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AbstractManuscript typeReviewResearch Question/IssueWhich forms of state control over corporations have emerged in countries that made a transition from centrally‐planned to marked‐based economies and what are their implications for corporate governance? We assess the literature on variation and evolution of state control in transition economies, focusing on corporate governance of state‐controlled firms. We highlight emerging trends and identify future research avenues.Research Findings/InsightsBased on our analysis of more than 100 articles in leading management, finance, and economics journals since 1989, we demonstrate how research on state control evolved from a polarized approach of public–private equity ownership comparison to studying a variety of constellations of state capitalism.Theoretical/Academic ImplicationsWe identify theoretical perspectives that help us better understand benefits and costs associated with various forms of state control over firms. We encourage future studies to examine how context‐specific factors determine the effect of state control on corporate governance.Practitioner/Policy ImplicationsInvestors and policymakers should consider under which conditions investing in state‐affiliated firms generates superior returns.

This paper is in closed access until 7 April 2020. ; Emerging economies are oftentimes characterized by state capitalism, concentrated ownership and constrained resources, where firms face underinvestment due to resource misappropriation. The adoption of Anglo-American corporate governance practices may result in sub-optimal outcomes. We draw on the multiple agency perspective and research on cross-national governance to examine how independent directors, as agents with multiple roles, might mitigate blockholder appropriation. Using unique panel data from Russian publicly traded firms where the government and the business elite are predominant blockholders, we find that independent directors in private firms are less effective in mitigating blockholder appropriation than in state-owned enterprises. We further investigate board independence effects driven by the exposure to three international governance boundary conditions, namely Russian Multinational Enterprises, foreign listings of Russian firms, and foreign independent directors on Russian boards. Our study focuses on the agents that might assuage principal-principal conflicts, explores when ineffective governance can be minimized, and contributes to research on how governance practices developed in advanced economies get translated in emerging market economies.

We review and bridge the literature on the internationalization of state-owned firms and sovereign wealth funds to provide a novel understanding of how government ownership affects foreign investments in three ways. First, we explain how state-owned firms and funds behave differently from private ones because they need to balance governments' nonbusiness objectives and firms' business goals. This results in competing predictions on whether government ownership helps or hinders internationalization due to particular nonbusiness objectives. Second, building on the review, we provide suggestions on how to extend research topics and theories of the firm by incorporating these nonbusiness objectives in the internationalization decisions in four areas: home government's endowments, characteristics, and attitudes; host-country expansion's support, influence, and impact; home- and host-country relationship conflicts, mediation, and disguising; and management's orientation, opacity, and arbitrage. Third, we capture how governments may use state-owned multinationals and sovereign wealth funds to nudge host-country governments by introducing the concept of discreet power and the use of four strategies (recognition, values, development, and supremacy) to achieve it. This helps to outline the beginning of a unified approach to how governments use their foreign investments to achieve nonbusiness goals. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1057/s41267-022-00522-w.