Suchergebnisse

This paper introduces a two-stage union-oligopoly-council model of wage and employment determination wherein at the first stage wage is negotiated through collective bargaining and at the second stage employment in each firm is co-determined by the employer and its works council. We provide a full characterization of the model outcome for all parameter values of bargaining power and co-determination power. In particular, works councils always increase employment while their impact on wage can be non-monotonic. Overall, individual works councils' pursuit of own workers' interests may well harm the workers as a union. ; Dieses Paper schlägt ein zweistufiges Gewerkschaft-Oligopol-Betriebsrat-Modell über Lohn- und Beschäftigungsverhandlungen vor. Hierbei wird in der ersten Stufe in Tarifverhandlungen der Lohn ausgehandelt, in der zweiten Stufe die Beschäftigung jeder Firma durch die Arbeiter und den Betriebsrat mitbestimmt. Wir liefern eine vollständige Charakterisierung des Modellergebnisses für alle Parameterwerte der Verhandlungsmacht und der Mitentscheidungsstärke. Es stellt sich insbesondere heraus, dass die Einrichtung eines Betriebsrats immer die Beschäftigungszahl steigert, während der Lohn nicht-monoton beeinflusst wird. Insgesamt kann jedoch das Bestreben der einzelnen Betriebsräte dem Gesamtinteresse aller Beschäftigten schaden.

AbstractThis paper studies firms' obfuscation choices in a duopoly setting where two firms differ in their marginal costs of production. We show that the high‐cost firm chooses maximum obfuscation while the low‐cost firm chooses minimal (maximal) obfuscation if the cost advantage is large (small). We argue that in this setting there is a new role for price regulation as it leads to more transparent pricing. Moreover, a price cap benefits social welfare as it shifts production to the more efficient low‐cost firm.

Abstract
This paper introduces price-dependent individual demand into the circular city model of product differentiation. We show that for any finite number of firms, an unique symmetric price equilibrium exists provided that demand functions are not "too" convex. As in the case of unit demand, the number of firms under free entry decreases in the fixed cost of entry while increases in the transportation cost of consumers. However, this number is no longer always in excess of the socially optimal level. Insufficient entry occurs when the fixed and transportation costs are high.