Suchergebnisse

John Hajnal's influential neo-Malthusian model of nuptiality in historical northwestern Europe makes economic conditions the regulator of the age at marriage and the proportion marrying, and so is in principle an economic theory of marriage. Yet because it over-simplifies the economic consequences of marriage for young adults, Hajnal's model cannot account for important differences in the incentive to marry implied by different economic and social environments. An alternative, non-Malthusian view of Ireland's nuptiality history suggests the need to integrate decisions by young adults about marriage into a broader appreciation of the consequences of marriage and permanent celibacy in concrete economic and social environments.

Economists have reported results based on populations for every country in the world for the past two thousand years. The source, McEvedy and Jones' Atlas of World Population History, includes many estimates that are little more than guesses and that do not reflect research since 1978. McEvedy and Jones often infer population sizes from their view of a particular economy, making their estimates poor proxies for economic growth. Their rounding means their measurement error is not "classical." Some economists augment that error by disaggregating regions in unfounded ways. Econometric results that rest on McEvedy and Jones are unreliable."… we haven't just pulled the figures out of the sky. Well, not often."—McEvedy and Jones (1978, p. 11)

Abstract
The first modern German cooperatives began operations in the 1840s and faced, among other challenges, unfriendly legal rules. In Prussia, cooperatives experienced official harassment as allies of the then-oppositional Liberals. More importantly, cooperatives lacked the right to act as bodies, forcing them to engage in expensive legal workarounds for simple tasks such as contracting debts. The first German cooperatives law, Prussia's 1867 Act, made clear the cooperatives had a right to exist and gave them the right to act as entities. Further development in the cooperative movement exposed flaws in the original act. The 1889 (Reich) Cooperatives Act legalized some organizational differences in the newer, rural cooperatives, and introduced compulsory external audits for cooperatives. Most famously, the 1889 Act first allowed cooperatives with limited liability, a step that made German cooperatives more similar to those elsewhere in Europe. The historical literature on cooperatives has neglected two important parts of this story: problems with the way unlimited liability operated under the 1867 Act, and the close connection between cooperative and company law.