Suchergebnisse
Filter
93 Ergebnisse
Sortierung:
World Affairs Online
World Affairs Online
World Affairs Online
Annexation or conquest?: The economics of empire building
In: NBER working paper series 8109
Inventors and pirates: creative activity and intellectual property rights
In: NBER working paper series 7898
Inventors and pirates: creative activity and intellectual property rights
In: European Journal of Political Economy, Band 21, Heft 2, S. 269-285
Constitution or Conflict?
In: Conflict management and peace science: the official journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 21, Heft 1, S. 29-42
ISSN: 1549-9219
Constitutional resolution of disputes between constituent groups of a polity avoids the incremental costs of civil conflict. But, the political process prescribed by a constitution provides a viable alternative to civil conflict only if the constitution is self-enforcing. Theoretical analysis reveals that the following properties help to make it possible to design a self-enforcing constitution that can settle recurring disputes: • No party to the disputes has a big advantage in civil conflict. • The parties to the disputes expect the incremental costs of civil conflict to be large relative to the importance of the disputes that arise between them. • The parties are greatly concerned about the future consequences of their current actions. Theoretical analysis also reveals that a self-enforcing constitution can require limitations on the prerogatives of winners of constitutional contests such that on average outcomes under the constitution are not too favorable to any one party and such that the outcome of each constitutional contest does not matter too much. The paper concludes with historical examples that illustrate the broad applicability of the theoretical analysis.
SSRN
Working paper
Constitution or Conflict?
In: Conflict management and peace science: CMPS ; journal of the Peace Science Society ; papers contributing to the scientific study of conflict and conflict analysis, Band 21, Heft 1, S. 29-42
ISSN: 0738-8942
Peace and War in Territorial Disputes
SSRN
Working paper
Peace and war in territorial disputes
Why do sovereign states sometimes fail to settle territorial disputes peacefully? Also, why do even peaceful settlements of territorial disputes rarely call for the resulting border to be unfortified? This paper explores a class of answers to these questions that is based on the following premise: States can settle a territorial dispute peacefully only if (1) their payoffs from a peaceful settlement are larger than their expected payoffs from a default to war, and (2) their promises not to attack are credible. This premise directs the analysis to such factors as the advantage of attacking over both defending and counterattacking, the divisibility of the contested territory, the possibility of recurring war, the depreciation or obsolescence of fortifications, and inequality in the effectiveness of mobilized resources. – credibility ; fortifications ; counterattacks ; divisibility ; recurring war ; depreciation
BASE