ABSTRACT We aim to raise awareness of the benefits of conducting international research rather than just single-country studies (which tend to be dominated by U.S. data). We outline the key challenges in terms of data collection and empirical design and propose various data sources for country-level variables, including formal and informal institutions. We also describe several hands-on approaches that are suitable in a crosscountry setting. Data Availability: Data are available from sources indicated in the paper. JEL Classifications: C1; C8.
In: The journal of financial research: the journal of the Southern Finance Association and the Southwestern Finance Association, Band 36, Heft 1, S. 43-66
AbstractDividend policies provide an opportune setting to examine how firms simultaneously manage the diverging interests of shareholders and creditors. Dividends ease shareholders' concerns about expropriation by insiders while exacerbating creditors' concerns about expropriation by shareholders. Firm insiders should set dividend policies to minimize the agency costs of equity and debt. Using a sample of 39 countries for 1991–2010, we find strong evidence that dividends are more positively sensitive to creditor (shareholder) rights when shareholders (creditors) are adequately protected. Our research emphasizes the importance of accounting for the interactions between both agency relationships when studying corporate policies.
In: The journal of financial research: the journal of the Southern Finance Association and the Southwestern Finance Association, Band 32, Heft 4, S. 395-422
AbstractWe examine the governance role of multiple large shareholder structures (MLSS) to determine their valuation effects in a sample of 1,252 publicly traded firms from nine East Asian economies. We find that the presence, number, and size of multiple large shareholders are associated with a significant valuation premium. Our results also show that the identity of MLSS influences corporate value and that the valuation effects of MLSS are more pronounced in firms with greater agency costs. Our results imply that MLSS play a valuable monitoring role in curbing the diversion of corporate resources.
We investigate the role of ownership structure and investor protection in postprivatization corporate governance. We find that the government relinquishes control over time, mainly to the benefit of local institutions and foreign investors. We also show that private ownership tends to concentrate over time. In addition to firm-level variables, investor protection, political and social stability explain the cross-firm differences in ownership concentration. We find that the positive effect of ownership concentration on firm performance matters more in countries with weak investor protection and that private domestic ownership leads to higher performance.