Suchergebnisse

International cooperation to tackle complex common resource problems like climate change is extremely difficult. Although there is broad agreement on the nature of the problem and what is required to solve it, many nations continue to block any meaningful action for solution. This global cooperation crisis is baffling in the light of recent evidence about the surprisingly cooperative disposition of human beings. Research from social and natural sciences points to an unmistakable conclusion: people cooperate all the time, and they enjoy doing so. This picture of human behaviour is at odds with common assumptions about people being narrowly-and exclusively-self-interested, and prompts the question that we address in this paper: why, if we are so good cooperating at interpersonal levels, is international cooperation so hard? We address this question in three steps. First, we review the recent multidisciplinary evidence demonstrating that people cooperate much more than rational-theory models predict, and that this might stem from a natural, evolved, predisposition to cooperate. Second, we argue that there are seven basic mechanisms that determine whether or not cooperation is successful or sustainable: reciprocity, trust, communication, reputation, fairness, enforcement and we-identity. We group these mechanisms in a 'cooperation hexagon' that summarizes the current consensus about what makes cooperation work. Finally, we discuss what these findings mean for global cooperation. We argue that power games are not enough to explain off current international cooperation blockades. A new, comprehensive theory of international cooperation must be compatible with the recent insights about the fundamentally cooperative nature of human behaviour. We suggest that the search for this theory be made in three directions: a) establish how cooperation scales up from interpersonal to larger scales, and how the basic mechanisms of cooperation behave under conditions of unprecedented complexity and rapid change; b) investigate cooperation at the 'meso-level' of global governance-the relatively small group of people who represent nations in international discussions and institutions-a key interface between interpersonal and inter-institutional motivations for cooperation; and c) examine patterns of international cooperation in the light of the cooperation hexagon, to ascertain whether international cooperation blockades are the result of the underprovisioning of the basic mechanisms of cooperation, and how these mechanisms can be used as criteria for designing better institutions for global governance.

The hundreds of millions of people in Asia, Latin America and Africa whose incomes have increased over the last decade or so have been called the "new middle classes" of the developing world. This group is getting bigger. Their unprecedented size — likely to reach the billions by mid-century — means that these new middle classes will play an important role in their countries and beyond. If we define the middle classes as those who spend between US$ 10 and 100 (purchasing power parity, PPP) per day, by some projections this group will grow by more than one billion people in Asia alone in the next decade. The new middle classes will dwarf the "old" ones soon, shifting the centre of gravity of world consumption. In the West, the middle classes are seen as a huge part of the success story of the post-war years. They are considered fundamental for sustained economic growth, democracy and good political institutions. If this happens in developing countries, then it will be good news. But will it? A simple replay of history is unlikely. We do not know how society will change as incomes grow for millions of people in the developing world. The new middle classes could become forces for political, economic and social change both domestically and globally. But the opposite can also happen: once well established, they could act conservatively to protect their own positions and prevent further social change. This uncertainty presents a diverse set of challenges for development policy. First, people tend to use up more natural resources as they get richer. Reducing the environmental footprint of consumption must therefore be a global concern. Second, the growth of middle classes will not necessarily foster greater social inclusion. Development policy needs to prioritise reducing inequality as well as promoting growth. Third, rising incomes will not automatically lead to Western- style democracy. Open political systems should be encouraged regardless of the outcomes of political processes. Fourth, improved global governance is not a given. International cooperation among countries with larger and more assertive middle classes may become more difficult and complex.

International cooperation to tackle complex common resource problems like climate change is extremely difficult. Although there is broad agreement on the nature of the problem and what is required to solve it, many nations continue to block any meaningful action for solution. This global cooperation crisis is baffling in the light of recent evidence about the surprisingly cooperative disposition of human beings. Research from social and natural sciences points to an unmistakable conclusion: people cooperate all the time, and they enjoy doing so. This picture of human behaviour is at odds with common assumptions about people being narrowly-and exclusively-self-interested, and prompts the question that we address in this paper: why, if we are so good cooperating at interpersonal levels, is international cooperation so hard? We address this question in three steps. First, we review the recent multidisciplinary evidence demonstrating that people cooperate much more than rational-theory models predict, and that this might stem from a natural, evolved, predisposition to cooperate. Second, we argue that there are seven basic mechanisms that determine whether or not cooperation is successful or sustainable: reciprocity, trust, communication, reputation, fairness, enforcement and we-identity. We group these mechanisms in a 'cooperation hexagon' that summarizes the current consensus about what makes cooperation work. Finally, we discuss what these findings mean for global cooperation. We argue that power games are not enough to explain off current international cooperation blockades. A new, comprehensive theory of international cooperation must be compatible with the recent insights about the fundamentally cooperative nature of human behaviour. We suggest that the search for this theory be made in three directions: a) establish how cooperation scales up from interpersonal to larger scales, and how the basic mechanisms of cooperation behave under conditions of unprecedented complexity and rapid change; b) investigate cooperation at the 'meso-level' of global governance-the relatively small group of people who represent nations in international discussions and institutions-a key interface between interpersonal and inter-institutional motivations for cooperation; and c) examine patterns of international cooperation in the light of the cooperation hexagon, to ascertain whether international cooperation blockades are the result of the underprovisioning of the basic mechanisms of cooperation, and how these mechanisms can be used as criteria for designing better institutions for global governance.