Experiments in Law and Economics
In: Guerra, Alice (2021). "Experiments in law and economics," Chapters, in: Ananish Chaudhuri (ed.), A Research Agenda for Experimental Economics, chapter 3, pages 43-68, Edward Elgar Publishing.
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In: Guerra, Alice (2021). "Experiments in law and economics," Chapters, in: Ananish Chaudhuri (ed.), A Research Agenda for Experimental Economics, chapter 3, pages 43-68, Edward Elgar Publishing.
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De analyse van het onrechtmatigedaadsrecht is een van de meest invloedrijke en meest ontwikkelde toepassingen van de economische benadering van het recht. Ondanks het enorme aantal publicaties over de economische analyse van het onrechtmatigedaadsrecht, zijn er nog veel onbeantwoorde vragen die verder onderzoek rechtvaardigen. Het algemene doel van dit onderzoeksproject is het traditionele model van het onrechtmatigedaadsrecht te verfijnen om het realistischer te maken, te actualiseren voor wat betreft recente technologische ontwikkelingen, en in overeenstemming te brengen met experimentele resultaten op het gebied van prosociaal gedrag. Dit boek is onderverdeeld in zes hoofdstukken: Hoofdstuk 1 en 6 bevatten respectievelijk een inleiding en conclusie en de overige hoofdstukken zijn geschreven in de vorm van afzonderlijke maar wel gerelateerde artikelen.
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In: Asian Journal of Law & Economics (Forthcoming)
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In: Journal of economics, Band 139, Heft 1, S. 33-42
ISSN: 1617-7134
In: Public choice, Band 191, Heft 1-2, S. 173-192
ISSN: 1573-7101
AbstractWe use experimental data to explore the conditions under which males and females may differ in their tendency to act corruptly and their tolerance of corruption. We ask if males and females respond differently to the tradeoff between the benefits accrued by corrupt actorsversusthe negative externality imposed on other people by corruption. Our findings reveal that neither males nor females uniformly are more likely to engage in, or be more tolerant of corruption: it depends on the exact bribery conditions—which can reduce or enhance welfare overall—and the part played in the bribery act. Females are less likely to tolerate and engage in corruption when doing so reduces overall welfare. On the other hand, males are less tolerant of bribery when it enhances welfare but confers payoff disadvantages on them relative to corrupt actors. Females' behavior is consistent across roles when bribery reduces welfare, but apart from that, gender behavior is strongly role-dependent.
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In: Guerra, A., Zhuravleva, T. (2022). Do women always behave as corruption cleaners?. Public Choice. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-022-00959-5
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In: Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper No. Forthcoming
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In: The B.E. journal of theoretical economics, Band 22, Heft 2, S. 603-620
ISSN: 1935-1704
AbstractTort models assume symmetry in the behavior of injurers and victims when faced by a threat of liability and a risk of harm without compensation, respectively. This assumption has never been empirically validated. Using a novel experimental design, we study the behavior of injurers and victims when facing symmetric accident risks. Experimental results provide qualified support for the symmetric behavior hypothesis.
In: Guerra, Alice and Brooke Harrington (2021). Why do People Pay Taxes? Explaining Tax Compliance by Individuals, in Handbook on The Politics of Taxation, Lukas Hakelberg and Laura Seelkopf (Eds.), chapter 23, pages 356-374, ISBN: 978 1 78897 941 2, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing.
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In: Guerra, A., & Zhuravleva, T. (2021). Do bystanders react to bribery?. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 185, 442-462.
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In: Guerra, A., Nilssen, T. (2022). Optimal sentencing with recurring crimes and adjudication errors. Journal of Economics. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-022-00813-8
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In: Guerra, A. and Parisi, F. (2021) Injurers versus Victims: (A)Symmetric Reactions to Symmetric Risks. The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, pp. 20200101. https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2020-0101
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