Noncooperative Collusion in Durable Goods Oligopoly
In: The Rand journal of economics, Band 18, Heft 2, S. 248
ISSN: 1756-2171
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In: The Rand journal of economics, Band 18, Heft 2, S. 248
ISSN: 1756-2171
In: American economic review, Band 100, Heft 4, S. 1616-1641
ISSN: 1944-7981
Two parties choose redistricting plans to maximize their probability of winning a majority in the House of Representatives. In the unique equilibrium, parties maximally segregate their opponents' supporters but pool their own supporters into uniform districts. Ceteris paribus, the stronger party segregates more than the weaker one, and the election outcome is biased in the stronger party's favor and against the party whose supporters are easier to identify. We incorporate policy choice into our redistricting game and find that when one party controls redistricting, the equilibrium policy is biased towards the preferences of the redistricting party's supporters. (JEL C72, D72)
In: American economic review, Band 97, Heft 2, S. 471-476
ISSN: 1944-7981
In: Journal of political economy, Band 103, Heft 5, S. 1039-1066
ISSN: 1537-534X
In: Journal of political economy, Band 103, Heft 5, S. 1039
ISSN: 0022-3808
In: Journal of political economy
ISSN: 1537-534X
In: American economic review, Band 107, Heft 1, S. 109-137
ISSN: 1944-7981
We introduce a notion of coarse competitive equilibrium, to study agents' inability to tailor their consumption to prices. Our goal is to incorporate limited cognitive ability (in particular limited attention, memory, and complexity) into the analysis of competitive equilibrium. Compared to standard competitive equilibrium, our concept yields more extreme prices and, when all agents have the same endowment, riskier allocations. We provide a tractable model suitable for general equilibrium analysis as well as asset pricing. (JEL D11, D51, D91, G10)
In: Journal of political economy, Band 108, Heft 3, S. 531-568
ISSN: 1537-534X
In: Journal of political economy, Band 108, Heft 3, S. 531
ISSN: 0022-3808
In: Journal of political economy microeconomics
ISSN: 2832-9368
In: British journal of political science, Band 42, Heft 3, S. 511-537
ISSN: 0007-1234