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AbstractThe literature on the effects of investment in broadband infrastructure finds positive macroeconomic effects. However, it is severely constrained because it could hitherto only analyse investment or adoption up to basic broadband, but not up to the newer generations of hybrid fibre and end‐to‐end fibre‐based broadband. Utilizing a comprehensive panel dataset of EU27 member states for the period from 2003 to 2015, we estimate a small but significant effect of end‐to‐end fibre‐based broadband adoption over and above the effects of basic broadband on GDP; specifically, we find that a 1 per cent increase in adoption leads to an incremental increase of 0.002–0.005 per cent in GDP. The incremental effect of hybrid fibre broadband adoption over basic broadband is slightly lower (0.002–0.003%). Our cost‐benefit analysis implies that policy intervention – as foreseen by the European Commission – is only justified for coverage and adoption levels of around 50 per cent, whereas for a 100 per cent coverage level net losses are likely.

The literature on the effects of telecommunications infrastructure investments find positive macroeconomic effects, however, it is severely constrained because it could hitherto only analyze investment up to "basic" broadband but not up to the newer generations of "fast" and "ultra-fast" broadband; in particular there is no such evidence available at the EU level so far. Utilizing a comprehensive panel dataset of EU27 member states for the period from 2003-2015, we estimate a small but significant effect of fiber-based ultra-fast broadband over and above the effects of basic broadband on GDP. Adoption of hybrid-fiber fast broadband is incrementally to basic broadband insignificant. Our cost-benefit analysis implies that policy intervention - as foreseen by the European Commission in its public policy targets - is only justified for coverage and adoption levels of around 50% of fast or ultra-fast broadband, whereas for 100% coverage levels we find net losses to society. Thus, it appears that - for the time being and according to the policy principle of "technological neutrality" - a combination of basic broadband, fast and ultra-fast broadband entails the largest economic net benefits to society.

The literature on the effects of telecommunications infrastructure investments find positive macroeconomic effects, however, it is severely constrained because it could hitherto only analyze investment up to "basic" broadband but not up to the newer generations of "fast" and "ultra-fast" broadband; in particular there is no such evidence available at the EU level so far. Utilizing a comprehensive panel dataset of EU27 member states for the period from 2003-2015, we estimate a small but significant effect of fiber-based ultra-fast broadband over and above the effects of basic broadband on GDP. Adoption of hybrid-fiber fast broadband is incrementally to basic broadband insignificant. Our cost-benefit analysis implies that policy intervention – as foreseen by the European Commission in its public policy targets – is only justified for coverage and adoption levels of around 50% of fast or ultra-fast broadband, whereas for 100% coverage levels we find net losses to society. Thus, it appears that – for the time being and according to the policy principle of "technological neutrality" – a combination of basic broadband, fast and ultra-fast broadband entails the largest economic net benefits to society.

To estimate demand for labor, we use a combination of detailed employment data and the outcomes of procurement auctions, and compare the employment of the winner of an auction with the employment of the second ranked firm (i.e. the runner-up firm). Assuming similar ex-ante winning probabilities for both firms, we may view winning an auction as an exogenous shock to a firm's production and its demand for labor. We utilize daily data from almost 900 construction firms and about 3,000 auctions in Austria in the time period 2006 until 2009. Our main results show that the winning firm significantly increases labor demand in the weeks following an auction but only in the years before the recent economic crisis. It employs about 80 workers more after the auction than the runner-up firm. Most of the adjustment takes place within one month after the demand shock. Winners predominantly fire fewer workers after winning than runner-up firms. In the crisis, however, firms do not employ more workers than their competitors after winning an auction. We discuss explanations like labor hoarding and productivity improvements induced by the crisis as well discuss implications for fiscal and stimulus policy in the crisis.

To estimate demand for labor, we use a combination of detailed employment data and the outcomes of procurement auctions, and compare the employment of the winner of an auction with the employment of the second ranked firm (i.e. the runner-up firm). Assuming similar ex-ante winning probabilities for both firms, we may view winning an auction as an exogenous shock to a firm's production and its demand for labor. We utilize daily data from almost 900 construction firms and about 3,000 auctions in Austria in the time period 2006 until 2009. Our main results show that the winning firm significantly increases labor demand in the weeks following an auction but only in the years before the recent economic crisis. It employs about 80 workers more after the auction than the runner-up firm. Most of the adjustment takes place within one month after the demand shock. Winners predominantly fire fewer workers after winning than runner-up firms. In the crisis, however, firms do not employ more workers than their competitors after winning an auction. We discuss explanations like labor hoarding and productivity improvements induced by the crisis as well discuss implications for fiscal and stimulus policy in the crisis.