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Deregulation, integration and market structure in European banking
This paper discusses the impact of deregulation and market integration policies on the structure of European banking markets. The paper argues that whether European integration will lead to an increased exploitation of scale advantages, or not, will depend on the extent to which competition in banking is based on fixed or variable costs. If competition focuses on variable costs, concentration will diminish with market enlargement when we control for the pro-concentration effect triggered by the deregulation process. Alternatively, when competition focuses on expenses unrelated to the level of intermediation, concentration will not tend to decline as the size of the market grows. This is due to the compensating effect of increased competition in fixed costs such as brand image or electronic banking. I propose a simple test using aggregate data to provide an empirical assessment of the dominant form of competition. The application of this procedure to data for eleven EU countries during the period from 1981 to 1995 yields parameter estimates which indicate that over the period of analysis, competition in Europe tends to be predominantly based on variable costs.
BASE
Deregulation, integration and market structure in European banking
In: Cahiers BEI: EIB papers, Band 4, Heft 2, S. 34-48
ISSN: 0257-7755
World Affairs Online
Integrating Regulated Networks Markets in Europe
In: Subsidiarity and Economic Reform in Europe, S. 157-175
The integration of EU banking markets
In: Building a Dynamic Europe, S. 127-163
European Commission Decisions on Anti-Competitive Behavior
In: IESE Business School Working Paper No. 846
SSRN
Working paper
Vertical industrial policy in the EU: An empirical analysis of the effectiveness of state aid
This paper assesses the effectiveness of vertical industrial policies within the European Union. Vertical industrial policy is defined as government support of specific firms or industries ('picking winners' or 'supporting losers'). It is measured as state aid granted by Member States to the manufacturing sectors, with the aim to analyse to what extent this government intervention affects the growth of multifactor productivity (MFP) in manufacturing. The analysis is conducted with both sectoral and horizontal aid, since in many cases vertical aid is disguised as aid pursuing horizontal objectives. Controlling for the potential endogeneity of state aid policy, the results indicate that vertical state aid contributes positively to MFP growth.
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Telecommunications Policies: Determinants and Impact
This paper presents new data, in the form of four indices, on liberalization policies and the independence of regulators for a cross section of countries. These indices are combined with a comprehensive set of performance, institutional and political data to analyze both the determinants and the impact of telecommunications policies. We find that liberalization policies are negatively associated with the degree to which countries have an interventionist tradition, but not with the partisan ideology of reforming countries per se. We also find that countries where the institutional endowment constrains less the behavior of the executive bodies, and countries with a stronger incumbent, are more prone to create truly independent regulatory agencies. There is weak evidence that the creation of independent regulatory agencies has a positive effect on network penetration when we take into account the endogeneity of regulatory independence.
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EINZELBESPRECHUNGEN - 2 Soziologie der Politik - Sozialpolitik-Wohlfahrtsstaat-Beschäftigungspolitik - Job Creation
In: Politische Vierteljahresschrift: PVS : German political science quarterly, Band 41, Heft 4, S. 796-799
ISSN: 0032-3470
European Telecoms Regulation: Past Performance and Prospects
In: Competition Policy in the EU, S. 236-258
State Aids to the Banking Sector: Rescuing Some Harms Others
In: Documentos de Economía "la Caixa", No. 13, April 2009
SSRN
Working paper