Suchergebnisse

New Zealand is facing increasing challenges in managing natural resources (land, freshwater, marine space and air quality) under pressures from domestic (population growth, agricultural intensification, cultural expectations) and international (climate change) sources. These challenges can be described in terms of managing 'wicked problems'; i.e. problems that may not be understood fully until they have been solved, where stakeholders have different world views and frames for understanding the problem, the constraints affecting the problem and the resources required to solve it change over time, and no complete solution is ever actually found. Adaptive governance addresses wicked problems through a framework to engage stakeholders in a participative process to create a long term vision. The vision must identify competing goals and a process for balancing them over time that acknowledges conflicts cannot always be resolved in a single lasting decision. Circumstances, goals and priorities can all vary over time and by region. The Resource Management Act can be seen as an adaptive governance structure where frameworks for resources such as water may take years to evolve and decades to fully implement. Adaptive management is about delivery through an incremental/experimental approach, limits on the certainty that governments can provide and stakeholders can demand, and flexibility in processes and results. In New Zealand it also requires balancing central government expertise and resources, with local authorities which can reflect local goals and knowledge, but have varying resources and can face quite distinct issues of widely differing severity. It is important to signal the incremental, overlapping, iterative and time-consuming nature of the work involved in developing and implementing adaptive governance and management frameworks. Managing the expectations of those involved as to the nature of the process and their role in it, and the scope and timing of likely outcomes, is key to sustaining participation.

The potential advantages in flexibility and efficiency of environmental use rights (such as permits and quotas) over prescriptive regulatory approaches have been well surveyed, and are being advocated in New Zealand now as a tool for achieving sustainable development. So why have they not been more widely adopted here? How can government help remove barriers and improve both economic and environmental outcomes in New Zealand? At the structural level the barriers tend to be well known, or presumed, as a lack of statutory frameworks or central government guidance, and information costs involved in defining the resource and in determining an appropriate rights framework to optimise its use. Even given these structural and technical barriers there remains the task of explaining why, since those barriers are not insuperable, little progress has occurred. Other factors include the extent to which such responsibility in New Zealand is delegated by central government, competing priorities for regional governments, lack of pressure on resources (eg; water in much of New Zealand), the difficulty of making contentious choices and strength of existing interests, reluctance to acknowledge any private rights to some resources, the relative ease of using existing regulatory tools, and low benefits relative to costs in small markets particularly where geographical distinctions exist such as for water and certain types of pollution. This suggests that the best focus for central government may be on better guidance, filling gaps in legislative frameworks, and providing or encouraging provision of the necessary institutions and systems in ways that allow economies of scope and scale. It is unclear how much scope there is for improvement but getting rid of unnecessary barriers, as long as it is done without unnecessary elaboration or restriction, will help secure whatever gains are out there to be had.

Achieving good regulatory outcomes normally requires high quality design, implementation and review of the regulatory regime. Major regulatory theories focus on concepts such as the public interest, the role of interest groups, and regulatory capture to explain why regulations come into existence. Regulatory design, however, exists at two levels. Downstream design involves creating a regime to give the appropriate incentives to firms and consumers. Upstream design seeks to incentivise regulators themselves to create and operate high quality regulatory regimes. This paper focuses on the latter. The OECD has undertaken a major programme on regulatory governance to ensure quality in the design and implementation of regulations. Such measures are now widespread. New Zealand has gradually implemented these approaches including Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) in its decision- making processes. These measures are supported, and to some degree required, by increased interaction with Australian practices through institutions such as the Council of Australian Governments and the obligations of Trans-Tasman Mutual Recognition Arrangement. Achieving full integration of best practice that creates an environment for consistently delivering high quality regulation requires a broad and sustained focus on design, capability, incentives and follow-up. New Zealand has attempted over the last decade to improve regulatory outcomes by focusing on the incentives on regulators. There is still scope for further improvement. Sustained progress on a number of mutually supporting initiatives, with continued reinforcement of the underlying messages and careful building of the necessary institutions and practices is required for continued improvement.

Subsidiarity requires taking decisions at the level of government best placed to do so, but does not say what that level is. Rather, it gives a broad framework within which to have the debate. Implementing subsidiarity means (1) allocating roles appropriately between levels of government, (2) co-ordinating implementation of decisions, and (3) managing accountability and participation. Subsidiarity does not, however, tell us how to achieve these goals. It is therefore more about how a decision is made than about what the specific decision is. Europe, the United States and Australia have adopted varying solutions to these issues. New Zealand's ability to influence the trans-Tasman outcome is likely to be limited. The main implications for New Zealand are in designing trans-Tasman institutions and allocating responsibilities between central and local government.

The paper responds to recent debate in New Zealand on the power of the government to take private property, directly or through regulatory constraints. This aspect of regulation has received less attention in New Zealand than it warrants. This paper addresses the issue of which protections against takings are appropriate, and the role of compensation as a protective device. A taking can be broadly defined an act by which a government assumes or assigns control over all or part of a property right held by a private party. Government regulation is typically not treated as a taking. In practice, compensation is normally required only for physical takings, such as the acquisition of land, and is not available for takings through regulation, such as restricting the right to use land in a particular way. New Zealand has three options for improved protection against takings: a tighter regime for scrutinising the quality of regulation, more restricted takings powers, and extended compensation provisions. The desirability and practicality of a greater role for compensation requires, however, more detailed consideration. The paper aims to stimulate further debate in this area as an aspect of the wider debate on regulatory quality.

This paper discusses aspects of harmonisation of regulatory structures (occupational, product approval etc) between jurisdictions. The primary focus is on trans-national arrangements, but many of the issues also apply to relations between central and regional/local government, and between regional/local governments. The paper addresses a taxonomy of harmonisation approaches, who to harmonise with, how far and in what areas, and a range of implementation issues, before reviewing some relevant EU examples, outlining existing trans-Tasman regulatory relationships and current trans-Tasman harmonisation proposals, and noting some issues relevant to local government. It does not address wider economic integration issues or currency or political union.