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AbstractCatholic-Nationalism is one of the defining, and also exclusive, characteristics of the Military Junta that ruled Argentina between 1976 and 1983. Such patriotic messianic ideology strongly influenced the armed forces' weltanschauung and justified, according to them, their actions. But this messianic ideology has its origins at the beginning of the 20th century and the coming of the first military regime in 1930. In order to properly describe the catholic-nationalist aspect of the Junta's dictatorship it is imperative to explore its origins; evaluate the Junta's discourse and its ideology in power; examine the role of the Argentinean Catholic Church and finally to see how the crusade transformed into actual divine violence among the repressive methods chosen by the military. Introduction Religious fundamentalism is maybe one of the last qualities that would characterize the military dictatorship that governed Argentina between 1976 and 1983. Nevertheless, it is the catholic-nationalist ideology that gave the Junta its most distinctive feature. The armed forces were convinced that they had the holy mission to fight a crusade against the enemies of the catholic foundations of the nation. Argentina, for them, was founded with "the sword and the cross" and together both of them protected the national identity from alien ideas. In the case of the military Junta, the foreign ideology that threatened the country's traditions was communism. The latter was particularly dangerous because it was an atheist creed. God was an integral part of the history of Argentina; attacking him meant attacking the foundations of the country: the Church and the military. To understand how the messianic trope played a pivotal role in the Junta's regime it is essential to: first, explore the historical origins of the catholic-nationalist ideology in Argentina and how they defined the nation and its internal enemies; second, to describe how the Junta incorporated that ideology into its politics and how it perceived that it was fighting a holy crusade against communism; third, to portray the legitimizing role of the Argentinean Catholic Church of the Junta and its repressive methods, particularly noting how the clerics identified themselves with the armed forces' holy mission and how they saw them as the natural protector of the national religion; and fourth, to depict how the repressive mechanisms chosen by the Junta to suppress foreign ideologies and reorganize society around Christian values contained certain elements an symbols that would categorize them as forms of divine violence. The OriginsThe idea of Argentina being governed by a political regime based on "the sword and the cross" was not created on March the 24th 1976. Catholic and authoritarian Argentina was conceived in the late 1920s early 1930s; although it could also be trailed into the 1890s (1). The catholic-nationalist movement that sprung between those years was the combination of two different political currents: the clerical and the nationalistic. The former was born from the catholic struggle against liberalism and laicism. The clericals were against several State policies, which they regarded as anti-Catholic, like the establishment of a public, mandatory and secular education and the creation of civil marriage among others. Juan Manuel Estrada was one of the intellectual architects behind clericalism and the figure that would lead a catholic insurrection against the liberal government of Juarez Celman in July 1890 (2). The clericals viewed liberalism and the secular State in Argentina as a negation of the natural- ergo, Christian -order and opposing to the historical messianic mission of the Republic that dated since colonial times. Interestingly, the catholic movement opposed the nationalist and fascist factions of the 1920s because both did not, yet, recognize Argentina's Christian identity.The nationalists, on the other hand, were a product of the backlash against immigration; particularly against non-white immigrants and Europeans of anarchist, socialist and communist ideologies. Massive immigration and its social repercussions was, according to the nationalists, threatening to radically change Argentina's national identity. The latter was defined, by the nationalist intellectual Ricardo Rojas, by taking into account Argentina's anti-European colonial legacy. Argentina was conceived as a Republic, but not as a democratic one. Democracy was an alien –European- element being introduced by immigrants, just like Judaism and Communism also were. The nationalists blamed the liberal governments for the open migratory policy that was undermining the traditions and identity of the country. If nationalists were anti-liberal, antidemocratic, anticommunist and anti-Semite they still did not recognize Catholicism as the pivotal ingredient of being Argentine. It took the work of an ex-anarchist and ex-socialist to make that fusion possible.Leopoldo Lugones was Argentina's main intellectual between the 1910s and the 1920s. He was also responsible of defining argentine nationalism in fascist, dictatorial, militarist, and finally, catholic terms. Lugones considered that the fatherland (la patria) had been created by the sword (la espada). The military were the true fathers of the nation. Therefore, he viewed the armed forces as a sacred cast superior to the people. The military was in charge of assuring the order of the Republic. Such order had been challenged by democracy and, consequently, socialism. Both ideologies were not part of the national tradition and their supporters were regarded as foreign internal enemies. The armed forces, then, had the sacred duty to violently reinstall the traditional republican order. This violence -the effective use of the sword– was not only legitimate and necessary, but more importantly, it was sacred (3). This sacrosanct mission to defend the fatherland was thought to be a continuation from the Spanish imperial rule. Accordingly, the Argentine military had also the holy mission to defend the foundational Christian identity of the nation. Violence was more than sacred; it was holy.The further development of Catholic-nationalism would have to wait until the end of the first military authoritarian regime. Uriburu's dictatorship inaugurated a long term period of modern military dictatorships, with more or less democratic regimes in-between, which would last until 1983. General Uriburu was a strong nationalist that sympathized with Lugones and that had participated in the Catholic insurrection of 1890 (4). He believed in Argentina's republican origins but he regarded democracy as an alien ideology that was undermining the foundations of the nation. Torture, political prisoners and executions were the rule during the two years dictatorship (1930-32). The picana was used for the first time in those years, but it did not have the same divine symbolism that would have in the last Argentinean military regime. Uriburu's despise for democracy prompted him to fundamentally restructure the State's institutions by trying to establish a pseudo-fascist corporative regime. This nationalist revolution did not succeed and Uriburu had to eventually let civic authorities take control of the government (5).Uriburu's dictatorship embodied the prototype of a nationalist authoritarian regime with close ties to the catholic tradition (6). Nationalist clerics, like Gustavo Franceshi and Julio Meinvielle, were the main thinkers behind the maturity of the catholic-nationalist ideology, during the 1930s, by describing the pivotal role that the Argentinean Catholic Church should have in legitimizing the armed forces' divine mission to protect the religious-national foundations of the country. The nationalist clerics saw themselves as God's political representatives and it was their mission to sanctify the crusade against the liberal, and democratic, regime. From then on, Argentina, for the catholic-nationalists, was conceived to be founded in the cross (the Catholic Church) and the sword (the Armed Forces).The nationalist movement of the 1930s in Argentina has to be regarded in a broad international context and cannot be detached from Europe's experience with fascism and other extreme nationalisms of the time (7). Argentine nationalists were deeply influenced by Italian fascism and would actually see themselves as fascists but with a religious twist. The political leader of the movement was not an earthly figure. It was Christ himself. Only he could have a truly totalitarianweltanschauung. The military and the clergy were his vicars in Argentina. The Nazis had their volksgemeinschaft; the Italian fascists their civiltá; and the argentine nationalist their cristiandad. According to each case, those were their respective nation's pillars. In the two first cases, the content is sacred, but pagan. In the last one, the content is holy and religious. Finally, the Spanish Civil War played a pivotal role in the Argentina nationalists' imaginarium. They witnessed how the most Catholic nation of all, the one that for centuries had defended the cross with the sword and that had even brought Christianity to Argentina's shores, was now battling an internal crusade against an atheist, and therefore foreign, ideology. The experience of the Spanish Republic and the subsequent Civil War would last in the Argentinean nationalist military's and clergy's memories.Even if the catholic-nationalist movement was popular, from the late 30s on, among the armed forces, the clergy and some middle class and elite sectors, it would not have the expected influence in the following military regimes from 1943 until 1966 included. Everything changed with the coup of 1976. (1) See Rock, David; La Argentina autoritaria. Los nacionalistas, su historia y su influencia en la vida pública; Ariel; Buenos Aires; 1993; pp. 45-71. (2) See Ibid; pp. 52(3) See Finchelstein, Federico; La Argentina fascista. Los orígenes ideológicos de la dictadura; Sudamericana; Buenos Aires; 2010; pp. 33; and Finchelstein, Federico; Transatlantic Fascism. Ideology, Violence, and the Sacred in Argentina and Italy, 1919-1945; Duke University Press; 2010; pp.62-78.(4) See Rock, David; La Argentina autoritaria. Los nacionalistas, su historia y su influencia en la vida pública; Ariel; Buenos Aires; 1993; pp. 104.(5) Uriburu was not able to change the State's structure; however he sponsored the creation of fascist paramilitary groups like la Legión Cívica. See Finchelstein, Federico; La Argentina fascista. Los orígenes ideológicos de la dictadura; Sudamericana; Buenos Aires; 2010; pp. 41; Rock, David; La Argentina autoritaria. Los nacionalistas, su historia y su influencia en la vida pública; Ariel; Buenos Aires; 1993; pp. 109-115.(6) Uriburu's farewell speech clearly shows the catholic-nationalist ideology to which his regime belonged to. See Rock, David; La Argentina autoritaria. Los nacionalistas, su historia y su influencia en la vida pública; Ariel; Buenos Aires; 1993; pp. 109.(7) See Finchelstein, Federico; Transatlantic Fascism. Ideology, Violence, and the Sacred in Argentina and Italy, 1919-1945; Duke University Press; 2010. *Estudiante de Doctorado, New School for Social Research, New YorkMaestría en Estudios Internacionales, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, Buenos AiresÁrea de Especialización: Procesos de formación del Estado moderno, sociología de la guerra, terrorismo, genocidio, conflictos étnicos, nacionalismos y minorías.E-mail: guere469@newschool.edu

¨The actions taken by the Armed Forces are not a mere overthrow of a government but rather the final closing of a historical cycle and the opening of a new one in which respect for human rights is not only borne out by the rule of law and of international declarations, but is also the result of our profound and Christian belief in the preeminent dignity of man as a fundamental value.¨ (…) ¨It will be the objectives of the Armed Forces to restore the validity of the values of Christian morality, of national tradition and of the dignity to be an Argentinean; (…) a final solution to subversion in order to firmly found a reorganized Argentina on the values of Western and Christian civilization by eradicating, once and for all, the vices which afflict the nation. This immense task will require trust and sacrifice but has only one beneficiary the Argentinean people¨ (1). With these words the military junta addressed the Argentines after taking over the government through a coup d'état the 24th of March 1976. Already in this first official communication it is possible to find the strong messianic discourse where the armed forces were fulfilling their holy mission to protect the Christian-national identity of the country.For the first time in the history of Argentina catholic-nationalism, as a nationalist ideology, had an absolute control of the State and was backed by the entrepreneurship and by important sectors of the middle class.(2) The military junta, leaded by Jorge Rafael Videla, was the perfect embodiment of a permanent alliance between religion and fatherland. The armed forces were compelled, being the institution that gave birth to the nation, to fulfill a decisive role in the "holy mission" to morally regenerate the country. This would have allowed Argentina, and therefore all of the Western-Christian civilization, to not just vanquish communism but, also, all of its roots like liberalism, democracy and agnosticism. The military, alongside the Argentinean Catholic Church and its supporters, were convinced that the final battle of the "third world war" was taking place in Argentina. Generals Ramon Camps and Menéndez would even call the "Argentinean theater of operations" as third world war, where they thought the international subversive movements were playing a pivotal role (3). This extremely eschatological feeling was completely different from other similar Cold War scenarios in other developing countries. In Argentina the "final showdown against international communism" syndrome was exacerbated by this alliance between the sword and the cross that would fight communism in order to make a "healthy" society possible, which would lead the way to the regeneration of the "atheist infected" western world. This expectation was the pillar of messianic spirit that justified the extermination plan.But the Proceso de Reorganización Nacional (National Reorganization Process), as the military junta denominated the period that begun with the coup d'état, was more than an extermination plan; it aimed at a total "restoration" of society. The speech given by Lieutenant Jorge Eduardo Goleri at a book burning gathering in Córdoba in April 1976 clearly shows what the Junta was aiming for: "God's will requires that the military preserves the natural order manifest in the Western and Christian civilization to which Argentina is integral, but the East had organized a massive international conspiracy to subvert that civilization by restructuring society in accordance with the seditious and atheistic doctrine of communism. We are facing the imminent doom of our way of being Christian under the assault of subversion"(4).The Junta regarded itself as the creative agent of historical destiny(5). In their eschatological mindset they were analogous to the Messiah. They saw themselves as the mythological/biblical Hero that defended the most sacred/holy interests and appeared when a series of afflictions required his abilities of salvation. The Hero needed a nemesis in order to act and what better foe than international communism. But the latter was constructed in a Manichean, epical and apocalyptical manner. The myth of the Hero was opposite to the myth of a "Metaphysical Enemy". The former would engage in a Mythological/Holy War against an invisible but encompassing "Evil". Violent acts from left-wing guerrilla groups, which the Junta labeled as terrorism, perfectly ascribed that ontological description. Communism, with its terrorist offspring, was foreign, atheist and ideological. The military, then, had to combat it not just in the streets or countryside; but in the people's minds, and souls, as well. Guerrilla fighters were just the armed side; the roots of communism, meaning of terrorism and anti-Catholicism, were to be found in individuals that had ideas contrary to the Juntas' weltanschauung. They were ideas that opposed the catholic foundations of the nation and the society that it embodied.The Junta's adversary was an essentially ideological foe as General Videla stated to a British journalist: "A terrorist (read communist or atheist) is not just someone with a gun or a bomb, but also someone who spreads ideas which are contrary to Western and Christian civilization" and he continued, "…Subversion is all action that seeks the alteration or the destruction of the people's moral criteria and form of life, with the end of seizing power and imposing a new form based upon a different scale of values"(6). The guerrilla was not the most dangerous enemy; because in military terms it was already defeated before the Junta took power. The nemeses were communism, liberalism and democracy, ideologies that advocated an "Anti-Christian Revolution" that subverted the catholic foundations of the country(7). Accordingly, the subversive was guilty of the most serious crime against the Augustinian concept of "Common Good". In this latter sense, the battle against that invisible, but spiritual, Evil was a conflict inside each one of us. Like Massera said: "…the Third World War is not only fought in battlefields but, more importantly, in the believer's soul" (8). This Holy War mobilized the Junta as a "warrior-savior", as a modern crusader fighting for God and freedom from foreign atheist ideologies. This, in part, self-perceived holy mission strengthened the Junta's self-image as Christ's vicar, as crusading defender of Christianity and its Natural Order from the "pagan agents and antinational beings of the Antichrist"(9). Not surprisingly, the military profession was defined by Monsignor Bonamín as a profession of religiosity. Consequently, it is no wander that before the armed forces toppled Isabel Peron's government, they asked for the Catholic Church benediction the night before the coup(10). The Argentinean Catholic Church was as deeply as it could possibly be involved in this crusade. The Crusade's sanctification by the ChurchAfter Videla and Massera were blessed by the heads of the Argentinean Episcopate the night before the coup, Parana's Archbishop and military Bishop Adolfo Tortolo announced that the Catholic Church would positively cooperate with the new government (11). The Church was actively supporting and legitimizing the imminent armed forces' putsch. This probably did not surprise the future Junta's leaders. In December 1975, just three months before the coup d'état, Tortolo had called for the military to inaugurate a "purification process" and his subordinate Bonamín had stated, during the mass in front of future Junta leader General Viola, that Christ wanted the armed forces to be beyond their function in the future (12). The vicars of Christ on Earth were actually telling the military what were their Lord's orders. This symbiosis between the sword and the cross continued even after the first accusations of human rights violations against the Junta. On October 1976, Tortolo declared that he did not know of any evidence that proved that human rights were being violated or abused. In 1977 he went even further by affirming that the Church thought that the armed forces were acting accordingly to the special demands of the present juncture; meaning that the military was fulfilling its duty (13). The same with Bonamín's declarations regarding the role of the armed forces: "…it was written, it was in God's plan that Argentina did not have to lose its greatness and it was saved by its natural custodian: the army"; "…Providence has given the army the duty to govern, from the Presidency to the intervention in a trade union"; and finally "…the anti-guerrilla fight is a battle for the Republic of Argentina, for its integrity, but also for its altars (…) This fight is a fight in morality's defense, of men's dignity, ultimately a fight in God's defense (…) That is why I ask for the divine protection in this dirty war to which we are committed to." (14)The vast majority of the Argentinean Catholic Church favored and strongly supported the military junta's government and repression. Only four of the eighty-four clerical members of the Argentinean Episcopate publicly denounced the regime's repression (15). However, the Church was not just backing the Junta because it legitimized its sacred duty to defend the fatherland or because it identified itself in the Junta's messianic mission; but because Church also had to deal with its own internal enemies. The Argentinean Catholic Church was, perhaps, the most conservative Latin-American national Church. It was strongly in disagreement with the three most important progressive movements inside the Catholic Church: the Second Vatican Council, the Third World Priesthood Movement and the Latin-American Episcopal Council of Medellin. The Theological Liberation Movement that spread through Latin America during the 60s and 70s was extremely popular among young Argentineans. Several priests identified themselves with the Movement and tried to bring change to the Argentinean Church through their communal and pastoral actions among poor sectors. Additionally, several Montoneros' members were former catholic school's students that had radicalized, in part, because of their experience with the Theological Liberation Movement. The Catholic Church, then, supported, or did not protest too much against, the "internal cleansing" done by the military; like the killing of Father Mujica, Angelleli and four Palotines clerics among other cases (16).Lastly, the Catholic Church was involved in a much sinister way with the Junta's actions. The heads of the Argentinean Church knew about the repressive methods being used by the security and armed forces and chose not to condemn them. They considered them as necessary sacrifices for the Common Good. Nevertheless, several clerics went further by assisting and taking an active part in the implementation of torture and other repressive mechanisms used by the Junta. More than two hundred prelates participated in four different ways: offering confession/absolution to the victims before being executed or thrown into the sea; assisting the torturers by playing the "good cop" role; being themselves the torturers; and, by confessing and spiritually assisting the torturers and other victimizers (17). The priest Christian von Wernich is, maybe, one of the best examples of the fusion between the cross and the sword. Not only he assisted the torturers in their tasks, he even was involved in the kidnapping and torture of several desaparecidos and in the infiltration of exiled groups in New York (18). He, among others like Archbishop Plaza, Fathers Astigueta, Castillo and Perlanda López that also assisted torture sessions, justified the repressive methods, not considering them sins, by legitimizing their, and the military, behavior under the Augustinian and De Vitorian doctrines of "just war". The support of the Catholic Church for the fight against subversion and its blessing was a pivotal element in the implementation of the plan of extermination and its suppressive mechanisms. The repressive methods, chosen by the Junta, were not void themselves of a messianic and divine nature. Divine and Redemptory Violence The three main types of violent acts that reflected the Junta's Messianic crusade, which were an integral part of their repressive methods, were: torture, thevictim's throwing into the sea and the appropriation of the victims' children by families deemed proper by the military. These violent means, chosen by the perpetrators to perpetually annihilate the ideas that were subverting the Argentinean Catholic traditions, were constructed under the discourse of "love" in two different ways: firstly, the kind of love upheld by Thomas Aquinas where the authority could legitimately kill evil-doers when the formers were motivated by charity. The crusading Junta envisaged that the repressive methods it used had a transcendental value. That type of violence was constructive rather than destructive, insofar as it was able to eradicate evil in order to create good (19). Love was considered the reason for an act of violence, for a punishment that redeemed the sinner, disregarding whether the latter survived the penitence. General Ramón Camps, commenting of how the detention centers perfected the victims through torture, said: "It is love that prioritizes and legitimates the actions of soldiers. The use of force to put an end to violence does not imply hate since it is nothing other than the difficult search for the restoration of love. In the war we are fighting, love of social body that we want to protect is what comes first in all of our actions" (20). Massera and Videla also referred to the dictatorship's repression as an "act of love" or "work that began with love"(21). All these statements reflected how the just war's discourse of Christian charity was in their minds by giving love a pivotal place.Secondly, there was another, and more complex, kind of love in the Junta's Christian-inspired crusade, which contrasted with the former metaphysical type and appeared exclusively in the torture tables of the detention centers, and should be labeled as sexual love. The torture sessions were filled of sexual symbolisms and discourse. The eroticism present in the torments was the exteriorization of the torturer's sexual -religiously repressed- desires into the body -the sexual surrogate totem- of the tortured. Consequently, the act of torture symbolized the act of sex(22). Like Jacobo Timerman perfectly put it, the Junta's violence was the emotional and erotic expression of a militarized nation (23).An expression orchestrated by the use of the picana. The latter was the preferred torture instrument used by the torturers for many reasons. Historically, it was first used by the nationalists during Uriburu's dictatorship and it was extremely effective in administering the desired amount of pain. However, symbolically, thepicana represented, better than other torments, the rawest manifestation of the Junta's conception of power related to "love's twofold sense". Considering torture as a Christian act of love, the picana was the necessary instrument to get a confession from the torturer that would eventually get him redemption. But thepicana had to fill a "void space". According to the perpetrators the victims were atheists (then they were not Argentines), which meant that in order to get any kind of absolution they had to, somehow, recognize and accept the Word of Christ. The Word would fill the empty victims; but first the picana would have to fill them with the will to "repent" and "convert". Once the tortured had received several electric shocks, they would receive and recite the Word by being ordered by the torturers to deliver Catholic prayers (24). Through these confessions the Junta's self perceived role of being the vicars of Christ on Earth was realized every time. They had defeated the atheist enemy but, employing Christian charity, they also had won the battle for the subversives' souls. Redemption was offered to anyone, even the irrecoverable cases. Even if their bodies were deprived of life their souls were saved. One of the ways that the ones not redeemed during confession were granted spiritual salvation was by the purifying power of water. By throwing them into the sea alive they were bestowing them a new, or first, "baptism" (25). It was the perpetrators' holy mission to redeem the victims' souls in life or in death. The picana, when considering torture as a sexual act, was also a phallic symbol. The torturer would make use of the picana-phallus to inflict pain and, at the same time, through the victim's screams and spasms satisfy his own repressed sexual desires. The perpetrator would systematically use the picana-phallus in the erogenous parts of the body. The body of the tortured would then transform into the sexual object of the repressor's desires. A sinful object that had to be purified with repent or conversion but only after the torturer's sexual desire had been satisfied (26). Symbols of divine violence can be found in other examples of torture sessions during the Junta's dictatorship. The torturers would yell at the captives, and would also made them say, "Viva Cristo Rey" and would make them thank God for another day by make them recite prayers before sleep. The picana was sometimes referred as "giving holy communion" as well as water-boarding was named "baptism". Among the many names that the torture chambers were given by the perpetrators there were: "the confessionary" and "the altar" (27). The latter clearly reflects the idea of sacrifice embedded in the repressors' minds. Regarding the victims' religious creeds the torturers would make a distinction between the recoverable and irrecoverable cases. Among the former ones there would be victims that had a catholic background because they had gone to catholic schools or because they knew how to recite prayers (28). Nevertheless, being catholic was not synonym of survival. The irrecoverable Catholics would only have their souls saved, but not their lives. Amid the desaparecidos there were an important proportion of Jews. About 1% of the Argentine population was of Jewish origin, but 20% of desaparecidos shared the same religious background (29). The Junta believed in an international communist conspiracy that, like the Nazis before, was leaded by the Jewry. Being Jewish meant being a Bolshevik. Additionally, the Junta's Messianic trope further propelled the kidnapping and execution of the community that, according to them, was responsible for Christ's crucifixion (30). Lastly, the appropriation of the desaparecidos children by the military was, perhaps, the most sinister of the Messianic-inspired repressive acts done by the military., The kidnapped pregnant women that gave birth in captivity, after being tortured regardless of their condition, were deprived of their children. The newborns were appropriated by families that would rise according to Catholic tradition. Motivated by Christian charity and its doctrine, these children would avoid the atheism, Judaism or wrongly conceived Catholicism that their parents would have offered them. These newborns were, according to the Junta, truly "innocent" and deserved to have the chance to live a proper life in genuine catholic families. Concluding RemarksThe Messianic ideology during the dictatorship was present not only in the Junta's ideology, but also in its discourse and repressive methods. Even if not everything that happened during the military regime can be explained through the catholic-nationalist ideology, the latter provides the essential motivation for the government. It is difficult to imagine that the magnitude, and chosen methods, of the repression would have been the same without the Messianic trope. By comparing the level of Argentinean repression to other military regimes of the Southern Cone in the same period, the distinction is remarkable. Not only the repressive mechanisms used by the Argentinean dictatorship were distinct, and more sadist and cruel, than the Chilean, Uruguayan and Brazilian cases, but the amount of Argentina's desaparecidos dwarfs those cases.Additionally, the Argentinean Catholic Church was the only one to completely back the regime and its repressive methods. In Chile, for example, the heads of the Church were divided in supporting Pinochet. Ultimately, the majority of the Church would condemn the Chilean regime. Regarding the political leadership, there are no religious discourses that serve as justification for the regimes in the other Southern Cone's dictatorships. The military juntas of those countries never legitimized their governments or their respective coup d'états in God's will or the salvation of Christian-Western civilization. National security and the fear of communism were their justification. Even if the regimes were ideologically justified, these were never of a religious nature like in the Argentinean case. It is probably the catholic-nationalist ideology, matured in the 30s, augmented by the international communist conspiracy typical of the Cold War that prompted the Junta in Argentina to completely wipeout what they perceived as atheist and foreign elements in society. Without a Messianic military that was ready to fight a crusade in order to restore order to the nation and without the blessing and active support from the Church, the repression would not have had the size and the horror that it had. The armed forces were fighting what they thought was the last crusade of the 20th century against the atheist forces of communism. The "Third World War" was already happening to them. Winning it was more than strategic, it was a holy mission. (1) Excerpts from a radio announcement made by the Junta after taking control of the State. Cited in Loveman, David and Davies, M. Thomas; The Politics of Antipolitics: The Military in Latin America; University of Nebraska Press; Lincoln; 1978; pp. 177. (2) See Novaro, Marcos and Palermo, Vicente; La Dictadura Militar; Paidos; Buenos Aires; 2003. (3) See Clarin, June the 26th 1976. Cited in Novaro, Marcos and Palermo, Vicente; La Dictadura Militar; Paidos; Buenos Aires; 2003; pp. 93. (4) Cited in Frontalini, Daniel and Caiati, Maria C.; El mito de la guerra sucia; CELS; Buenos Aires; 1984; pp. 90. Note how the East is viewed as the geopolitical source of "evil" similar to the Nazis' fear of the East. (5) See Graziano, Frank; Divine Violence. Spectacle, Psychosexuality, & Radical Christianity in the Argentine "Dirty War"; Westview Press; Boulder; 1992; pp. 120.(6) See CONADEP; Nunca Más; Eudeba; Buenos Aires; 1984; pp. 342. (7) See Castro Castillo, Marcial; Fuerzas armadas: Ética y represión; Nuevo Orden; Buenos Aires; 1979; pp.120. (8) Massera, Emilio; El país que queremos; FEPA; Buenos Aires; 1981; pp. 44. This concept of an internal and spiritual struggle is common to all religious fanatic ideologies. For example the original significance of Jihad was that of the soul's struggle against temptation. The concept would later evolve to holy war. (9) As subversives were defined by Ramon Agosti. Cited in Verbitsky, Horacio; La última batalla de la tercera guerra mundial; Legasa; Buenos Aires; 1984; pp.16. (10) La Nación, March the 25th 1976; cited in Mignone, Emilio; Iglesia y Dictadura; Colihue; Buenos Aires; 1986; pp.25. (11) See Mignone, Emilio; Iglesia y Dictadura; Colihue; Buenos Aires; 1986; pp.25. Additionally, Tortolo was Videla's private confessor. (12) Ibid; pp. 25(13) Ibid; pp. 26-28. (14) Ibid; pp. 30-31. (15) See Novaro, Marcos and Palermo, Vicente; La Dictadura Militar; Paidos; Buenos Aires; 2003; pp. 99 (16) Ibid; pp. 97(17) See Mignone, Emilio; Iglesia y Dictadura; Colihue; Buenos Aires; 1986; and CONADEP;Nunca Más; Eudeba; Buenos Aires; 1984; pp. 342-360. (18) See Mignone, Emilio; Iglesia y Dictadura; Colihue; Buenos Aires; 1986pp.179-188. (19) Graziano, Frank; Divine Violence. Spectacle, Psychosexuality, & Radical Christianity in the Argentine "Dirty War"; Westview Press; Boulder; 1992; pp.152(20) See Camps, Ramón; Caso Timerman: punto final; Tribuna Abierta; Buenos Aires; 1982; pp. 21. (21) CONADEP; Nunca Más; Eudeba; Buenos Aires; 1984; pp. 348. Additionaly, it is interesting to notice how Carl Schimitt's political theology theory is translated into the Junta's discourse. In this sense, the Junta's actions would be a Schimittian case of politics not being able to be dettached from religion. This, in turn, would contradict several secularization theories. See, Schimitt, Carl, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignity, Chicago Univertisty Press, Chica, 2006.(22) Interestingly, Saint Augustine described copulation in such a dreadful way that it seemed like an act of torture. See Foucault, Michel; Historia de la Sexualidad: Vol. 1, La voluntada del saber; Siglo XXI; Buenos Aires; 2008; pp. 37. (23) See Timerman Jacobo; Preso sin nombre, celda sin número; De la Flor; Buenos Aires; 2002; pp. 17. (24) See CONADEP; Nunca Más; Eudeba; Buenos Aires; 1984; pp. 347-360; and Graziano, Frank; Divine Violence. Spectacle, Psychosexuality, & Radical Christianity in the Argentine "Dirty War"; Westview Press; Boulder; 1992; pp. 166. (25) It is rather interesting to note that throwing victims alive into the sea or rivers was a common killing method used by other strongly catholic Messianic inspired authoritarian regimes or groups. The falangistas would throw communists, anarchists and socialists (and whoever they thought was not catholic enough) to the rivers during the Spanish Civil War. The Algerian French and later the OAS would throw FLN suspects to the Mediterranean during the Algerian War of Independence. Even in Argentina, during the 1930s, the nationalists were talking about pushing the communists into the sea. A more detailed research should be conducted on this issue. Probably the Spanish Inquisition's torture methods, involving boiled water or a pool where the suspected heretics would drown, clearly influenced all of these cases into using natural sources of water to purify their sacred lands from the nonbelievers. (26) For more on torture as a sexual act and the picana as phallus see Graziano, Frank; Divine Violence. Spectacle, Psychosexuality, & Radical Christianity in the Argentine "Dirty War"; Westview Press; Boulder; 1992; pp. 158-190. (27) CONADEP; Nunca Más; Eudeba; Buenos Aires; 1984; pp. 26-50. (28) Many tortured victims remember how the torturers were clearly surprised to see the formers wearing crosses after making them take out their clothes. In some of these cases the torturers would say to the victims that their life would be saved because they were Christians but had lost their way and it would be the repressors' task to show them the right path. (29) See Novaro, Marcos and Palermo, Vicente; La Dictadura Militar; Paidos; Buenos Aires; 2003; pp. 115. (30) During the trial of torturer known as Jorge "El Tigre" Acosta a witness remembered him saying, after killing a captive while torturing him, that he was happy that he had died because he was going to be freed but he did not want a Jew to walk freely in Argentina; all Jews were guilty because they had killed Christ. See Diario Perfil; "Juicio al Tigre Acosta por el asesinato de Hugo Tarnopolsky"; May the 12th 2007. *Estudiante de Doctorado, New School for Social Research, New YorkMaestría en Estudios Internacionales, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, Buenos AiresÁrea de Especialización: Procesos de formación del Estado moderno, sociología de la guerra, terrorismo, genocidio, conflictos étnicos, nacionalismos y minorías.E-mail: guere469@newschool.edu

From the pages of The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte by Marx and understanding the political and social events in France between 1848 and 1852, several interpretations have been made, by Marxist and non-Marxist authors alike, regarding the role played by the lower middle class in moments of crisis. Particularly, after the advent of fascism in 20th century Europe, many voices have risen to signal the XVIII Brumaire as Marx's call of attention on the dangers set by the lower middle class's counterrevolutionary and reactionary spirit. Even more, some think of the XVIII Brumaire, and Marx's take on Bonapartism as the first, and extremely prophetic, definition and description of a modern fascist regime. The purposes of this essay are to: first, define and describe the lower middle class and its social and political consequences according to Marx; and, second, to explore how the lower middle class has been analyzed by a selection of Marxist and non-Marxist authors as a crucial sociological and historical problem. The latter has been taken to the extent of even comparing the political phenomenon of Bonapartism to Fascism and the lower middle class historical relationship in both of them. Bonapartism and Fascism are very distinct types of political regimes, even if they share some similarities. Nevertheless, it would be ahistorical to describe Louis Bonaparte's regime as fascist. Even so, Marx's typically coined reactionary or counter-revolutionary role played by the lower middle class in both cases was similar. (1)Several designations have been used to differentiate the lower middle class from the higher middle class or big bourgeoisie: petite bourgeoisie, Kleinburgertumand, the unpleasant, lumpen-bourgeoisie. It is impossible to assign fixed meanings in distinct times and places to those concepts. What they mean, and enfold, in different historical moments is determined by historically concrete political, social and economic structures and conditions. A social lower middle stratum was economically, but not so much politically, active during the preindustrial era. Its internal structure, predominantly formed by independent peasants, corporate-guild artisans and shopkeepers, and the nature of its relationship to the rest of society was particularly different from the economically, socially and more politically active, lower middle class of primarily dependent clerks, independent peasants, technicians, professionals and small shop owners of capitalist society (2). From Marx to the present there have been few attempts to define the lower middle class because the main issue was not the Kleinburgertum's own historical, social and political particularities; but, the fact that the petite bourgeoisie conformed a "classes class". In Marxist terms, the lower middle class was a class in but not foritself. This meant that the petty bourgeoisie was dependent on its own fate but not on its own existence. The lower middle class was torn, and it still may be today, between two possible outcomes: proletarianization or embourgeoisement (3). In the first one, the petite bourgeoisie is condemned to being proletarianized. In fact, during the early industrialization period of England the small artisans and some specialized technicians were dissolved or forced into the industrial working class (4). In the second scenario, they would integrate with the big bourgeoisie finally accomplishing a long social aspiration. It would, certainly, diminish the fears and concerns of being proletarianized and, lastly and possibly, would allow clerks and professionals to be the frontrunners of a classless postindustrial society (5). Accordingly, as Marx said in the XVIII Brumaire, the lower middle class should be viewed as a transitional class whose members would finally end up being part of the proletarians or the bourgeoisie. Nevertheless, the lower middle class has had a pivotal role in certain historically crucial events: revolutions and counterrevolutions. Marx attributed no apparent class-consciousness to the petite bourgeoisie, except in times of severe crisis. The lower middle class, following Marx, lacked its own class-consciousness because it was afraid to become proletarian and aspired to attain the bourgeoisie's style of living and class standing in society even though it also despised the big bourgeoisie's productive means and way of life. Marx, in a prophetic Freudian style analysis, would ascribe this apparent contradiction to the lower middle class own self-hate. Nevertheless, lacking its own class-consciousness did not mean that the petite bourgeoisie was not capable of generating its own separate culture, life-style and Weltanschauung. The problem was that it engendered its own ethos in direct opposition to the proletarian and bourgeoisie ones; affecting, then, its own cultural authenticity. All this said, the lower middle class may not have been self-conscious but it certainly was self-aware. It had distinctive class awareness (6). The interest of Karl Marx in the lower middle class was provoked by the role the author gave to it during the events that unfolded in France between February 1848 and December 1852, particularly the role played by the petite bourgeoisie in the ascendance to power of Louis Bonaparte in the coup d'état of December 1852. First of all, it is imperative to define how Marx understood the social composition of the lower middle class in mid-nineteen century France. Small independent peasants, clerks and small artisans and shopkeepers were Marx's main petty bourgeoisie members. All of them were part of this classless class because they lacked the property of the main means of capitalist production, that in mid-nineteen century France Marx attributed to the industrial, large-retail and financial sectors; and, because they were not even proletarians either because they were small owners (particularly small peasants and shopkeepers) or because their work did not constitute an intensive manual waged labor (artisans and specially State's clerks). Marx did not see in them any economic conditions of existence, under which they lived, that could separate their mode of life, their interests and their culture from those of other classes. Given this situation, the small peasants, clerks and shopkeepers were not in any hostile opposition (as a clearly defined class with its own interests, culture and mode of life) to the bourgeoisie or the proletariat. Marx did not witness any sense of class-consciousness in them. He only viewed a local interconnection among small peasants, shopkeepers and clerks; but there was no sense of identification of interests between all of them that could beget unity and political organization. But even if they did not conform a class on itself, they were aware of their own uncertain socio-economic circumstances: at any given moment the big bourgeoisie, either by the action of retail competition or that of bank executions of failed mortgage payments, could toss them into the proletarian class. This socio-economic fear of becoming part of a propertyless class put them in direct opposition with the working class and drove them into the arms of the big bourgeoisie in moments of severe political crisis. Only here did Marx perceive the existence of class-consciousness in the petty bourgeoisie. In the XVIII Brumaire Marx distinguishes three moments where the lower middle class acted as a class in itself: in the February Revolution of 1848 when they rebelled, alongside sectors of the big bourgeoisie and the proletarians, against the Orleanist monarchy; in June 1848 when they actively collaborated with the big bourgeoisie in crushing the proletarian rebellion; and finally, in December 1852 when they endorsed Louis Bonaparte's coup d'état against the bourgeoisie republic. In the first episode, Marx observes a revolutionary role embedded in the lower middle class. He recognizes a class-consciousness in them; a strive to enact political and social change in the wellbeing of their own interests. In June 1848, Marx assigns them a counter-revolutionary role. They react out of fear and misguided by the bourgeoisie. They are afraid that a proletarian revolution would forever kill their socio-economic aspiration to become part of the bourgeoisie. According to Marx they are right to be fearful. A proletarian revolution would lead to a dictatorship of the proletariat and to the end of all classes. Alas, their desire of a bourgeoisie life-style as a "heaven on earth" would be tromped. A classless society would take away from them what distinguished them from the proletariat and what would, eventually, provided them upwards-social mobility: small private property and better paid and socially-respected professional labor. It has to be added that Marx also makes the bourgeoisie responsible for the lower middle class actions in the June rebellion. The former convinced the latter not to support and even to fight the proletarians by guaranteeing them access to better social standing, better financial and trade benefits and inclusion into the higher middle class. These were all false promises, which lack of satisfaction led to the events of December 1852. The lower middle class, betrayed by the bourgeoisie and immersed in deeply economic despair (which they made the big bourgeoisie responsible for) decided to fully endorse Louis Bonaparte's coup d'état. Again, and maybe more than ever if Marx's argument is to be followed, the lower middle class acted as a fully conscious class and had a counter-revolutionary and, even more, a reactionary role against the French bourgeoisie republic. Why did the lower middle class support Bonapartism? According to Marx, Napoleon III was the only one that could represent the petty bourgeoisie's interests. They did not have any sense of class-consciousness, which meant that they were unable to express their interests in a collective way. Meaning, that they were, like Marx says, incapable of enforcing their class interests in their own name through a parliament or any other democratic convention or institution. The lower middle class needed, and were also longing for, a paternalistic, authoritarian and charismatic figure that would represent their interest and implement policies accordingly. Louis Bonaparte mirrored everything the lower middle class was pursuing: the protection of their interests by identifying them with France's interests; the understanding of France as an economically based petite bourgeoisie country in opposition to big bourgeoisie enterprises (banks and big retails companies); and, the conversion of the lower middle class's aspiration forgrandeur through the Second French Empire's expansionist foreign policy (7).Bonapartism protected them from the rapacious big bourgeoisie, assured their vital place in society as France's economic engine protecting small private property from socialist distribution of wealth drives coming from the working class and satisfied their sumptuousness desires by establishing a lower middle class based Empire as Europe's major power. Marx's perceptions and warnings on the lower middle class counter-revolutionary and reactionary roles in periods of political and economic crisis has been regarded, by Marxist and non-Marxist authors alike, as an indication for future revolutionary moments and as a prophetic alert on future authoritarian regimes like fascism. Lenin himself defined the petite bourgeoisie as a "half-class" or "quasi-workers" or "quasi-bourgeois" class that would be more difficult to eradicate than the big bourgeoisie and that would be politically unreliable (8). The lower middle class unpredictable behavior and dislike for radical policies could produce a reactionary backlash that could only be prevented by a rapid proletarization of all society. Nevertheless, even if Lenin was afraid of the possibility of an authoritarian government led by Kornilov and backed by the petty bourgeoisie (9); he later acknowledged, particularly by implementing the New Economic Policy, the lower middle class economic importance and envisaged them as a transitory class towards a proletarian society (10). Lastly, several authors have taken the XVIII Brumaire in order to compare Bonapartisim to fascism, even affirming that Napoleon's III rule was the first fascist regime in history, or to seek the social origins of both kinds of regimes in the lower middle classes. Jacob Schapiro not only sees the origins of 20th century fascism in 19th century Bonapartist France, he even defines Bonapartism as a type of fascism based on Marx's description of the regime in the XVIII Brumaire (11). Jost Dulffer analyses such comparison and, even if similarities are found, completely rejects its. He actually trends the historical origins of such comparisons to Trotsky's and August Thalheimer's writings on Nazism during the 1920s and 30s (12). Finally, Seymour Martin Lipset popularized the notion that fascism, just like Bonapartism, was an expression of the lower middle class resentments. According to Lipset, fascism was politically transformed rage of independent artisans, shopkeepers, small peasants and clerks that found themselves squeezed between better organized industrial workers and big businessmen and were "missing the boat" within the rapid social and economic changes of modern society (13). However, Ian Kershaw, Robert Paxton and Thomas Childers empirically confirm that fascism was not only a lower middle class phenomenon and that without the acquiesce of the conservative elites and sectors of the big bourgeoisie it would never had have come to power (14). Even if the comparisons between Bonapartism and fascism are historically pointless it is worth noticing, like Arno Meyer did, that Karl Marx was the first one to tackle the problem of the lower middle class lack of class-consciousness (15). Marx is correct in pointing out the lower middle class's awareness of itself and its dysfunctional and contradictory relationship vis-à-vis the big bourgeoisie and the proletariat. Even more so, Marx accurately identifies the social, political and historical role of the petty bourgeoisie: to gain consciousness in moments of crisis and pivotally function either as a revolutionary actor, alongside the bourgeoisie and the working class, or as a counter-revolutionary one, against the proletariat, or as reactionary one against the big bourgeoisie. This is, maybe, Marx's most important and timeless legacy from The Eighteen Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte.(1) Crossick, Geoffrey and Haupt, Heinz-Gerhard, The Petite Bourgeoisie in Europe 1780-1914, Rutledge, New York, 1998, pp. 16-38.(2) Mayer, Arno J., "The Lower Middle Class as Historical Problem", The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 47, No.3, Sep. 1975, pp. 409-436. (3) See Thompson, Edward, The Making of the English Working Class, Random House, New York, 1963.(4) See Bell, Daniel, The Coming of Post-Industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting, Basic Books, New York, 1999. (5) See Giddens, Anthony, The Class Structure of Advanced Societies, Unwin Hyman, London, 1989.(6) See, Zeldin, Theodore, The Political System of Napoleon III, Macmillan, London, 1958.(7) Lenin, V. I., "Left-Wing" Communism: An Infantile Disorder: A Popular Essay in Marxian Strategy and Tactics, University of the Pacific Press, San Francisco, 2001, pp. 9-52. (8) Fitzpatrick, Sheila, The Russian Revolution, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008, pp. 60.(9) Ibid, pp. 93-149.(10) Schapiro, Jacob S., Liberalism and the Challenge to Fascism, McGraw Hill, New York, 1949, pp. 308-31.(11) Dulffer, Jost, "Bonapartism, Fascism and National Socialism", Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 11, No.4, 1976, pp. 109-128.(12) Lipset Seymour M., Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1981, pp. 127-182.(13) See, Childers, Thomas, "The Social Bases of the National Socialist Vote",Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 11, No.4, 1976, pp. 17-42; Kershaw, Ian,"The Hitler Myth": Image and Reality in the Third Reich, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001; Kershaw, Ian, The Nazi Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000; and, Paxton, Robert, The Anatomy of Fascism, Random House, New York, 2004.(14) Mayer, Arno J., "The Lower Middle Class as Historical Problem", The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 47, No.3, Sep. 1975, pp. 409-436. *Estudiante de Doctorado, New School for Social Research, New YorkMaestría en Estudios Internacionales, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, Buenos AiresÁrea de Especialización: Procesos de formación del Estado moderno, sociología de la guerra, terrorismo, genocidio, conflictos étnicos, nacionalismos y minorías.E-mail: guere469@newschool.edu

The Political and Social Natures of the State of ExceptionThe main questions regarding the political and social natures of the state of emergency concern: the restriction of individual freedoms as an innate power of the State to assure its continued existence –and of its democratic regime- in times of national crisis; the exception as being a transitional phase from democracy to autocracy or dictatorship; and, the legitimization of a permanent state of exception through consensus.Carl Schmitt stated that 'sovereign is he who decides on the exception' (1). This means that the exception, which he defined as the application of extraordinary measures, is what constitutes the essence of the highest power of the State. Schmitt, following Bodin and Hobbes, emphasized the extralegal nature of the State's sovereign power. The State could not exist without the possibility of exception. In fact, the State was born from the exception and relied on it for its survival (2). Therefore, the state of exception could not be framed within the legal order. Sovereignty cannot be limited; it is an absolute. Laws are created by the State, but the State's sovereign power –the exception- has to remain outside the boundaries of the rule of law. This was the only way that the exception could function as the mechanism that guaranteed the State's survival in moments of grave peril. To Schmitt, there was no point arguing about lesser or greater evils. The State had to prevail always. Order, even a dictatorial one, was preferable to revolution and anarchy. The permanent elimination of individual freedoms was, at all times, more desirable than the extinction of the State. Schmitt was deeply influenced by the 1918-1919 Revolution, following Germany's defeat in World War I, and by the early chaotic years of the Weimer Republic. He considered, taking on Weber in extremis, that the State was the absolute embodiment of the monopoly of the use of violence. Legitimacy did not matter because authority –the sovereign- was the real source of law, not a Rousseaunian state of nature or the people's will (3). The State creates and maintains law through force. When the monopoly is broken, because violence is being used against the State from outside or within, the exception assures its reestablishment. Other authors have considered the survival of the sovereign body at all costs, perceived as a lesser evil when weighted against the greater evil of its possible decease, as the driving force behind the state of emergency's employment in moments of real or perceived national crisis (4). Exception, to them, is a legal tool that restores order by rapidly extricating the threats to the polity's existence. Supporters of this view consider that in times of foreign war or internal strife the State is compelled to undermine individual freedoms. Dictatorships react to crisis in a much effective way than democracies. The very nature of the latter –mainly enacting decisions after deliberation, consensus and the rule of law- may be its own Achilles' heel. In order for modern democracies to survive, they have to recur to non-liberal, but legally framed and provisional, measures (5). After 9/11, the War on Terror has been defined as a national crisis that cannot be overcome within the 'normal' rule of law. The long term peril to democracy, which terrorism poses, is far greater and more permanent than the one that the state of exception causes to democratic liberties in the short term. The suspension and restriction of fundamental freedoms are a small price to pay when a democratic regime is faced with the kind of foe that terrorism is. Even such strong advocates of liberal democracy, like Michael Ignatieff, believe that the state of emergency is a necessary tool to protect society from terrorist attacks (6). To him, the exception in a modern democracy can be effectively restrained from committing the kind of human rights violations and abuses that were present during the French-Algerian War and the Dirty War in Argentina. Ignatieff considers that those cases can be avoided, in the current War on Terror, by setting up contradictory procedures after targeted killing and aggressive interrogation have been implemented(7). Lastly, the provisional characteristic of the state of exception must also be properly defined by introducing a time limit or by setting up attained objectives. The problem with the latter is that it is difficult to discern when terrorism has been actually defeated. Regarding the temporal nature of the exception, it has been the case that governments have continued to extend, indefinitely, the state of emergency (8). In this sense, Charles Tilly was right when he noticed that once the State acquires more power it is extremely difficult, or almost impossible, to go back to the previous situation (9). Ignatieff's notion that the state of exception can be controlled if it is properly framed within the legal order is mistaken. First, following Tilly, the State's behavior is not controllable, particularly within a legal framework. Even if the State seems to be making concessions, it is actually gaining more command. It is in the State's nature to increase its control over society in order to assure its survival(10). Therefore, the state of exception will never be controlled by the legal order. Terrorism overtly defies the essence of the State: its monopoly of the use of violence. To protect itself the State will disregard the rule of law if necessary. Secondly, the exception cannot be legal in any sense because, as said by Giorgio Agamben, it is the negation of law (11). Agamben considers exception as it has been defined by Schmitt: the nature of sovereign power. Consequently, it can never be framed by the rule of law. In fact, when the exception is enacted law ceases to exist. When national crisis occur, a State will make decisions based on necessity, not on lawfulness. Accordingly, if the rule of law is negated and the newly acquired faculties are not relinquished after the crisis has passed, the exception represents the transition of a democratic regime into an authoritarian or autocratic one. There is a divide in literature regarding this issue: some deem that the exception creates a provisional dictatorship but once the crisis is over democracy returns in full force, others see the exception as a one way ticket ride. According to Rossiter when the state of exception is declared, a democratic regime turns into a provisional dictatorship by granting extraordinary authority and powers to the executive (12). Ignatieff, following Rossiter, considers Italy and Germany during the 70s, by naming them 'selective dictatorships', to show how modern democracies used the state of exception to tackle terrorism and returned to the rule of law once the threat had ended (13). However, the provisional and extraordinary measures passed in both countries have never been suspended. They are still in place and sporadically and selectively used. As a result, the provisional feature of the exception never actually materializes. Authors, like Hannah Arendt and Frances Fox Piven, explain how the suspension, restriction and infringement of constitutional rights and individual freedoms by the necessity of the state of exception permanently erode democracies by introducing autocratic measures (14). Arendt wonderfully describes how democracy died in the Weimer Republic when Chancellor Bruning declared the state of emergency in 1930, and not the moment Hitler raised into power in 1933 (15). For Arendt, from the moment the exception was enacted until Hitler took over the Chancellery, the path to dictatorship was irreversibly one. Piven regards the declaration of the state of emergency in the United States in September 2001 as the crucial moment where democratic liberties started to irrevocably fade away in the name of necessity (16). The subsequent restrictions to individual freedoms were accepted as necessary sacrifices to avert a catastrophe. It was not considered that the greater evil was not the one posed by terrorists; but, the permanent damage made to democracy by the State. Democracy is still far from dying in the United States, but its agony may have already started. The state of exception requires another ingredient to remain in effect indefinitely and permanently harm democracy. The State's intentions –if there is such an oxymoron- are not sufficient alone. Legitimacy, as Weber so cleverly insisted upon, is also needed (17). Arendt showcased how the transformation of the Weimar Republic, from a democracy into a totalitarian regime, mainly depended on the masses (18). In modern democracies it is the general public, the citizenship or the masses who always have the final voice on any matter. Governments' actions have to be legitimized by the public in order to be truly effective. They are accepted if they are not broadly contested or if they are enthusiastically received. They are not perceived as legitimate when they produce protests against them (19). The measures taken by the U.S. Government after 9/11 have received its share of criticism, but they have not been openly contested by the public in a massive way. In fact, there has been a strong consensus from the American citizenship. It may have been a tacit consensus between the executive, Congress and the citizens; but, the case remains that the suspension, restrictions and infringement to fundamental liberties have been seen as a necessary sacrifice to assure the security of the nation (20). Even controversial and dangerous measures as targeted assassination or torture have been widely accepted -in an extremely cheerfully way in some cases (21)- by the general public. Perhaps, the public truly considers them appropriate and it is willing to risk democracy for security. However, it would seem that the compliance comes from the perception that they will never be subject to those measures. The majority of the people of the United States do not consider themselves targeted by the restrictions to individual freedoms, and will never feel that way. For them it is easy to make sacrifice a minority's fundamental liberties. It has been the case in every country where the state of exception has been declared for terrorist activities. The idea that 'it will never happen to me' precludes the perception of being on the verge of loosing any kind of freedom. Interestingly, Karl Marx, in the XVIII Brumaire, warned us about the dangers of a massive support for an autocratic State in the name of security (22).ConclusionThe current War on Terror shows how close a stable and mature,democratic regime is to absolutely disregard the rule of law in favor of necessity. History and political theory has demonstrated that many authoritarian governments and dictatorships originate with a declaration of the state of exception. The measures taken by the enactment of the exception are not only immoral, they are unnecessary and illegal. The lesser evil is always less when it is not applied to the majority of the population. No matter how small the amount of individuals affected by the restrictions on their liberties, the damage done to democracy –and to their lives- is permanent and with grave repercussions for the future. Terrorism is a strategy used by a small group of people that pose no vital danger to the State's institutions or to democracy. The real danger to a democratic regime is the State's reaction to terrorism and the public's acceptance of them. Terrorists can be effectively persecuted within the rule of law. No worst case scenario can justify the torture, the indefinite imprisonment and the assassination of an innocent individual. The possible avoidance of a worst case scenario is never the lesser evil when it requires fundamental freedoms to be sacrificed. Finally, it is the public who always has the last word, and who is ultimately responsible for the known actions taken by their government. The choice between the rule of law and necessity, eventually, relies on them.(1) Schmitt, Carl; Political Theology. Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty; Chicago University Press; Chicago; 2005; pp. 5.(2) Ibid; pp. 7-12.(3) Ibid; pp. 35.(4) See Huntington, Samuel; Political Order in Changing Societies; Yale University Press; New Heaven; 2006; and Krasner, Stephen;Sovereignty. Organized Hypocrisy; Princeton University Press; New York; 1999.(5) See Walzer, Michael; Just and Unjust Wars; Basic Books; New York; pp. 335-360.(6) See Ignatieff, Michael; The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror; Princeton University Press; New York; 2004; pp. 130-143.(7) See Ignatieff, Michael; The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror; Princeton University Press; New York; 2004; pp. 150-156.(8) See http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/09/10/letter-president-continuation-national-emergency-with-respect-certain-te(9) See Tilly, Charles; Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1992; Wiley-Blackwell; New York; 1995.(10) See Tilly, Charles; "War Making and State Making as Organized Crime," Bringing the State Back In, Eds. Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Theda Skocpol. Cambridge University Press, 1985.(11) See Agamben, Giorgio; State of Exception; University of Chicago Press; Chicago; 2005; pp. 32-40.(12) See Rossiter, Clinton; Constitutional Dictatorship - Crisis Government In The Modern Democracies; Rossiter Press; New York; 2008. Rossiter takes the cases of the United States and the United Kingdom during the Second World War and analyses the 'dictatorial' powers held by Roosevelt and Churchill to command both countries during the crisis.(13) See Ignatieff, Michael; The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror; Princeton University Press; New York; 2004; pp. 174-178.(14) See Arendt, Hannah; Origins of Totalitarianism; Benediction Books; New York; 2005; pp. 305-341; andSee Piven, Frances Fox;The War at Home: The Domestic Costs of Bush's Militarism; New Press; New York; 2006.(15) See Arendt, Hannah; Origins of Totalitarianism; Benediction Books; New York; 2005; pp. 389-400.(16) See Piven, Frances Fox; The War at Home: The Domestic Costs of Bush's Militarism; New Press; New York; 2006.(17) See Weber, Max; "Politics as a Vocation," in From Max Weber, Eds. Gerth and Mills.(18) See Arendt, Hannah; Origins of Totalitarianism; Benediction Books; New York; 2005; pp. 305-341(19) See Piven, Frances Fox; and Cloward, Richard; Poor People's Movements: Why They Succeed, How They Fail; Random House; 1979; pp.1-41.(20) See, Posner, Richard; Law, Pragmatism and Democracy; Harvard University Press; Cambridge; 2003. (21) Like it was seen immediately after President Obama announced the targeted assassination of Osama Bin Laden.(22) See Marx, Karl; "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte," in The Marx/Engels Reader, Ed. Robert Tucker. *Estudiante de Doctorado, New School for Social Research, New YorkMaestría en Estudios Internacionales, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, Buenos AiresÁrea de Especialización: Procesos de formación del Estado moderno, sociología de la guerra, terrorismo, genocidio, conflictos étnicos, nacionalismos y minorías.E-mail: guere469@newschool.edu

'It is a lesson which all history teaches wise men, to put trust in ideas, and not in circumstances'.Ralph Waldo Emerson'It is precisely in times of national emergencies that civil liberties must be defended and protected most forcefully. If not, then governments will be given incentives to constantly create crises, or perceptions of crises, and declaring "official states of emergency" in order to grab more and more power and money and destroy more and more liberty and prosperity'.United States Supreme Court (Ex Parte Milligan. 1866)IntroductionSince the September 11 attacks, the notion of state of exception has been used in order to coin the legal and political repercussions of the 'War on Terror'. These, by being labeled within the state of emergency's legal -or extralegal- framework, have been able to be constitutionally justified and, also, ethically criticized. Proponents of draconian measures consider that, in certain circumstances, necessity dictates policies aimed at protecting the State from terrorist attacks. They deem terrorism an imminent and serious threat capable of destroying the institutions that give political cohesion to society. Denying, suspending and limiting certain individual rights amount to a lesser evil; compared to the, apparently, almost certain greater evil that terrorists embody. On the other hand, advocates of the inviolability of the rule of law believe that under any situation a democratic government should allow urgency and peril prevail over the constitutionally recognized political and human rights. For them, counterterrorism should not rely on extralegal actions 'legitimized' by the state of exception. The State already has the legal and adequate tools, provided by the police and criminal justice, to persecute terrorists. Democracies that recur to lesser evil arguments to fight terrorism always end up committing more damage that the one they were trying to prevent.This essay will analyze the state of exception by studying the legal and the political-social natures of it. Various arguments, in favor and against the exception, will be showcased by continuously referring to the War on Terror and its effects on the legal system and democracy. Lastly, a conclusion will address the importance of this debate in current politics and society. The State of ExceptionThe state of exception or emergency can be studied under two different kinds of views: the legal and the political-social ones. The former defines the state of emergency, within the various constitutional frameworks of current modern democracies, as a temporary measure that limits or suspends certain individual freedoms within the territory of the State . It is prompted by a critical and imminent, domestic or foreign, threat to the State's existence. Under this scenario, necessity overcomes the 'normal' rule of law. Consequentially, individual freedoms are limited while police, security and military agencies' powers are enhanced. The debate regarding the state of exception's legal aspect circles around the constitutionality of its enactment, the variety of faculties attributed to the State's security forces and, more importantly, the personal rights suspension's lawfulness. Politically and socially, the state of emergency is conceived either as the pivotal attribute that defines the sovereign body as such; or, either as the transitional step required for -'legitimately'- transforming a democracy into a dictatorship. The former perception links the state of exception with the concept of sovereigntyunderstood as the State's existence as an organized polity . The latter one considers any type of restriction to individual freedoms as a permanent damage to the fabrics of democracy . The Legal Nature of the State of Exception The legal, and political, origin of the state of emergency is to be found in ancient Roman law. According to the lex de dictatore creando, whenever the Roman Republic was in grave danger, the Senate designated an extraordinary magistrate that was invested with absolute and total authority over the Republic . Subsequently, a provisional dictatorship was instituted that lasted for six months or until the threat passed. The republican and the dictatorship authorities, to the Romans, were complementary; quite the opposite of how democracies and authoritarian regimes are understood today. However, Roman dictators quickly learned how to indefinitely prolong their authority by perpetuating foreign wars through the creation of an Empire.The institution of the Roman provisional dictatorship is the historical legal inception of the various types of state of emergency that are currently present within modern constitutions. Broadly speaking, in every constitution the state of exception is declared by the head of the executive power whenever the normal functions of the State's institutions are no longer guaranteed because of foreign attack or domestic unrest. Fundamental liberties and rights -such as habeas corpus, freedom of movement and public gathering among others- are suspended or severely restricted. In most cases, the executive is entitled to order the arrest of individuals and to set military commissions for their trials. The security forces' faculties are enhanced and the military is allowed to take on police activities. Depending on the country, the state of emergency could be declared to last for days, months or years and it can even be extended indefinitely number of times . The debate concerning the state of exception's legal aspect comprises three main issues: its constitutionality; the amount of power given to the security forces; and, the limits set on fundamental freedoms, individual rights and constitutional guarantees. The state of emergency's constitutional validity considers under which cases it can be declared. As stated before, it is necessity that calls for the establishment of exception. It is necessary to give to the executive branch of government extraordinary powers and authority in order to prevent the State's breakdown from an imminent and grave danger. This peril can be prompted by a domestic or foreign threat. The latter are not sufficiently, and narrowly, defined by modern constitutions. Normally, they invoke a military invasion by a foreign country or an internal insurrection; but both of them are broad cases and can be loosely interpreted. Taking the U.S. Constitution, for example, the state of emergency is only referred to in Article I, Section 9 where it states: 'The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.'Therefore, only in the cases of rebellion –domestic threat- and invasion –foreign threat- the state of exception can be enacted. Regrettably, the Constitution does not define what constitutes a rebellion or an invasion. The task was left for legal experts and the Judiciary to tackle; but, it has not been easy or even coherent.The Supreme Court had the opportunity to take on the constitutionality of the state of emergency after President Lincoln had declared it in 1861 . In Ex Parte Milligan, it was decided that the suspension of the habeas corpus and the setting of military tribunals for citizens was unconstitutional because, even if a rebellion was in course, civilian courts were still operating. Additionally, the Supreme Court went even further by declaring that the theory of necessity, which justifies the state of exception, was false. It was argued that under the rule of law, guaranteed by the Constitution, the powers needed to protect the State's institutions are already set in place. Lastly, the Justices regarded the state of exception as a dangerous instrument that could only lead to despotism . Nevertheless, the Court did not pronounce itself about the issue of defining what constitutes a rebellion or invasion. Interestingly, even if it was deemed –correctly- that necessity never justifies the suspension of the rule of law, by not defining what constitutes an emergency, the Court considered the issue a political, and not a legal, matter . Rebellion and invasion remain broad, undefined, cases open to interpretation and to malleability by politics. In subsequent cases, the Supreme Court refrained itself from approaching the issue .The question of the security forces' enhanced powers, during the state of emergency, is a thornier one when compared to the former. Moreover, it is also deeply intertwined with the problem regarding limitations to fundamental liberties. During the state of exception the police and other security agencies are given extraordinary faculties aimed at facilitating the expedient resolution of the crisis. Therefore, they are allowed to search within premises without warrants, to arrest suspects without a court order, to hold individuals for a long period of time with no access to a lawyer or judge, to carry out aggressive interrogations, to set up wiretapping and close surveillance with no Judiciary control. Furthermore, it could also be the case that intelligence agencies and the military would be empowered to perform police and judicial activities. Since the declaration of the state of emergency by President George W. Bush, following 9/11, numerous enhanced and new attributes have been granted to the United States' security forces and agencies. Their faculties were augmented by several executive decrees and the three Patriot Acts. These pieces of legislation were said to be justified by the imminent and severe danger that terrorism embodied. But, are these prerogatives really needed to prevent future terrorist attacks? This is, of course, an endless debate; and one that again points out to the relationship between law and politics. As implied by the Supreme Court in Ex Parte Milligan, terrorists can be persecuted without declaring the state of emergency, by applying 'plain' criminal law and by letting the F.B.I -not the military- take the lead. To sum up, the 'normal' rule of law is perfectly suited for the task. However, depending on how terrorism is considered, as a war act or as a criminal one, is still a political issue.Just like in both the question of the constitutionality of the state of exception and the empowerment of security agencies, the concern regarding the suspension or restriction of fundamental liberties is one that is ascribed within the lesser evil debate. Legally, the selection between continuing the 'normal' rule of law or enacting the state of exception weights the possible damage that not acting would cause against the harm that limiting individual freedoms would produce . It is here where the legal concept of necessity comes into play. It is necessary to inflict or withstand a lesser evil in order to prevent a greater evil. This is the pragmatic view of constitutional freedoms: the risk of harming individual freedoms is a lesser one when compared to the possibility of not having any State that protects those liberties . The moral point of view argues that, by restricting constitutional freedoms, the State is causing an irreversible damage that may, quite possibly, be greater than the one that necessity is trying to avoid . When a state of exception is enacted the fundamental liberties that are suspended are, normally, the right to habeas corpus; freedom of movement; the right to public and private gathering; and the right to due process among others. The United States Government, during both the Bush and the Obama Administrations, restricted and suspended several individual freedoms and constitutionally guaranteed rights in order to effectively and speedily fight terrorism and avert further attacks. The rights to habeas corpus, to due process, to unnecessary cruel punishment and to trial by jury have been gravely and irreversibly hampered by the legalization of indefinite detention, targeted killing, aggressive interrogation and military tribunals respectively. In nearly all these cases, there is no chance of contradictory or revisionary procedures that would allow the dismissal of their establishment by proving their unfairness or unconstitutionality . The issue, maybe, is that they are not only unfair, but that they are unnecessary and cause permanent damage. Targeted killing and aggressive interrogation, which would be better labeled as targeted assassination and torture, are completely detrimental to the rule of law and set up dangerous precedents for the future. Since both measures have to be sanctioned, in each case, by the President and there is no possibility of revision, it could be argued that the executive is taking on the exclusive attributes of the other two branches of government. The check and balances system, designed to avoid despotic power, is totally disregarded in these cases . Here, the effects of necessity are clearly the greater evil.Depending on the country, the state of emergency or exception is labeled as martial law or state of siege (état de siège or estado de sitio). Both, however, share the same objectives and are justified by necessity. See Ignatieff, Michael; The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror; Princeton University Press; New York; 2004; pp. 25-28. Schmitt, Carl; Political Theology. Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty; Chicago University Press; Chicago; 2005; pp. 5-6. See, Arendt, Hannah; 'Personal Responsibility under Dictatorship'; in Responsibility and Judgment; Kohn, Jerome (Ed.); Schocken Books; New York; 2003.Lintott, Andrew; The Constitution of the Roman Republic; Oxford University Press; Oxford; 1999; pp. 110.For example, in France l' état de siège can only last for 12 days, although the President is allowed to extend it for more time with the Parliament's confirmation. In the United States, the National Emergency Acts can only last for no more than two years, but the President is entitled to extend it for one more years indefinitely number of times by only notifying Congress of his decision. For the French case see Article 16 of the Constitution, available at http://www.vie-publique.fr/decouverte-institutions/institutions/approfondissements/pouvoirs-exceptionnels-du-president.html ; for the American case see the U.S. Code, Title 50, Chapter 34, available at http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode50/usc_sup_01_50_10_34.html .See the United States Constitution, available at http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage?collId=llsl&fileName=001/llsl001.db&recNum=138See Neely, Mark; The Fate of Liberty: Abraham Lincoln and Civil Liberties; Oxford University Press; New York; 1991; pp. 179-184. See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866); available at http://supreme.justia.com/us/71/2/case.htmlSee, Roche, John; Executive Power and Domestic Emergency: The Quest for Prerogative'; Western Political Quarterly; Vol. 5; N. 4; December 1952. See Ex Parte Quirin , 317 U.S. 1 (1942), which declared constitutional the military trials of German saboteurs during the Second World War in U.S. soil, available at http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=317&invol=1 ; Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), which determined constitutional the Japanese Americans internment camps, available athttp://supreme.justia.com/us/323/214/case.html ; and, Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008), where it was decided that all Guantanamo detainees had the right of habeas corpus, available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/07pdf/06-1195.pdf The national emergency was declared through Proclamation 7463 available athttp://ra.defense.gov/documents/mobil/pdf/proclamation.pdfSee Ignatieff, Michael; The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror; Princeton University Press; New York; 2004; pp. 40-44.See, Posner, Richard; Law, Pragmatism and Democracy; Harvard University Press; Cambridge; 2003. It is also interesting to consider here Margaret Somers' Arendtian view of political rights versus human rights because the former are recognized and protected by the State. See Somers, Margaret; Genealogies of Citizenship: Markets, Statelessness, and the Right to Have Rights; Cambridge University Press; Cambridge; 2008.See Dworkin, Ronald; Freedom's Law: The Moral Reading of the Constitution; Harvard University Press; Cambridge; 1996.Only regarding the cases of the restriction of habeas corpus and the setting up of military tribunals has the Supreme Court been able to declare their unconstitutionality and illegality. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) and Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006); both available athttp://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=US&vol=000&invol=03-6696&friend andhttp://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/05pdf/05-184.pdf respectively.For a better and more detailed analysis of the legality or illegality of targeted killings and torture see Banks, William; 'Targeted Killing and Assassination: the U.S. Legal Framework'; University of Richmond Law Review; Vol. 37; N. 667; 2002-2003; Dershowitz, Alan; 'When All Else Fails, Why not Torture?'; American Legion Magazine; July 2002; Blum, Gabriella, and Heymann, Philip; 'Law and Policy of Targeted Killing'; The Harvard National Security Journal; Vol. 2, Issue 2; 2010; and Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). *Estudiante de Doctorado, New School for Social Research, New YorkMaestría en Estudios Internacionales, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, Buenos AiresÁrea de Especialización: Procesos de formación del Estado moderno, sociología de la guerra, terrorismo, genocidio, conflictos étnicos, nacionalismos y minorías.

Alexis de Tocqueville was the first author to correctly underline some of the main factors that stimulated, or better yet triggered, a series of events that led to the social and politically structure based radical changes implemented by the French Revolution. Tocqueville properly highlighted which social and political aspects of the Old Regime not only survived, but were strengthen and vigorously adopted by the Revolution and its begotten system. In this sense, he was able to demystify the French Revolution from its characteristically tabula rasa, or national foundational-stone, kind of event given by later post-revolution French governments. The French Revolution transformed many things from its roots, but so many remained unchanged or were even reinforced. Tocqueville's The Old Regime and the French Revolution masterfully embodies Lampedusa's famous dixit in Il Gattopardo: "The more things change the more they remain the same". On the other hand, Tocqueville's work suffers from a few shortcomings. First, he tries so emphatically to demonstrate the continuances between the Ancient Regime and the post-revolution system that he almost completely undermines the social and political changes brought up by the Revolution. Secondly, he does not pay any kind of attention to exogenous or international system factors. Tocqueville, actually, disregards them as having any role in the revolution's origins. This paper will briefly comment on Tocqueville's factors that triggered the French Revolution and briefly comment on the variables that he did not consider.It is rather interesting to see that Tocqueville defines the French Revolution as a religious revolution but with no anti-religious goals. He defines the revolution in such terms in order to emphasize its universal aspiration. The French Revolution originated in France but dealt with issues that were common to all humanity. The revolution tried, not only, to free the Frenchmen but all men. Tocqueville refers to the Revolution's philosophical foundations: the Enlightenment. During the second half of the 18th century, France was its cradle. The Enlightenment's ideas achieved for universal freedom from despotic rule. They were notorious among the kings' court, the nobility and the rapidly growing upper bourgeoisie and, finally, were the intellectual product of aristocratic individuals. In this way, Tocqueville points out how the French nobility was going to be one of the main factors of the French Revolution in two distinct ways. First, the Enlightenment's political and social ideas, which were the core of the political ideology that would embody the Revolution and inspire the policies enacted after July 1789, were a conception of aristocratic minds. The nobility, in a way, conceived the ideas that would later on politically, socially and morally justify and legitimize their downfall. Secondly, according to Tocqueville it was the French aristocracy who first rebelled against the absolutist monarchical power. The nobles did not only conceive the ideas that would destroy them, they also actually started a series of events that would culminate in a Revolution that they did not envisage and that would ultimately decimate them. Tocqueville accurately recognizes that it was the French aristocracy that petitioned the calling of the General Estates in 1787 because they were trying to impede the Monarchy's last possible financial resort at its hand: the taxation of the nobility. Tocqueville actually downgrades the fiscal constraints to which the French State was subject at the end of the 18th century. He argues that the State's bankruptcy was not an issue because it was not the first time that a similar situation happened to the French Crown and because between 1780 and 1789 France was a more economically prosperous country than during the Seven Years War and the American Independence War. The issue was not that the Crown did not have any money; it was that the State decided to end with the centuries' long aristocracy's exception of taxation; which resulted in nobility's rebellion. Tocqueville describes how the French nobility had lost its feudal role and, instead, it primarily dedicated to civil management, most importantly court and fiscal administration; to rent their lands to small peasants; and, to partake in the King's court. All of them were exempted from taxation just because they owned a noble title. Tocqueville underlines the pivotal role that the nobility played in being civic servants. Even if many members of Absolutist regime's bureaucracy were bourgeois, the courts, fiscal agencies and other institutions, like the provincial parliaments and the municipal councils, were almost exclusively integrated by noblemen. The central power of the State and its immense bureaucracy is one of the continuities that Tocqueville sees between the old and the new regime; particularly, the idea of a bureaucratic machine managed by elites. As Tocqueville, and much later Perry Anderson, notice, the French aristocracy had an enormous control over the Absolutist system; the Monarchy could only enact its desired policies when they did not harm the nobility's interests(1). If any decision taken by the Crown was detrimental to their interests then they would have obstructed its implementation in an institutional way: the aristocratic packed courts and provincial parliaments would have delayed or refused to execute any unfavorable provision (2). The French aristocracy, then, obstructed the French Monarchy's taxation plan and pressured the King to call the General Estates in 1787. The upper bourgeoisie, on the other hand, favored the Crown's taxation plan but wanted to take advantage of the General Estates calling in order to gain more leverage in the tax reform's decision process (3). Either way, it was the French nobility's rebellious attitude against the King that would prompt the next series of events. Much has been said about this aristocratic political defiance; Tocqueville does not regard nobility's actions as a way to transform Absolutist France into a British kind of constitutional monarchy where the aristocracy would obtain political dominance, with regards to the Crown and the upper bourgeoisie, through an income-based or landownership-based representative parliament (4). He just perceives these actions as the last available desperate option to a soon to be old socio-economic system's class. French aristocracy had become a burden to France. If they did not turn themselves into a productive force, like the growing bourgeoisie, they would remain a useless, parasitic and institutionally over-represented class in the eyes of France's main economic sector: the peasants. As stated before, Tocqueville does not give too much of a relevant role to the bourgeoisie in the origins of the French Revolution. Both the upper and lower middle class would have a greater role after the 14th of July 1789. Instead, he sees the roots of the Revolution in the French aristocracy, as indicated above, and in the French peasantry. Tocqueville is able to empirically prove that the feudal agrarian system was almost dead in 18th century France. Seigniorial-peasantry relationships just amounted to land-renting, hunting and pasture privileges and harvest's percentage rendering (5). However, peasants were drowning in taxes. More than 75% of their returns were destined to the French central State, to the regional or provincial departments and to the municipalities (6). The last two were mainly aristocratic conformed institutions. Additionally, peasants were forced to give in to the central State's or departmental authorities a substantial percentage of their harvest for the urban populations. Furthermore, if it is considered that during the 1780s a series of famines and bad harvests produced a serious of food shortages, where commodity's high prices could not compensate the limited quantity of offered goods, worsening the peasantry conditions. Then, it is no surprise that there was a growing discontent among the peasants against the Crown failed foreign policies endeavors, that they were supporting with their work and their children, and against the aristocracy's unproductive and untaxed life style that they had to provide for (7). Here, Tocqueville discerns continuity between the old and the new regime: France after the revolution will still be mostly peasant and they will still be severely burdened with taxes and wars but a new kind of political system will replace Monarchy and a new class will replace the aristocracy. All those circumstances were the catalyst for a sequence of peasant's rebellions, starting in 1788, that overwhelmed the Monarchy's police authority (8). Ironically, the Crown was unable to contain the rising revolts because its repressive power depended on army garrisons that were headed by the aristocracy, whom, at first, refrained from suppressing in order to pressure the King with no taxation. The fateful combination of the rebellion of the dominant classes against the regime's authority plus the total breaking of the State's repressive power permitted an all-out uprising of the lower classes. Peasants and middle classmen were able to take the reins of the revolution and change the French socio-political system according to their interests. Regardless of Tocqueville's successful achievement in identifying the origins of the French Revolution, (the aristocracy refusal to be taxed and the peasantry's discontent on the nobility's untaxed privileges) it has to be said that no exogenous factors are taken into consideration. Tocqueville did not agree with the idea that the American Independence War depletion of France's reserves had provoked the civil unrest that later triggered the revolution. Even if the causal correlation between the American Revolution and the French one is indirect, international systemic variables did matter in the revolution's inception. Without strong international competition from a rising industrialist country like Great Britain and a series of military defeats, the French Monarchy would have not had to resort to tax the aristocracy and the regime's repressive mechanisms would have worked and effectively stopped the peasant's uprisings (9). Finally, Tocqueville sees the bourgeoisie a class that masterfully took advantage of a revolution that they did not originated. Even if the role of the bourgeoisie may have been greatly exaggerated in the French Revolution's narrations, it still had a pivotal role in confronting the aristocratic courts and parliaments; in replacing the nobility as civic servants; and, in obstructing the aristocracy's crave for an exclusive political role in State's decisions. Without the upper and lower middle class, nobility may have gained total control of the Absolutist system (10). Lastly, it has to be said that there are moments where Tocqueville affirms that political and social freedom were greater during the Ancient Regime than afterwards. These statements have to take into account Tocqueville's own historical context and personal life at that moment. He had self-exiled from politics after Louis Bonaparte coup d'état in December 1852 and was completely aware that Napoleon's III regime was a new kind of authoritarian system with more repressive and despotic rule than the pre-revolutionary Absolutist regimes. Nevertheless, Tocqueville's work stands out among the best and most descriptive analysis of the French Revolution's origins. His emphasis on underlining the continuances between the old regime and the new one and the almost complete lack of attention paid to the important and radical social and political changes brought by the Revolution have to attributed to the fact that The Old Regime and the French Revolution was the first part of his uncompleted work on the revolution; which had it been continued and concluded would have certainly highlighted the system-changing ideas enacted after July 1789.1) See Anderson, Perry, Linages of the Absolutist Sate, New Left Books, London, 1974. It is rather interesting to compare Tocqueville take on the French State compared with his views on the United States. He argues that one of the main differences between of how the Frenchmen and the American perceived the State was that the first ones saw it as place to look for working positions an mode of living, while the latter had a completely opposite idea.(2) See Skocpol, Theda, States and Social Revolutions. A comparative Analysis of France, Russia & China, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1979, pp. 56-60.(3) See Furet, Francois and Richet, Denis, The French Revolution, Macmillan, New York, 1970.(4) See Cobban, Alfred, Old Regime and Revolution, 1715-1799, Penguin, Baltimore, 1957, pp.155.(5) See Moore Barrington, The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World, Beacon Press, Boston, 1966, pp. 40-108. (6) See Skocpol, Theda, States and Social Revolutions. A comparative Analysis of France, Russia & China, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1979, pp. 119.(7) See Moore Barrington, The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World, Beacon Press, Boston, 1966, pp. 40-108. (8) See Skocpol, Theda, States and Social Revolutions. A comparative Analysis of France, Russia & China, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1979, pp. 121.(9) See Skocpol, Theda, States and Social Revolutions. A comparative Analysis of France, Russia & China, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1979, pp. 60-65.(10) See Moore Barrington, The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World, Beacon Press, Boston, 1966, pp. 40-108. Moore's famous theory: weak landlords but strong bourgeoisie give rise to democratic system like the French on.*Estudiante de Doctorado, New School for Social Research, New YorkMaestría en Estudios Internacionales, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, Buenos AiresÁrea de Especialización: Procesos de formación del Estado moderno, sociología de la guerra, terrorismo, genocidio, conflictos étnicos, nacionalismos y minorías.