Breach with Overconfident Expectations: Experimental Evidence on Reference-Dependent Preferences
In: YGAME-D-24-00356
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Procedural Unfair Wage Differentials and Their Effects on Unethical Behavior
In: Economic Inquiry, Band 58, Heft 4, S. 1689-1706
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Procedural Unfair Wage Differentials and Their Effects on Unethical Behavior
In: Grosch, K., & Rau, H. A. (2020). Procedural Unfair Wage Differentials and their Effects on Unethical Behavior. Economic Inquiry.
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Do Discriminatory Pay Regimes Unleash Antisocial Behavior?
In: CEGE Discussion Paper No. 315
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Working paper
Gender Differences in Honesty: The Role of Social Value Orientation
In: Journal of Economic Psychology 62, 258-267, 2017
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Competition and prosociality: A lab-in-the-field experiment in Ghana
Competitive bonuses are commonly used to promote higher productivity in the workplace. Yet, these types of incentives can have subsequent negative spillovers on coworkers' prosocial behavior. We revisit this question in a lab-in-the-field experiment and examine whether competition negatively affects Social Value Orientation (prosocial attitudes) in addition to contributions to a public good (cooperative behavior). By considering the context of a developing country, we contribute to replicating previous findings in White, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic (WEIRD) samples. We find that when the payment dispersion between winners and losers is high, competition reduces both cooperation and prosocial attitudes compared to a threshold payment. Mainly winners cooperate less under competition. A comparison with a random payment scheme suggests that rivalry might partly explain the crowding-out effect in other-regarding preferences. Under low payment dispersion, competition does not affect cooperation or prosocial attitudes.
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Competition and Prosociality: A Field Experiment in Ghana
In: GlobalFood Discussion Paper 113, University of Goettingen, December 2017
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Working paper
A Hidden Cost of Violent Conflict? Sorting into Local Labor Markets in Colombia
In: DEVEC-D-24-01334
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Closing the Gender Stem Gap - a Large-Scale Randomized-Controlled Trial in Elementary Schools
In: CESifo Working Paper No. 9907
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Gender Differences in Dishonesty Disappear When Leaders Make Decisions on Behalf of Their Team
In: CESifo Working Paper No. 8514
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Working paper
Selection into Leadership and Dishonest Behavior of Leaders: a Gender Experiment
Leaders often have to weigh ethical against monetary consequences. Such situations may evoke psychological costs from being dishonest and dismissing higher monetary benefits for others. In a within-subjects experiment, we analyze such a dilemma. We first measure individual dishonest behavior when subjects report the outcome of a die roll, which determines their payoffs. Subsequently, they act as leaders and report payoffs for a group including themselves. In our main treatment, subjects can apply for leadership, whereas in the control treatment, we assign leadership randomly. Results reveal that women behave more dishonestly as leaders while men behave similarly in both the individual and the group decision. For female leaders, we find that sorting into leadership is not related to individual honesty preferences. In the control we find that female leaders do not increase dishonesty. A followup study reveals that female leaders become more dishonest after assuming leadership, as they align dishonest behavior with their belief on group members' honesty preferences.
Selection into Leadership and Dishonest Behavior of Leaders: a Gender Experiment
Leaders often weigh ethical against monetary consequences. We experimentally study such a dilemma where leaders can benefit their groups at the expense of moral costs. First, we measure individual dishonesty preferences and, second, leaders' reporting decisions for a group by using payoff-reporting games. We focus on an endogenous leadership setting, where subjects can apply for leadership. Women have less pronounced dishonesty preferences than men, but increase dishonesty as leaders. The increase disappears when leadership is randomly assigned. A follow-up study reveals that women leaders behave dishonestly when they believe their group members prefer dishonesty.