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AbstractDigital credit scoring is driving a number of significant transformations in Chinese economy and society, catalyzing financial liberalization, deepening financial inclusion, and shifting economic power beyond the previously state-controlled commercial banking system. Yet the significance of financial technology is informed in turn by locally specific traditions of governance and regulation. This article critically interrogates the rise of Chinese fintech, reconceptualizing it as a process of financialization that is embedded in a Chinese systems-oriented authoritarian governance tradition. On the basis of documentary sources, Chinese-language secondary literature, and fieldwork conducted from 2016-18, it argues that in addition to disrupting existing practices of financial intermediation, the emergence of novel digital credit scoring technologies is enabling new forms of algorithmic governance to be exercised over the process of financialization, which in turn represents an important component in the construction of China's neo-statist authoritarian capitalism. These findings have broader implications for how we understand the importance of new financial technologies in an era of big data, contributing to contemporary debates in international political economy, economic sociology, and Chinese studies.

Digital credit scoring is driving a number of significant transformations in Chinese economy and society, catalyzing financial liberalization, deepening financial inclusion, and shifting economic power beyond the previously state-controlled commercial banking system. Yet the significance of financial technology is informed in turn by locally specific traditions of governance and regulation. This article critically interrogates the rise of Chinese fintech, reconceptualizing it as a process of financialization that is embedded in a Chinese systems- oriented authoritarian governance tradition. On the basis of documentary sources, Chinese- language secondary literature, and fieldwork conducted from 2016-18, it argues that in addition to disrupting existing practices of financial intermediation, the emergence of novel digital credit scoring technologies is enabling new forms of algorithmic governance to be exercised over the process of financialization, which in turn represents an important component in the construction of China's neo-statist authoritarian capitalism. These findings have broader implications for how we understand the importance of new financial technologies in an era of big data, contributing to contemporary debates in international political economy, economic sociology, and Chinese studies.

China's financial system, dominated by the banking sector, has played a central role in the development of an imbalanced trajectory of economic development and growth. As one of the primary mechanisms for implementing decisive macro-economic policy, the banking sector has hitherto served the Chinese growth strategy well in actively allocating capital towards the investment and export sectors, whilst proving capable of managing the macro-economic ramifications of this highly inter-ventionist strategy. However, the role of the financial system in this growth strategy is also rooted in the requirement that authority over financial capital remains closely tied to state institutions and policies, due to elite concern over politico-economic instability. Based on policy analysis and qualitative interviews conducted in mid-2012, the article suggests that whilst the structure of the financial system was conducive to fostering the growth of the real economy, it will hold back not the need for rebalancing, but rather the process of rebalancing itself. (JCCA/GIGA)

AbstractA central concern of critical theory is that of how the forces of Modern reason cause certain logics to become reified in the name of rational progress. Two such logics – the ongoing spread of liberal capitalism, and territorial particularism – are simultaneously embodied within social institutions such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) that regulate the global economy, a phenomenon that occurs on the premise of maximising global welfare. Building upon a critical reading of Jürgen Habermas' theory of communicative action, this article undertakes an empirical immanent critique of the extent to which such logics repress the possibility of normative imperatives being considered within agricultural trade negotiations. Specifically, it argues that the dialectic of functionalist and communicative rationality, operating as a theoretical heuristic, reveals that the DDA is susceptible to an ethical indictment that arises from its inability to countenance the alternatives to the dual logics of neo-liberalism and state-interest that could otherwise emerge from a free and rational discussion. The nature of the WTO as a site of social action is revealed to be that of a closed epistemic community in which important normative claims are repressed, and as such, one in which the underlying rational bases for communication are fundamentally distorted.

China's involvement in global financial regulatory governance in the wake of the global financial crisis has surprised many observers. While Beijing has pushed for governance reform in the international financial institutions and created alternative ones, Chinese representatives in the Financial Stability Board and the standard-setting bodies it coordinates have adopted a comparably passive stance. This paper however identifies recent signs of discontinuity in China's accepting embrace of global financial standards. While policymakers supported the interpretation of non-bank financial services as "shadow banking" early on, they are challenging this frame half a decade later. Global regulatory bodies are reluctant to adjust the frame of shadow banking in order to incorporate developing country preferences. In response, Chinese authorities are redefining the label of its fast-growing non-bank financial sector to imbue it with regulatory legitimacy. They have promoted a shift away from shadow banking to the overlapping frames of fintech (internet finance) and financial inclusion. The interaction between Chinese and international regulators reveals the options and constraints the rising power faces in the political economy of global financial regulatory governance.

Why has China's 'transition' to a market economy not catalysed corresponding political transformation? In an era of deepening synergy between authoritarian politics and capitalist economics, this book offers a novel perspective on this central dilemma of contemporary Chinese development, shedding light on how the Chinese Communist Party achieved rapid economic growth while preserving political stability. Drawing on extensive fieldwork and over sixty interviews with policymakers, bankers and former party and state officials, the book delves into the role of China's state-owned banking system since 1989, showing how political control over capital has been central to the country's experience of capitalist development. It challenges existing state-market paradigms of political economy and reveals the Eurocentric assumptions underpinning liberal perspectives towards Chinese authoritarian resilience.

AbstractChina's increasing engagement in global financial governance since the 2008 crisis has potentially significant ramifications for global financial rule‐making and standard‐setting. This article presents a novel analysis of China's growing influence on the international stage and its consequences for the financial rules and standards that constrain policy makers in developing countries. We draw upon literature from international political economy and development studies to develop a framework for assessing whether China's rise has catalyzed a shift in global financial governance towards a tailored approach that responds to country‐specific developmental circumstances and needs. We argue that China's status as a rising power that still has idiosyncratic developmental priorities is leading it to push for rules and standards that are more flexible and sensitive to specific national development conditions. We illustrate this argument in three case studies, deploying the framework to explain variation in the post‐crisis evolution of rules in prudential banking regulation, capital flow management, and debt sustainability surveillance.